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What is it like to be a bat?

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Re: What is it like to be a bat?

#81

Post by biophysboy »

mtlmtlmtlmtl wrote: post #31
bondarchuk wrote: post #19

> "An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism – something that it is like for the organism." IMHO the phrasing here is essential to the argument and this phrasing contains a fundamental error. In valid usage we only say that two things are like one another when they are also separate things. The usage here (which is cleverly hidden in some tortured la…

This is the conclusion I come to whenever I try to grasp the works of Nagel, Chalmers, Goff, Searle et al. They're just linguistically chasing their own tails. There's no meaningful insight below it all. All of their arguments, however complex, all rely on poorly defined terms like "understand" "subjective experience", "what it is like", "qualia", etc. And when you try to understand the arguments with the definition…

If he were capable of describing subjective experience in words with the exactitude you're asking for, then his central argument would be false. The point is that objective measures, like writing, are external, and cannot describe internal subjective experience. Its one thing to probe the atoms; its another thing to be the atoms themselves.

Basically his answer to the question "What is it like to be a bat?" is that its impossible to know.

Re: What is it like to be a bat?

#82

Post by geye1234 »

jibal wrote: post #72
geye1234 wrote: post #43

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One big problem with physicalism is that many alleged arguments in its favor are nothing of the sort. Any argument for physicalism that refers to neurological observation is invalid. Physicalism claims that all mental events can be reduced to physical events. But you cannot look at physical events to prove this. No matter the detail in which you describe a physical event, you can't use this to prove, or even argue in…

You're making a number of unsupported assertions. There's a massive amount of literature in support of physicalism. And it's a far cry from "there's no proof of x" to "x is invalid". No metaphysical stance can be proved. > Same with physicalism: most arguments in its favor limit their method to looking at the physical, so in practice say nothing about whether this is all there is. This is simply wrong ... there are v…

> And it's a far cry from "there's no proof of x" to "x is invalid".

Oh this is undoubtedly true, and my argument was limited to the statement that the most common argument for physicalism is invalid. I was not launching an attack on physicalism itself.

> No metaphysical stance can be proved.

That's an interesting metaphysical stance, but again, I'm not trying to prove any metaphysics, just pointing out the main weakness that I see in the physicalist argument. I'm pointing out that any pro-physicalist argument that is a variant of "neuroscience says X" is invalid for the reason I gave: by limiting your scope to S, you can say nothing about anything outside S. This is true regardless of whether there is actually anything outside S, so there is no assumption in my argument that physicalism is wrong.

One argument against physicalism is that if thought or knowledge can be reduced to particles bouncing around, then there is no thought or knowledge. My knowledge that 2+2=4 is about something other than, or different from, the particles in my brain. Knowledge is about the content of the mind, which is different from the associated physical state of the brain. If content is neurons, then content as something my mind considers doesn't exist. If my thought "2+2=4" just is a bunch of particles in my brain doing stuff, then my belief that my thought is true is not even wrong, as the saying goes: just absurd.

I'm no Cartesian dualist though -- the interaction problem is just one problem with his dualism. I think Aristotle and Aquinas basically got the picture of reality right, and their metaphysics can shed yuuuuge amounts of light on the mind-body problem but obviously that's a grossly unfashionable worldview these days :-)

Re: What is it like to be a bat?

#83

Post by glenstein »

Al-Khwarizmi wrote: post #76
bondarchuk wrote: post #19

> "An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism – something that it is like for the organism." IMHO the phrasing here is essential to the argument and this phrasing contains a fundamental error. In valid usage we only say that two things are like one another when they are also separate things. The usage here (which is cleverly hidden in some tortured la…

I believe you're falling into a purely linguistic trap. In other languages we wouldn't even use the word "like" in this kind of constructions, that's an English thing because other wordings sound awkward, but I don't think it entails comparison. In translations to Spanish, the article is titled "¿Qué se siente ser un murciélago?", literal word by word translation "What is felt being a bat?" In French, "Quel effet cel…

Wholeheartedly agree. I want to credit the GP one way, which is that the category they're identifying is real, namely of frivolous or circular comparisons. This just isn't one of those. It's a turn of phrase that's emphatic about the felt quality of qualitative experience. And in I think it's quite a good one, because in English it has just the right amount of cross-sections of connotation that it brings out this being felt quality that everyone reading it seems to understand. The idea has been around but this expression of it has gained the most traction in English.

