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Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

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Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#81
post #69
post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So, to play Pandora, what if the net effect of uncovering all these unknown attack vectors is it actually empties the holsters of every national intelligence service around the world? Just an idea I have been playing with. Say it basically cleans up everything and everyone looking for exploits has to start from scratch except “scratch” is now a place where any useful piece of software has been fuzz tested, property t…

TBH this is a pretty good way of looking at it. Yeah we're seeing an explosion of vulnerabilities being found right now, but that (hopefully) means those vulnerabilities are all being cleaned up and we're entering a more hardened era of software. Minus the software packages that are being intentionally put out as exploits, of course. Maybe some might say it's too optimistic and naive, but I think you have a good poin…

New code will also use these tools from the get go, hopefully vastly reducing the vulnerabilities that make it to prod to begin with.

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#82
post #65

This was always a nightmare waiting to happen. The sheer mass of packages and the consequent vast attack surface for supply chain attacks was always a problem that was eventually going to blow up in everyone's face. But it was too convenient. Anyone warning about it or trying to limit the damage was shouted down by people who had no experience of any other way of doing things. "import antigravity" is just too easy to…

So, to play Pandora, what if the net effect of uncovering all these unknown attack vectors is it actually empties the holsters of every national intelligence service around the world? Just an idea I have been playing with. Say it basically cleans up everything and everyone looking for exploits has to start from scratch except “scratch” is now a place where any useful piece of software has been fuzz tested, property t…

This assumes that there are no new exploits being generated.

We're seeing maintainers retreat from maintaining because the amount of AI slop being pushed at them is too much. How many are just going to hand over the maintenance burden to someone else, and how many of those new maintainers are going to be evil?

The essential problem is that our entire system of developing civilisation-critical software depends on the goodwill of a limited set of people to work for free and publish their work for everyone else to use. This was never sustainable, or even sensible, but because it was easy we based everything on it.

We need to solve the underlying problem: how to sustainably develop and maintain the software we need.

A large part of this is going to have to be: companies that use software to generate profits paying part of those profits towards the development and maintenance of that software. It just can't work any other way. How we do this is an open question that I have no answers for.

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#83
post #65

This was always a nightmare waiting to happen. The sheer mass of packages and the consequent vast attack surface for supply chain attacks was always a problem that was eventually going to blow up in everyone's face. But it was too convenient. Anyone warning about it or trying to limit the damage was shouted down by people who had no experience of any other way of doing things. "import antigravity" is just too easy to…

So, to play Pandora, what if the net effect of uncovering all these unknown attack vectors is it actually empties the holsters of every national intelligence service around the world? Just an idea I have been playing with. Say it basically cleans up everything and everyone looking for exploits has to start from scratch except “scratch” is now a place where any useful piece of software has been fuzz tested, property t…

Will need those animal bones if all the industrial control systems get turned against us

Nuclear might be airgapped but what about water, power…?

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#84
post #53

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think the author was suggesting "wait a week" as a one-time wait for fixes to be written and patches distributed for these specific prematurely-disclosed vulnerabilities, not an on-going suggestion for delaying all updates. But otherwise I agree with you.

Yep, that was my intent.

Oh! Not GP but skimmed too quickly

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#85

Earlier quoted context omitted.

this, this is something I don't understand there are a billion ways to gain root once you control the user that regulary uses sudo. this is only scary for rootless containers as it skips an isolation layer, but we've started shipping distroless containers which are not vulnerable to this due to the fact that they lack priviledge escalation commands such as su or sudo. never trust software to begin with, sandbox every…

> this, this is something I don't understand there are a billion ways to gain root once you control the user that regulary uses sudo. I won't enter into all the details but... It's totally possible to not have the sudo command (or similar) on a system at all and to have su with the setuid bit off. On my main desktop there's no sudo command there are zero binaries with the setuid bit set. The only way to get root invo…

Would you mind sharing the relevant config?

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#86
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

More a case for something like this from Show HN three months ago https://github.com/artifact-keeper An artifact manager. Only get what you approve. So you can get fast updates when needed and consistently known stable when you need it. Does need a little config override - easy work. I had my own janky tooling for something like it. This is a good project.

Does that really scale well? Thanks to cascading dependencies, even a medium sized project can import hundreds of dependencies. Can a developer really review them all to figure out if they are safe and that there's not security fix that was fixed in a newer version of the package?

[deleted]

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#87

"Wait a week to install software" does not work. Just a few months ago a massive exploit hit the web, which was a timed attack which sat for more than a month before executing. If everyone starts waiting a week, their exploits will wait 2 weeks. Cyber criminals do not need to exploit you immediately, they just need to exploit you. (It also doesn't change a large range of vuln classes like typosquatting)

A popular package has more exposure. When the artefact is published, the entire world can see it. Hopefully some people check the diff between versions. But without any delays then you could be hit by exploits nobody has seen yet.

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#88
post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

if you don't already consider responsible disclosure a quaint idea, you may want to grow warm on it the idea that it exists at all is more or less a gentleman's agreement in the engineering world anyway

[flagged]

but there is punctuation: there's one comma and two apostrophes! everything we need to comprehend, nothing more

correctly using those tells me it was a stylistic choice not to use capital letters and omit the periods.

fwiw the HN guidelines say more about not posting "shallow dismissals", not complaining about "tangential annoyances" and being "kind, not snarky" than about grammar and punctuation: https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#89
post #19
post #16

There's already an okay solution to supply-chain attacks against dependency managers like npm, PyPI, and Cargo: set them to only install package versions that are more than a few days old. The recent high-profile attacks were all caught and rolled back within a day, so doing this would have let you safely avoid the attacks. It really should be the default behavior. Let self-selected beta testers and security scanner…

So you get security updates late too? Many vulnerabilities are in the wild for years before being noticed, and patched. Once noticed, that's where the exploit explosion erupts, excited exploiters everywhere, emboldened... enticed... excessively encouraged, by your delayed updates.

You could still have security bumps happening (like dependabot).

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#90

Alternatively, switch to an operating system like FreeBSD which doesn't take a YOLO approach to security. Security fixes don't just get tossed into the FreeBSD kernel without coordination; they go through the FreeBSD security team and we have binary updates (via FreeBSD Update, and via pkgbase for 15.0-RELEASE) published within a couple minutes of the patches hitting the src tree. (Roughly speaking, a few seconds for…

FreeBSD didn’t have user land ASLR until 2019 and, amongst other mitigations, still doesn’t have kASLR. It’s not a serious operating system for people who care about security. If you want FreeBSD and security take Shawn Webb’s HardenedBSD.

Is there anywhere that provides a good overview of the various OS protection technologies/approaches that exist and which OSes have implemented them?
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