Earlier quoted context omitted.
Honestly what I really want is the latter (mutable references), but pointing to aliases that I own and update manually (the former).
So, fork the action repository and pull from upstream at your own pace?
So JFrog
Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
81–90 of 97 posts
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#82Earlier quoted context omitted.
The sandbox will need internet access (to update data) and you will need to send code to test into it; so compromise already equals leaking all your code, without even breaking the sandboxing
You only need internet access to grab the image, I don't think trivy requires internet access itself. All of my image scanning tools run in isolation.
It needs internet access for upgrading the check bundle and for full Java library resolution (pom.xml). See e.g. https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/discussions/9698
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#83Friendly reminder that just because someone is building security software it doesn't mean they are competent and won't cause more harm than good. Every month the security team wants me to give full code or cloud access to some new scanner they want to trial. They love the fancy dashboards and lengthy reports but if I allowed just 10% of what they wanted we would be pwned on the regular...
From having worked at and consulted with security software producing companies as well as security software consuming ones, I would say the security companies are worse than average at security.
And their security teams more cynical.
Sometimes they deliberately hire lower aptitude candidates to run internal security to prevent them from getting distracted by the product.
In other cases they are getting high on their own supply, more or less.
Jack Welch style management seems to take a deeper toll in this sector.
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#84You're supposed to scan for vulnerabilities, not become one!
a security scanner that cant secure its own credentials. at this point the irony writes itself
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#85Friendly reminder that just because someone is building security software it doesn't mean they are competent and won't cause more harm than good. Every month the security team wants me to give full code or cloud access to some new scanner they want to trial. They love the fancy dashboards and lengthy reports but if I allowed just 10% of what they wanted we would be pwned on the regular...
From having worked at and consulted with security software producing companies as well as security software consuming ones, I would say the security companies are worse than average at security. And their security teams more cynical. Sometimes they deliberately hire lower aptitude candidates to run internal security to prevent them from getting distracted by the product. In other cases they are getting high on their…
It doesn't help that a lot of security software is pretty niche. It's unreasonable to expect most candidates to know it or have experience.
In one case I was one of exactly two people out of 500 that had used the product as a paying customer. Neither of us was in management.
After a year or two the CISO drifted over and asked me to show him how to use the product, but he was more interested in soundbytes than actually using the system.
It became a powerpoint exercise and I collected my attaboy.
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#86Earlier quoted context omitted.
You only need internet access to grab the image, I don't think trivy requires internet access itself. All of my image scanning tools run in isolation.
It needs internet access for upgrading the check bundle and for full Java library resolution (pom.xml). See e.g. https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/discussions/9698
Nice, thanks! Yeah, so exfil is definitely still a thing to watch out for, even if you run in an unprivileged env.
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#87[flagged]
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#88[dead]
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#89[flagged]
People should really just move away from pip/requirements.txt and move to poetry or uv. They tend to solve this problem more elegantly and through their normal default workflows.
Re: Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets
#90Earlier quoted context omitted.
I audited Trivy's GitHub Actions a while back and found some worrying things, the most worrying bit was in the setup-trivy Action where it was doing a clone of main of the trivy repo and executing a shell script in there. There was no ref pinning until somebody raised a PR a few months ago. So a security company gave themselves arbitrary code execution in everyone's CI workflows. Aqua were breached earlier this month…
The ref pinning part is almost worse than no pinning. You can pin the action itself to a commit SHA, sure. But half the actions out there clone other repos, curl binaries, or run install scripts internally. Basically none of that is covered by your pin. You're trusting that the action author didn't stick a `curl | bash` somewhere in their own infra. Audited our CI a few months back and found two actions doing exactly…
In this case I'm talking about what the Action did internally. The git clone inside was not pinned, but is now.