81–90 of 137 posts
Wouldn’t it be more effective for the government to develop a highly secure communication app, known only to individuals in top-level positions? This app would be discreetly installed upon appointment to a senior government role and automatically removed upon departure from office.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Even though Israel is our "Ally" -- we really shouldn't trust a foreign company with our sensitive messaging. If you're in the government, you should treat Hegseth and anyone who uses Signal and TMSIGNL as compromised.
It's not like Israel would ever spy on the US right? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonathan_Pollard
What is the point of using Signal if you are going to let a (foreign) company intercept your communications? I guess they wanted the UX of a commercial product instead of whatever clunky app that's approved for government. Does anyone know what the alternative was?
So is signal safe or not?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
That very much depends on who is running the archive system, and how it is implemented. But more generally, your point is why I mentioned "unless the archive is considered an end and the connection to it is secure."
The point of E2E is only to make sure that Alice is talking to Bob and nobody else can pretend to be either of them or eavesdrop. There is no reason whatsoever to include where else the message may be sent, encrypted or not. Consider E2E protected email service. You send me the final designs over this encrypted channel. Then I put the designs onto a USB drive and give them to my printer to print. Then I hang them as…
If I care more about my snapchat account than I do about saving your disappearing message minus your ability to leverage snapchat into banning my account or apply outside social pressure, then your disappearing message may actually disappear. As the stakes go up, so does the leverage required for “endpoint security” to be a meaningful security boundary.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
From last year after Salt Typhoon became public: > Adopt a free messaging application for secure communications that guarantees end-to-end encryption, such as Signal or similar apps. CISA recommends an end-to-end encrypted messaging app that is compatible with both iPhone and Android operating systems, allowing for text message interoperability across platforms. https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/guidan…
As Dev_VR said, that is a recommendation from CISA to private sector users, not an approval for DOD users.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Even though Israel is our "Ally" -- we really shouldn't trust a foreign company with our sensitive messaging. If you're in the government, you should treat Hegseth and anyone who uses Signal and TMSIGNL as compromised.
Please tell that to European governments too. The Netherlands military police was using Whatsapp (e.g., https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2022/06/15/maatregele... ). Only Germany has the BwMessenger (Matrix) as far as I know. It makes me wonder what the other militaries are using.
The leader of those 11 was fired because of it.
It says it right there in the article. Stop making drama.
“On Thursday Reuters published a photograph of Waltz checking his mobile phone during a cabinet meeting held by Donald Trump. The screen appears to show messages from various top level government officials, including JD Vance, Tulsi Gabbard, and Marco Rubio.” Head of NatSec, ladies and gentlemen. Once the domain of Kissinger, Brzezinski, Powell and Rice. Now with the opsec of a brain-damaged cocaine dealer.
They are shuffling him off to be UN ambassador per recent reporting. Better late than never, I suppose.
What is the point of using Signal if you are going to let a (foreign) company intercept your communications? I guess they wanted the UX of a commercial product instead of whatever clunky app that's approved for government. Does anyone know what the alternative was?
It makes a lot more sense if you don't assume from the start these people have one iota of intellectual horsepower. Signal is approved for government uses, just not non-public DOD information. They're supposed to use Signal for something like "hey, get to a SCIF so we can discuss details," then they discuss the details in a secure environment.
Sort of like the drug dealers from The Wire
>>> overnment agencies have paid for versions of encrypted messaging apps that also have archive abilities before. In 2021, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) paid encrypted app company Wickr $700,000. This seems like a perfect use case to support Signal. Have large, corporate or govt entities, pay for a custom fork of the app, built by the app developers themselves. Why is telemessage getting the money ? Does the S…