Read the original papers on them.
http://li.mit.edu/Stuff/CNSE/Paper/Hanson90.pdf
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Read the original papers on them.
http://li.mit.edu/Stuff/CNSE/Paper/Hanson90.pdf
Making insider/true expert information public more quickly in the form of influencing prices in a toy market is THE ENTIRE POINT of prediction markets. Read the original papers on them. http://li.mit.edu/Stuff/CNSE/Paper/Hanson90.pdf https://www.jstor.org/stable/3216893 https://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/insiderbet.pdf
Making insider/true expert information public more quickly in the form of influencing prices in a toy market is THE ENTIRE POINT of prediction markets. Read the original papers on them. http://li.mit.edu/Stuff/CNSE/Paper/Hanson90.pdf https://www.jstor.org/stable/3216893 https://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/insiderbet.pdf
Both should face consequences but only one will.
Unfortunately, it's not just elected officials that are problematic for prediction markets. The Secretary of War, for instance is not an elected official nor are leaders of the armed forces and there is definitely a prediction market for war. Multiply this by every powerful appointee and every career bureaucrat and see what kind of picture that paints.
It's also low-ranking members of the armed forces that have a lot more information than you'd expect. If you just banned the high ranking members from prediction markets, I actually don't think very much would change. (There would just be slightly more delay.)
Making insider/true expert information public more quickly in the form of influencing prices in a toy market is THE ENTIRE POINT of prediction markets. Read the original papers on them. http://li.mit.edu/Stuff/CNSE/Paper/Hanson90.pdf https://www.jstor.org/stable/3216893 https://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/insiderbet.pdf
It also creates weird incentives. If I want to pay a politician to do something, bribing them would generally be illegal. But what if I instead bet lots of money that they won't do it?
Unfortunately, it's not just elected officials that are problematic for prediction markets. The Secretary of War, for instance is not an elected official nor are leaders of the armed forces and there is definitely a prediction market for war. Multiply this by every powerful appointee and every career bureaucrat and see what kind of picture that paints.
There's no such position. You may be referring to the Secretary of Defense.
The prediction market trend will "work itself out". It will become common knowledge that these platforms are exploited by insiders so people "trust" apparent flagged insider bets, so people will try to piggyback insiders, then it will be revealed that a sophisticated party with infinitely deep pockets burns massive amounts of cash to manipulate odds and these piggybackers will be burned badly, so in the end classical…
Unfortunately, it's not just elected officials that are problematic for prediction markets. The Secretary of War, for instance is not an elected official nor are leaders of the armed forces and there is definitely a prediction market for war. Multiply this by every powerful appointee and every career bureaucrat and see what kind of picture that paints.
> The Secretary of War There's no such position. You may be referring to the Secretary of Defense.
Unfortunately, it's not just elected officials that are problematic for prediction markets. The Secretary of War, for instance is not an elected official nor are leaders of the armed forces and there is definitely a prediction market for war. Multiply this by every powerful appointee and every career bureaucrat and see what kind of picture that paints.
This machine kills hope.