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A privacy VPN you can verify

vp.net

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Re: A privacy VPN you can verify

#81

Post by mjg59 »

can16358p wrote: post #69

Okay I don't have much information about this whole attestation flow and one question boggles my mind. If someone can explain this in simple terms, I'd be thankful: The post says build the repo and get the fingerprint, which is fine. Then it says compare it to the fingerprint that vp.net reports. My question is: how do I verify the server is reporting the fingerprint of the actual running code, and not just returning…

"Ask a VP.NET server for the fingerprint it reports" is a little bit simplistic. The process for actually doing this involves you handing the server a random number, and it sending you back a signed statement including both the fingerprint and the random number you gave it. This prevents it simply reporting a fixed fingerprint statement every time someone asks. The second aspect of this is that the key used to sign the statement has a certificate chain that ties back to Intel, and which can be proven to be associated with an SGX enclave. Assuming you trust Intel, the only way for something to use this key to sign such a statement is for it to be a true representation of what that CPU is running inside SGX at the time.

Re: A privacy VPN you can verify

#82

Post by nneonneo »

nugzbunny wrote: post #75
dguido wrote: post #70

This is cool, and I'm glad to see someone doing this, but I also feel obligated to mention that you can also just quickly deploy your own VPN server that only you have access to with AlgoVPN: https://github.com/trailofbits/algo

I’ve recently become interested in hosting my own VPN, due to the amount of websites that require me to disable my VPN when visiting their site. I imagine those websites block IP ranges of popular VPN providers. Am I right in thinking that hosting my own VPN would resolve this issue?

Yep! It’s very easy: rent any cloud server, stick a WireGuard/OpenVPN/ShadowSocks container on it, download the config, and you’re done. Since you’re not interested in compute, you can probably use the tiniest cloud server available to save costs.

I pay approximately 50¢/month for such a setup, and you can probably do it for free forever if you decide to be slightly abusive about it. However, be aware that you don’t really gain any real privacy since you’re effectively just changing your IP address; a real VPN provides privacy by mixing your traffic with that of a bunch of other clients.

Some services will also block cloud ranges to prevent e.g. geoblock evasion, although you’ll see a lot less blocking compared to a real VPN service or Tor.

Re: A privacy VPN you can verify

#84

Post by nneonneo »

aysfrm11 wrote: post #83

I have no relationship with OVPN but after watching their server deployment on YouTube I have to say I do like their approach to security / privacy. Servers that don't log and can't without hard drives, ports physically glued shut. https://www.ovpn.com/en/security

Ah, but how can you tell that you’re connecting to a server that was actually configured that way?

Answer: no you can’t, you still have to trust them. At the end of the day, you always just have to trust the provider, somewhere.

Re: A privacy VPN you can verify

#85

Post by thrown-0825 »

akimbostrawman wrote: post #71
OsrsNeedsf2P wrote: post #46

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Cryptocurrencies? Aka the least private form of transactions, where not only the sender and receiver know, but the whole block chain immutably stores for everyone else to view?

cryptocurrency != bitcoin. monero has solved this issue for almost a decade.

they just got exploited a few days ago

Re: A privacy VPN you can verify

#86

Post by mzajc »

mjg59 wrote: post #81
can16358p wrote: post #69

Okay I don't have much information about this whole attestation flow and one question boggles my mind. If someone can explain this in simple terms, I'd be thankful: The post says build the repo and get the fingerprint, which is fine. Then it says compare it to the fingerprint that vp.net reports. My question is: how do I verify the server is reporting the fingerprint of the actual running code, and not just returning…

"Ask a VP.NET server for the fingerprint it reports" is a little bit simplistic. The process for actually doing this involves you handing the server a random number, and it sending you back a signed statement including both the fingerprint and the random number you gave it. This prevents it simply reporting a fixed fingerprint statement every time someone asks. The second aspect of this is that the key used to sign t…

How do I know I'm connecting to the WireGuard instance being attested and not something else? Could the host run one attestable instance, but then have users connect to a separate, malicious one?

Re: A privacy VPN you can verify

#87

Post by 9dev »

nneonneo wrote: post #80
mjg59 wrote: post #68

I'm a huge fan of the technical basis for this. I want services to attest themselves to me so I can verify that they're running the source code I can inspect. And, well, the combination of founders here? Good fucking lord. I'm really fascinated to see whether we can generate enough trust in the code to be able to overcome the complete lack of trust that these people deserve. I can't imagine a better way to troll me o…

The SGX TCB isn’t large enough to protect the really critical part of a private VPN: the source and destination of packets. Nothing stops them from sticking a user on their own enclave and monitoring all the traffic in-and-out. Also, the README is full of AI slop buzzwords, which isn’t confidence-inspiring.

Also, it requires me to trust Intel—an American company, to not have a backdoor in the SGX. That amounts to exactly no trust at all, so it’s a pass from me, and probably any non-US citizen.

Re: A privacy VPN you can verify

#88

Post by nneonneo »

mzajc wrote: post #86
mjg59 wrote: post #81

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"Ask a VP.NET server for the fingerprint it reports" is a little bit simplistic. The process for actually doing this involves you handing the server a random number, and it sending you back a signed statement including both the fingerprint and the random number you gave it. This prevents it simply reporting a fixed fingerprint statement every time someone asks. The second aspect of this is that the key used to sign t…

How do I know I'm connecting to the WireGuard instance being attested and not something else? Could the host run one attestable instance, but then have users connect to a separate, malicious one?

The attestation covers the public key, so you would only connect to an instance which has that public key.

In order for a malicious instance to use the same public key as an attested one, they’d have to share the private key (for decryption to work). If you can verify that the SGX code never leaks the private key that was generated inside the enclave, then you can be reasonably sure that the private key can’t be shared to other servers or WG instances.

Re: A privacy VPN you can verify

#89

Post by nneonneo »

9dev wrote: post #87
nneonneo wrote: post #80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The SGX TCB isn’t large enough to protect the really critical part of a private VPN: the source and destination of packets. Nothing stops them from sticking a user on their own enclave and monitoring all the traffic in-and-out. Also, the README is full of AI slop buzzwords, which isn’t confidence-inspiring.

Also, it requires me to trust Intel—an American company, to not have a backdoor in the SGX. That amounts to exactly no trust at all, so it’s a pass from me, and probably any non-US citizen.

The backdoor is as simple as “Intel has all the signing keys for the hardware root of trust so they can sign anything they want” :)

Re: A privacy VPN you can verify

#90

Post by ranger_danger »

can16358p wrote: post #69

Okay I don't have much information about this whole attestation flow and one question boggles my mind. If someone can explain this in simple terms, I'd be thankful: The post says build the repo and get the fingerprint, which is fine. Then it says compare it to the fingerprint that vp.net reports. My question is: how do I verify the server is reporting the fingerprint of the actual running code, and not just returning…

> how do I verify the server is reporting the fingerprint of the actual running code

Since this was answered already, I'll just say that I think the bigger problem is that we can't know if the machine that replied with the fingerprint from this code is even related to the one currently serving your requests.

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