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AI Slop vs. OSS Security

devansh.bearblog.dev

81–90 of 124 posts

Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security

#81
post #9

> This is the fundamental problem: AI can generate the form of security research without the substance. I think this is the fundamental problem of LLMs in general. Some of the time looks just enough right to seem legitimate. Luckily the rest of the time it doesn’t.

A parallel to AI-slop has existed for generations now out here in meatspace: Administrative/legal people on the periphery of a technical field (though possibly alas, at the top of the org's command chain) who do not at all understand what technical terms signify, but having seen hundreds of sentences produced by real experts, become able to themselves string together plausible-looking assertions.

Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security

#83
post #27
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yesterday my wife burst into my office: "You used AI to generate that (podcast) episode summary, we don't sound like that!" In point of fact, I had not. After the security reporting issue, the next problem on the list is "trust in other people's writing".

I think one potential downside of using LLMs or exposing yourself to their generated content is that you may subconsciously adopt their quirks over time. Even if you aren't actively using AI for a particular task, prior exposure to their outputs could be biasing your thoughts. This has additional layers to it as well. For example, I actively avoid using em dash or anything that resembles it right now. If I had no exp…

I didn't make heavy use of it, but I did sometimes use "It's not X, it's Y" or some closely related variant. I've had to strike that from my writing, because whether or not it makes anyone else cringe, it's making me cringe now. My usage doesn't even match the ones the LLMs favor, my X & Y were typically full clauses with many words rather than the LLM's use of short, punchy X & Ys... but still. Close enough. Can't write it anymore.

I'm still using bullet lists sometimes, as they have their place, and I'm hoping LLMs don't totally nuke them.

Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security

#84
post #73
post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think one potential downside of using LLMs or exposing yourself to their generated content is that you may subconsciously adopt their quirks over time. Even if you aren't actively using AI for a particular task, prior exposure to their outputs could be biasing your thoughts. This has additional layers to it as well. For example, I actively avoid using em dash or anything that resembles it right now. If I had no exp…

Isn't the alternative far more likely? These tools were trained on the way people write in certain settings, which includes a lot of curated technical articles like this one, and we're seeing that echoed in their output. There's no "LLM style". There's "human style mimicked by LLMs". If they default to a specific style, then that's on the human user who chooses to go with it, or, likely, doesn't care. They could just…

There is no "LLM style".

There is a "default LLM style", which is why I call it that. Or technically, one per LLM, but they seem to have converged pretty hard since they're all convergently evolving in the same environment.

It's trivial to prompt it out of that style. Word about how to do it and that you should do it has gotten around in the academic world where the incentives to not be caught are high. So I don't call it "the LLM style". But if you don't prompt for anything in particular, yes, there is a very very strong "default LLM style".

Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security

#86
post #9

> This is the fundamental problem: AI can generate the form of security research without the substance. I think this is the fundamental problem of LLMs in general. Some of the time looks just enough right to seem legitimate. Luckily the rest of the time it doesn’t.

It's also a fundamental problem of security research. Lot's of irrelevant, highly contextual "vulnerabilities", submitted to farm internet points (driven by a broken cve system). AI only amplifies this.

Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security

#87
post #14
post #6

> Requiring technical evidence such as screencasts showing reproducibility, integration or unit tests demonstrating the fault, or complete reproduction steps with logs and source code makes it much harder to submit slop. If this isn't already a requirement, I'm not sure I understand what even non-AI-generated reports look like. Isn't the bare-minimum of CVE reporting a minimally reproducible example? Like, even if yo…

As someone who worked on the recieving end of security reports, often not. They can be surprisingly poorly written. You sort of want to reject them all, but ocassionally a gem gets submitted which makes you reluctant. For example, years ago i was responsible for triaging bug bounty reports at a SaaS company i worked at at the time. One of the most interesting reports was that someone found a way to bypass our oauth t…

I do not understand. If auth is bypassable, this is not a browser issue, right?

Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security

#89
I agree with a lot of things said in this article, I also think some sort of centralized trust system for OSS bug bounty would be a really good solution to this problem

> The downside is that it makes it harder for new researchers to enter the field, and it risks creating an insider club.

I also think this concern can be largely mitigated or reduced to a nonissue. New researchers would have a trust score of zero for example, but people who consistently submit AI slop will have a very low score and can be filtered out fairly easily.

Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security

#90
post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can tell it who's style to copy, it's actually decent at following instructions like that.

It's not bad at following my own style. I have longstanding quirks like naming any string that will end up in a DB query with a "q_" in front of the variable name, and shockingly Claude picks up on those and mimicks them. Wouldn't trust it to write anything without thorough review, but it's great at syntax.

this isn't shocking, they are very good at repeating patterns in the immediate context. they're just not very good at anything else. your quirk is part of the immediate pattern
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