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Stop Hacklore – An Open Letter

hacklore.org

81–90 of 115 posts

Re: Stop Hacklore – An Open Letter

#81

So, since this seems to be relevant im a CISO myself. And i would definitely not agree with everything in this letter. Personally, i think the worst part about it is handling a low probability as something that's not gonne happen. Thats, especially in IT-Sec, one of the worst practices. To take on point as example - the "never scan public QR codes". Apart from the fact that there have been enaugh exploits in the past…

"Never scan public QR codes" is functionally equivalent to "never type in a URL and never click on a link". Other than the smallish scan-specific attack surface that you mention and then largely dismiss, there's nothing that makes QR codes more dangerous than any other way of delivering links.

It's somewhere between impractical and impossible to evaluate a URL and know anything about its "safety". So if you can't make your Web browser impervious enough to tolerate basically any crap a server may send back to your satisfaction, then your only answer is a total walled garden.

Re: Stop Hacklore – An Open Letter

#82
post #8

Note that most of the signers are from companies which collect substantial consumer information for revenue purposes. Hence the emphasis on "updating". And the absence of "turn up browser security levels to max" or "get a good ad blocker". Also, any password manager that's "cloud based" is potentially a security hole. Yeah, they say the server is secure. Right.

> Also, any password manager that's "cloud based" is potentially a security hole. Yeah, they say the server is secure. Right. You think of someone stealing your password vault and cracking AES? The vault is E2EE.

Yeah - but where does the code doing the encryption/decryption come from? 1Password serves me the Javascript that encrypts/decrypts my vault every time I open my work 1PW webapp.

It's not reasonable to assume their server is "secure" not just from evil-hakzors and script kiddies, but also from government agencies with things like Technical Capability Notices and secret FISA warrants and NSLs with gag orders (or whatever their jurisdictional equivalents are), and also from threats like offensive cybersecurity firms with clients like disgruntled royalty in nepotistic moncharcy nations states who send bonesaw murder teams after dissident journalists.

I (mostly) trust AES (assuming it's properly implemented, and I exclude the NSA from that, and the equivalent agencies in at least a handful of other major nation states).

I have a lot less trust in owners and executives at my password vault vendor or their cloud hosting company or their software supply chain. If I were them, I'm pretty sure I wouldn't be able to stick up for my users the way Ladar Levison and Lavabit did. There's no doubt that the right federal agency could apply enough pressure on me and my family/friends to make me give up all my users unencrypted vaults. Sorry, but true.

Re: Stop Hacklore – An Open Letter

#83
post #8

Note that most of the signers are from companies which collect substantial consumer information for revenue purposes. Hence the emphasis on "updating". And the absence of "turn up browser security levels to max" or "get a good ad blocker". Also, any password manager that's "cloud based" is potentially a security hole. Yeah, they say the server is secure. Right.

Max browser security levels and a good ad-blocker will not prevent you from getting phished or hacked more than an encryption-audited cloud-based zero-knowledge vault, where server compromise is irrelevant. All competent #1 cloud-based password managers are like that.

Phish resistant MFA is worth mentioning. You and all your staff with access to critical credentials should have something like YubiKeys, so you can't (as easily) get tricked into entering some TOTP (or email/sms) code into a fraudulent website.

At least that ups the threshold to "someone who can not only poison your dns or MITM your network, but can also generate trusted TLS certs for the website domain they're phishing for".

Re: Stop Hacklore – An Open Letter

#84
post #8

Note that most of the signers are from companies which collect substantial consumer information for revenue purposes. Hence the emphasis on "updating". And the absence of "turn up browser security levels to max" or "get a good ad blocker". Also, any password manager that's "cloud based" is potentially a security hole. Yeah, they say the server is secure. Right.

Max browser security levels and a good ad-blocker will not prevent you from getting phished or hacked more than an encryption-audited cloud-based zero-knowledge vault, where server compromise is irrelevant. All competent #1 cloud-based password managers are like that.