As for whether I agree with Nagle, I find him consistently just wrong enough to be irritating in ways that I want to work out my thoughts in response to, which by some standards can be counted as a compliment. As much as I understand the turn of phrase and its ability to get people to grasp the idea, and I at least respect it for that reason, I kind of sort of always have the impression that this is what everyone meant the entire time and wouldn't have thought a whole essay emphasizing the point was necessary.

Re: What is it like to be a bat?

#84

Post by cl3misch »

adityaathalye wrote: post #17
jm__87 wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

None of us have even experienced the full range of what humans can experience, so even we don't fully know what it is like to be any given person, we only know what it is like to be ourselves. It is kind of amazing when you think about it.

https://www.galactanet.com/oneoff/theegg.html Andy Weir's The Egg makes regular HackerNews appearances.

That's almost exactly the beginning of Logic's story album "Everybody" which I have listened to so often that I can almost recite it. Despite years on HN I have never seen The Egg though. That blew my mind a bit, thanks!

Re: What is it like to be a bat?

#85

Post by nomilk »

> Nagel asserts that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."

Struggling to make sense of this sentence.

Re: What is it like to be a bat?

#86

Post by dimal »

vehemenz wrote: post #58
ebb_earl_co wrote: post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What brought down your level on convinced?

When you reject the idea of reductionism, which Nagel's paper provokes us to do, then the entire idea of emergent phenomena collapses. Everything is on the same level, from fundamental particles to consciousness. Of course, some things can still be reduced and others can't, but in no situation is a phenomenon reduced in its metaphysical status. So what's the "problem" again, exactly? Consciousness doesn't need to be…

I don’t read Nagel as rejecting the idea of reductionism as strongly as you suggest. He’s simply calling out its limitations with regard to subjective experience. Why does it imply that “everything is on the same level”?

Re: What is it like to be a bat?

#87

Post by padjo »

nomilk wrote: post #85

> Nagel asserts that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism." Struggling to make sense of this sentence.

I wouldn’t bother.

Re: What is it like to be a bat?

#88

Post by PreHistoricPunk »

nomilk wrote: post #85

> Nagel asserts that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism." Struggling to make sense of this sentence.

It means that if something has conscious mental states then it must have subjective experience from its own perspective. If John has a conscious mental state, then I must be able to ask "What is it like to be John?". Hope that helps.

Re: What is it like to be a bat?

#89

Post by cwmoore »

mellosouls wrote: post #44
mtlmtlmtlmtl wrote: post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is the conclusion I come to whenever I try to grasp the works of Nagel, Chalmers, Goff, Searle et al. They're just linguistically chasing their own tails. There's no meaningful insight below it all. All of their arguments, however complex, all rely on poorly defined terms like "understand" "subjective experience", "what it is like", "qualia", etc. And when you try to understand the arguments with the definition…

All of their arguments, however complex, all rely on poorly defined terms like "understand" "subjective experience", "what it is like", "qualia", etc. Because they are trying to discuss a difficult-to-define concept - consciousness. The difficulty and nebulousness is intrinsic to the subject, especially when trying to discuss in scientific terms. To dismiss their attempts so, you have to counter with a crystal, unarg…

“The Feeling of What Happens” by Antonio D’Amasio, a book by a neuroscientist some years ago [0], does an excellent job of building a framework for conscious sensation from the parts, as I recall, constructing a theory of “mind maps” from various nervous system structures that impressed me with a sense that I could afterwards understand them.

[0] https://www.labyrinthbooks.com/the-feeling-of-what-happens/

Re: What is it like to be a bat?

#90

Post by AlexResi »

nomilk wrote: post #85

> Nagel asserts that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism." Struggling to make sense of this sentence.

An organism is conscious exactly when there is something it is like for that organism to be itself.

Or in a simpler way, consciousness is present just in case being that organism has an inner, subjective character - something that can not be reduced to a purely material state.

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