I liked the Transmeta web page from before they launched. It was just bare HTML with no styling. It said: This page is not here yet. The product hype and lack of knowledge about what it was meant that nobody knew what to expect. In these hyped expectations, and with Torvalds on board, everyone expected that everything would be different. But it wasn't. A similar product launch was the Segway, where we went from this…
https://web.archive.org/web/19970710102251/http://www.transm... Then, https://web.archive.org/web/20000229173916/http://www.transm... , when content appeared around Feb 2000. Product launch PDF from Jan 19, 2000: https://web.archive.org/web/20000815231116/http://www.transm...
What happened to Transmeta, the last big dotcom IPO
81–90 of 156 posts
Re: What happened to Transmeta, the last big dotcom IPO
#82Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's kind of the bet they made, but misses a key point. Their fundamental idea was that by having simpler CPUs, they could iterate on Moore's law more quickly. And eventually they would win on performance. Not just on a few speculative edge cases, but overall. The dynamic compilation was needed to be able to run existing software on it. The first iterations, of course, would be slower. And so their initial market,…
I don't know if the bet was even particularly wrong. If they had done a little better job on performance, capitalized on the pains of Netburst + AMD64 transition, and survived long enough to do integrated 3D graphics and native libraries for Javascript + media decoding it might have worked out fine. That alternate universe might have involved a merger with Imagination when the Kyro was doing poorly and the company ha…
One key factor against them, though, is that they were facing a company whose long-term CEO had written Only The Paranoid Survive. At that point he had moved from being the CEO to the chairman of the board. But Intel had paranoia about possible existential threats baked into its DNA.
There is no question that Intel recognized Transmeta as a potential existential threat, and aggressively went after the very low-power market that Transmeta was targeting. Intel quickly created SpeedStep, allowing power consumption to dynamically scale when not under peak demand. This improved battery life on laptops using the Pentium III, without sacrificing peak performance. They went on to produce low power chips like the Pentium M that did even better on power.
Granted, Intel never managed to match the low power that Transmeta had. But they managed to limit Transmeta enough to cut off their air supply - they couldn't generate the revenue needed to invest enough to iterate as quickly as they needed to. This isn't just a story of Transmeta stumbling. This is also a story of Intel recognizing and heading off a potential threat.
Re: What happened to Transmeta, the last big dotcom IPO
#83Transmeta made a technology bet that dynamic compilation could beat OOO super scalar CPUs in SPEC. It was wrong, but it was controversial among experts at the time. I’m glad that they tried it even though it turned out to be wrong. Many of the lessons learned are documented in systems conferences and incorporated into modern designs, ie GPUs. To me transmeta is a great example of a venture investment. If it would hav…
Re: What happened to Transmeta, the last big dotcom IPO
#84Re: What happened to Transmeta, the last big dotcom IPO
#85I also looked at the TM specific flags that they documented, and was surprised to find some that hadn’t been enabled on Linux despite Linus still working there at the time. They looked to be useful for low power mode, and at that time I was looking for a carry-everywhere laptop with decent run time so I invested in those flags.
Turns out they didn’t do anything observable to the system. Power draw was unphased by flipping these toggles. I don’t believe those changes ever got merged.
But it was the Linux fuckery that convinced me I wanted a bask shell and a Unix CLI and just get shit done without having to fiddle all the time. I had better things to do. So I’ve been on apple since except for Pi, Docker, and work.
Re: What happened to Transmeta, the last big dotcom IPO
#86Transmeta made a technology bet that dynamic compilation could beat OOO super scalar CPUs in SPEC. It was wrong, but it was controversial among experts at the time. I’m glad that they tried it even though it turned out to be wrong. Many of the lessons learned are documented in systems conferences and incorporated into modern designs, ie GPUs. To me transmeta is a great example of a venture investment. If it would hav…
I was an intel cpu architect when transmeta started making claims. We were baffled by those claims. We were pushing the limit of our pipelines to get incremental gains and they were claiming to beat a dedicated arch on the fly! None of their claims made sense to ANYONE with a shred of cpu arch experience. I think your summary has rose colored lenses, or reflects the layman’s perspective.