> All competent #1 cloud-based password managers are like that.

If you say so...

Sadly there could potentially also be a supply chain attack that happens to make its way into the client you use to view your supposedly secure vault. Odds are they use npm, btw.

Re: Stop Hacklore – An Open Letter

#85
I don't really like the name. When you say 'Hacklore' I think of the hackers at MIT and such. That stuff is really cool and shouldn't be stopped or suppressed!

But the message, absolutely on board with it.

Re: Stop Hacklore – An Open Letter

#87
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Accurate? Lets take the Wifi (Other users already commented the other ones). Open a wifi access point with the name of the restaurant, intercept the DNS requests and serve your filtered stuff. PS: If the text is real and not trolling, the keyword in the text is 'rarely happen', which we could apply to car seatbelts then.

Then what? The user presumably sees TLS certificate warnings since you don't have valid certicates. HSTS would prevent downgrades to plain HTTP and is pretty common on sensitive websites. Isn't the better advice to avoid clicking through certificate warnings? That applies both on and off open wifi networks. There is a privacy concern, as DNS queries would leak. Enabling strict DoH helps (which is not the default brow…

I am afraid that it is not only about privacy (that they recommend ignoring), there are many options to chose, like CA vectors, lets say TrustCor (2022), e-Tugra (2023), Entrust (2024), Packet injection vectors, or Click here or use your login first vectors as you commented, bugs and configurations.

This ones known. Therefore I just cannot believe that those who wrote the open letter did not even though about such significant events from the past year, I remark the past year, or even on zero-days.

We are talking about people connecting to an unknown unsupervised network, that we do not know what new vulnerabilities will be published on main stream also, and the ones of the open letter know it because they are hiding behind the excuse of "rarely".

Re: Stop Hacklore – An Open Letter

#88

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Updating software is good advice. Do you realize how many CVEs are reported on a daily basis? Once you've got a password manager you're largely protected against phishing, so the biggest target becomes your computer, and the most likely way to compromise that would be through outdated software with public vulnerabilities. What do you expect your browser security levels to the max to do? Browsers are designed to be se…

Almost all CVEs are basically irrelevant to everyone that doesn't have some obligation to keep on top of patching them. Meanwhile, auto-updates are RCE by default.

Indeed. I'm far more worried about picking up a supply-chain hack via updates than I am that some low-profile denial-of-service attack will actually affect me; the updates themselves historically have caused me far more actual denials of service than they fix.

Re: Stop Hacklore – An Open Letter

#89
post #77
post #24

I have two more to add to the list: > Secret questions No, my mother's maiden name is not a secret. And some questions like "who was your best friend in elementary school?" might have different answers depending on when you ask me. Plus, unless my best friend's name was Jose Pawel Mustafa Mungabi de la Svenson-Kurosawaskiwitz (we used to call him Joe) it's pretty easy to guess with a dictionary attack. The only way t…

There seems to be an easy solution: use a password manager and save the answer to the question as an additional password. (This is actually a FR to any password manager's product team: it's time to treat things like 2FA recovery code and secret question answers as first class citizen in your product).

Exactly. My mother's maiden name is "xGj5kLm9abM16q". Which is why she no longer uses it I guess?

Re: Stop Hacklore – An Open Letter

#90
post #8

Note that most of the signers are from companies which collect substantial consumer information for revenue purposes. Hence the emphasis on "updating". And the absence of "turn up browser security levels to max" or "get a good ad blocker". Also, any password manager that's "cloud based" is potentially a security hole. Yeah, they say the server is secure. Right.

To be fair, this letter is about information security, not privacy. Maximizing privacy is a somewhat different goal, and recommendations for how to do so would differ from person to person. Some people really don't care about privacy. And for some other people, adblocker and tracking-blocker software is sufficient for their privacy needs. Whereas for certain people in certain parts of the world, literally the only wa…

Advertising is a channel for scams. So an ad blocker is also a security tool.
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