> This is the fundamental problem: AI can generate the form of security research without the substance. I think this is the fundamental problem of LLMs in general. Some of the time looks just enough right to seem legitimate. Luckily the rest of the time it doesn’t.
AI Slop vs. OSS Security
81–90 of 124 posts
Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security
#82Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security
#83Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yesterday my wife burst into my office: "You used AI to generate that (podcast) episode summary, we don't sound like that!" In point of fact, I had not. After the security reporting issue, the next problem on the list is "trust in other people's writing".
I think one potential downside of using LLMs or exposing yourself to their generated content is that you may subconsciously adopt their quirks over time. Even if you aren't actively using AI for a particular task, prior exposure to their outputs could be biasing your thoughts. This has additional layers to it as well. For example, I actively avoid using em dash or anything that resembles it right now. If I had no exp…
I'm still using bullet lists sometimes, as they have their place, and I'm hoping LLMs don't totally nuke them.
Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security
#84Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think one potential downside of using LLMs or exposing yourself to their generated content is that you may subconsciously adopt their quirks over time. Even if you aren't actively using AI for a particular task, prior exposure to their outputs could be biasing your thoughts. This has additional layers to it as well. For example, I actively avoid using em dash or anything that resembles it right now. If I had no exp…
Isn't the alternative far more likely? These tools were trained on the way people write in certain settings, which includes a lot of curated technical articles like this one, and we're seeing that echoed in their output. There's no "LLM style". There's "human style mimicked by LLMs". If they default to a specific style, then that's on the human user who chooses to go with it, or, likely, doesn't care. They could just…
There is a "default LLM style", which is why I call it that. Or technically, one per LLM, but they seem to have converged pretty hard since they're all convergently evolving in the same environment.
It's trivial to prompt it out of that style. Word about how to do it and that you should do it has gotten around in the academic world where the incentives to not be caught are high. So I don't call it "the LLM style". But if you don't prompt for anything in particular, yes, there is a very very strong "default LLM style".
Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security
#85Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security
#86> This is the fundamental problem: AI can generate the form of security research without the substance. I think this is the fundamental problem of LLMs in general. Some of the time looks just enough right to seem legitimate. Luckily the rest of the time it doesn’t.
Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security
#87> Requiring technical evidence such as screencasts showing reproducibility, integration or unit tests demonstrating the fault, or complete reproduction steps with logs and source code makes it much harder to submit slop. If this isn't already a requirement, I'm not sure I understand what even non-AI-generated reports look like. Isn't the bare-minimum of CVE reporting a minimally reproducible example? Like, even if yo…
As someone who worked on the recieving end of security reports, often not. They can be surprisingly poorly written. You sort of want to reject them all, but ocassionally a gem gets submitted which makes you reluctant. For example, years ago i was responsible for triaging bug bounty reports at a SaaS company i worked at at the time. One of the most interesting reports was that someone found a way to bypass our oauth t…
Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security
#88So use AI to check AI reports, problem solved.
Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security
#89> The downside is that it makes it harder for new researchers to enter the field, and it risks creating an insider club.
I also think this concern can be largely mitigated or reduced to a nonissue. New researchers would have a trust score of zero for example, but people who consistently submit AI slop will have a very low score and can be filtered out fairly easily.
Re: AI Slop vs. OSS Security
#90Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can tell it who's style to copy, it's actually decent at following instructions like that.
It's not bad at following my own style. I have longstanding quirks like naming any string that will end up in a DB query with a "q_" in front of the variable name, and shockingly Claude picks up on those and mimicks them. Wouldn't trust it to write anything without thorough review, but it's great at syntax.