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First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5

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Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5

#81

Post by lugu »

lowdude wrote: post #79
shpx wrote: post #75

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Maybe it's physically impossible to build a theoretically secure system, just as it's (presumably) impossible to have a cell that isn't susceptible to any virus. Maybe this whole time we've been getting away with a type of security by obscurity, where the obscurity is just no one having the time and focus to actually analyze the code.

I would rather claim that building a theoretically secure system is prohibitively expensive. At the end of the day, Mythos et al. are just better tools for finding vulnerabilities that will eventually be available to both offensive and defensive actors. If you imagine you had a vulnerability scanner as fast and convenient as a linter, it would be much cheaper to write secure code right away. Probably not perfectly se…

I would find it funny if one day we found it irresponsable to write hand generated production code. Just like it would be irresponsable to build a significan building without running numerical simulations.

Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5

#82

Post by ruszki »

alwillis wrote: post #73
runlevel1 wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The world is so not ready for the impact of LLMs on security issues. I agree, but it's the people I'm worried about. I'm hearing anecdotes from all over about devs pushing LLM-generated code changes into production without retaining any knowledge of what it is they're pushing. The changes compound, their understanding of the codebase diminishes, and so the actions become risker. What's worse is a lot of this behavi…

> I'm hearing anecdotes from all over about devs pushing LLM-generated code changes into production without retaining any knowledge of what it is they're pushing. The changes compound, their understanding of the codebase diminishes, and so the actions become riskier. I don’t think so. An LLM can produce higher-quality documentation than most humans. If it's not already happening, when a new developer joins a team, th…

> An LLM can produce higher-quality documentation than most humans.

Can bears some heavy weight.

LLM generated documentation has so low level of information density, that it’s useless. Yes, it writes nice sentences… or even writes. But it contains so much noise that currently, reading code is a better documentation than what I’ve seen from every single LLM generated documentation.

The same with LLM generated articles. I close them after the second sentence because at least about 90% of it is useless filler.

Now compare that to this: https://slate.com/technology/2004/11/the-death-of-the-last-m...

I almost closed it when I read the first few sentences because these kinds of articles are useless time wasting nonsenses. But this was different. This was old. Most sentences contained something new. Something worthy. (Of course, people also write unnecessary long articles… looking at you Atlantic)

You can throw out almost everything by volume from LLM generated documentation without loosing any information.

Currently, if I smell (and it’s very easy to smell) LLM generated documentation or article, then I close it immediately, because it’s good for only one thing: wasting my time, for no good reason.

Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5

#83

Post by andai »

So like ... I thought Mythos was just a bunch of hype? Or maybe the researchers are having their skills boosted due to using a model with such a cool name?

I jest, but I did notice having more confidence to take on more ambitious work lately. We're all centaurs now.

Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5

#84

Post by saagarjha »

nvr219 wrote: post #25
iqihs wrote: post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

you're assuming that blue teams and engineers are sitting around twiddling their thumbs

Most companies in the world do not have “blue teams”. They barely have any kind of security employee.

Apple definitely does.

Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5

#85

Post by saagarjha »

Veserv wrote: post #43
nvr219 wrote: post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Most companies in the world do not have “blue teams”. They barely have any kind of security employee.

That is actually unfair. Most companys spend enormous amounts on security with vast armys of security employees. Not that it is effective, but it is not for lack of resources or trying. I mean we are literally in a thread about how the 4 trillion dollar company, literally the 3rd most valuable company in the world, with a core competency in software has, yet again, released a core product riddled with security defect…

Maybe they should've been as productive as the guys down in Santa Barbara.

Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5

#86

Post by saagarjha »

JacobKfromIRC wrote: post #78
shpx wrote: post #75

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Maybe it's physically impossible to build a theoretically secure system, just as it's (presumably) impossible to have a cell that isn't susceptible to any virus. Maybe this whole time we've been getting away with a type of security by obscurity, where the obscurity is just no one having the time and focus to actually analyze the code.

Suppose the following: 1. Any given system has a finite number of findable vulnerabilities. 2. All findable vulnerabilities are fixable (if not in software then with a new hardware revision). 3. Fixing a vulnerability while keeping the same intended functionality introduces on average less than 1 other findable vulnerability. 4. It is possible to cease adding new features to a system and from that point forward only…

Systems generally evolve to add vulnerabilities.

Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5

#87

Post by concinds »

Veserv wrote: post #43
nvr219 wrote: post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Most companies in the world do not have “blue teams”. They barely have any kind of security employee.

That is actually unfair. Most companys spend enormous amounts on security with vast armys of security employees. Not that it is effective, but it is not for lack of resources or trying. I mean we are literally in a thread about how the 4 trillion dollar company, literally the 3rd most valuable company in the world, with a core competency in software has, yet again, released a core product riddled with security defect…

> Most companys spend enormous amounts on security with vast armys of security employees

This is true in America in many industries now, but most of the rest of the world (even the rest of the OECD) is still far behind.

Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5

#88

Post by 0xdcbd1cffe9 »

JacobKfromIRC wrote: post #78
shpx wrote: post #75

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Maybe it's physically impossible to build a theoretically secure system, just as it's (presumably) impossible to have a cell that isn't susceptible to any virus. Maybe this whole time we've been getting away with a type of security by obscurity, where the obscurity is just no one having the time and focus to actually analyze the code.

Suppose the following: 1. Any given system has a finite number of findable vulnerabilities. 2. All findable vulnerabilities are fixable (if not in software then with a new hardware revision). 3. Fixing a vulnerability while keeping the same intended functionality introduces on average less than 1 other findable vulnerability. 4. It is possible to cease adding new features to a system and from that point forward only…

[dead]

Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5

#90

Post by dgellow »

saghm wrote: post #65
dgellow wrote: post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not at all. I’m considering that the amount of vulnerable software in the wild is very, very large, with most organizations not managing their systems properly. Imagine all the small to medium size companies that do not have budgets for a dedicated, talented security team. And all the software that will never be patched. We are at the beginning of the exponential

> I’m considering that the amount of vulnerable software in the wild is very, very large I'd imagine this set is very similar to just "the set of software on the world". Even before the AI stuff, it was a pretty good bet at any given software had some vulnerability; it was just a question of how easy to was to find it.

Yes, that’s my point. Look at how fast the Calif team tackled that macOS issue. Against the top company in the world. One week from bug to exploit. In 2-5 years things will be really wild for everybody out there. We released a technology that make it possible to design extremely complex exploits at a scale we never had to face before. What does that mean if you’re not the top company? Things will be really bad
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