From my perspective it was more exciting to the programming systems and compiler community than to the computer architecture community.
Re: What happened to Transmeta, the last big dotcom IPO
#87TL;DR: What happened to Transmeta was that in 2005, Transmeta shifted to licensing intellectual property rather than selling CPUs. …they became a patent troll
Thats different qualitatively and quantitatively than buying patent rights for cheap (since the even the original patent holders didn't think it was worth much) and suing random people who happen to use a product that may infringe on the patent.
Re: What happened to Transmeta, the last big dotcom IPO
#88Earlier quoted context omitted.
> That said, I don't know what the Transmeta CPUs did. Maybe they had a low-level instruction set that had all sorts of hacks to help the translation layer avoid the problems of branch destination translation. Fixed guest branches just get turned into host branches and work like normal. Indirect guest branches would get translated through a hardware jump address cache that was structured kind of like TLB tag lookups…
Thank you for sharing! > Fixed guest branches just get turned into host branches and work like normal. How does that work in case of self-modifying code, or skewed execution (where the same x86 instruction stream has two totally different interpretations based on what offset you start at)?
Self modifying code is handled with MMU traps on the writes, and invalidation of the relevant traces. It is very much a slow path though. Ideally heavy self modfying code is able to stay in the interpreter though and not thrash in and out of the compiler.
Re: What happened to Transmeta, the last big dotcom IPO
#89Transmeta made a technology bet that dynamic compilation could beat OOO super scalar CPUs in SPEC. It was wrong, but it was controversial among experts at the time. I’m glad that they tried it even though it turned out to be wrong. Many of the lessons learned are documented in systems conferences and incorporated into modern designs, ie GPUs. To me transmeta is a great example of a venture investment. If it would hav…
I was an intel cpu architect when transmeta started making claims. We were baffled by those claims. We were pushing the limit of our pipelines to get incremental gains and they were claiming to beat a dedicated arch on the fly! None of their claims made sense to ANYONE with a shred of cpu arch experience. I think your summary has rose colored lenses, or reflects the layman’s perspective.
It's worth noting that Google actually did succeed with a wildly different architecture a couple years later. They figured "Well, if CPU performance is hitting a wall - why use just one CPU? Why not put together thousands of commodity CPUs that individually are not that powerful, and then use software to distribute workloads across those CPUs?" And the obvious objection to that is "If we did that, it won't be compatible with all the products out there that depend upon x86 binary compatibility", and Google's response was the ultimate in hubris: "Well we'll just build new products then, ones that are bigger and better than the whole industry." Miraculously it worked, and made a multi-trillion-dollar company (multiple multi-trillion-dollar companies, if you now consider how AWS, Facebook, TSMC, and NVidia revenue depends upon the cloud).
Transmeta's mistake was that they didn't re-examine enough assumptions. They assumed they were building a CPU rather than an industry. If they'd backed up even farther they would've found that there actually was fertile territory there.
Re: What happened to Transmeta, the last big dotcom IPO
#90Transmeta made a technology bet that dynamic compilation could beat OOO super scalar CPUs in SPEC. It was wrong, but it was controversial among experts at the time. I’m glad that they tried it even though it turned out to be wrong. Many of the lessons learned are documented in systems conferences and incorporated into modern designs, ie GPUs. To me transmeta is a great example of a venture investment. If it would hav…
I was an intel cpu architect when transmeta started making claims. We were baffled by those claims. We were pushing the limit of our pipelines to get incremental gains and they were claiming to beat a dedicated arch on the fly! None of their claims made sense to ANYONE with a shred of cpu arch experience. I think your summary has rose colored lenses, or reflects the layman’s perspective.
I wonder if the x86 teams at Intel people were similarly baffled by that.