Something like 8 years ago I used this tutorial to get unlimited food at the uni vending machine. Good times.
MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]
81–90 of 103 posts
Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]
#82This news about RFID vulnerabilities really highlights the importance of rethinking how we secure access to critical systems, especially in industrial environments. At Siemens, we’ve been working on a solution that addresses these exact concerns. I’ve developed Unified Air, a new technology that allows factory workers to authenticate to production machines using the biometric sensors on their mobile devices—eliminati…
That's a pretty clever idea! How does the whole authentication process work exactly? What protocol is used, once the engineer used its biometrics?
Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]
#83Baader Meinhof effect but I spent the last two days trying to clone my uni's Mifare Classic 1K's because they refuse to reactivate my ID because it is faded.
Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]
#84I've been involved with carding for 10+ years and issues with MIFARE Classic cards have been around and known for at least that long. Anyone in the carding industry will (should at the very least) tell you not to use them and move on to DESFire or some other newer safer chips. The introduction even says as much "By 2024, we all know MIFARE Classic is badly broken." If you're still deploying MIFARE Classic cards you r…
Yup… the vending machines at my university used to use mifare classic tokens with credit on such tokens… in like 2014 i was a student and ran out of money in the middle of july and barely had the money to buy a train ticket to go home for vacation… but thanks to mommy mifare i managed to survive on sandwiches from said vending machines for like two weeks. Oh, to be young again.
My university had something similar, but with ID numbers correlated to each person in a database that recorded how many credits they had left.
Tapping the vending machine with your card sends the ID in plaintext over the wire to the upstream server, which responds in plaintext for the machine to either accept or reject the transaction.
Tomfoolery may or may not have been performed by a bunch of bored, hungry college students at 1AM one night...
Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]
#85Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes, locking people into buildings (which is what you are doing if you need a key to get out, whether it's an RFID badge or a skeleton key) has been illegal since the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire
I guess we're ignoring the existence of prisons.
Those and mental hospitals are the exception to the rule(/law)
Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]
#86Earlier quoted context omitted.
I used to work on such systems in another life, we could setup antipass back for a gate or area. I believe we could also put a temporal restriction but my memory is a bit fuzzy.
I don't think the contention was that the feature or ability doesn't exist, but rather that companies choose not to do it. When you worked on those systems - did you set up anti-passbacks?
Yes, it was in France and related to security, we had to ensure that the area antipass back was working properly, there were several areas where "random" entry was highly prohibited (let's say live shows).
Recently I worked for a bank where they had different types of entry airlocks, it was a bit a pain, especially the multiperson ones.
Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]
#87Earlier quoted context omitted.
My guess is NFC -> Extra Actions -> MIFARE Classic Keys -> Add, but I don't have any Classic keys to test on right now.
Oh, the existing MIFARE app already supports this new attack? That's awesome! I was expecting to have to write some code for it! I do have a flipper and a classic key, will test it out soon!
It should not work (yet), at least not the official firmware or the RogueMaster. It requires special auth command(s) instead of the usual. Hopefully soon tho!
Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]
#88Earlier quoted context omitted.
NXP would probably want to steer you away from mifare classic in the first place, wouldn't they?
Maybe for greenfield deployment… but there’s all the existing infrastructure to support. I still see classic being installed for door/gate systems in American apartments that are under active construction in 2024. Presumably that’s because resellers either don’t know better or they just have a massive inventory.
I still see new apartment buildings with Sentex or Linear call boxes with the factory master passwords. I don't think these guys are crack security experts.
Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]
#89I've been involved with carding for 10+ years and issues with MIFARE Classic cards have been around and known for at least that long. Anyone in the carding industry will (should at the very least) tell you not to use them and move on to DESFire or some other newer safer chips. The introduction even says as much "By 2024, we all know MIFARE Classic is badly broken." If you're still deploying MIFARE Classic cards you r…
MIFARE Classic are cheap and reliable, only their encryption is broken. One can use them as simple storage and encrypt/authenticate data by different means. Nothing wrong with that. I did that, ECC signatures are small enough to fit in 2K/4K cards.
Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]
#90Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you care about this at all you’d use a turnstile.
Because nobody has ever jumped over one of those or triggered the motion sensor on the other side of those paddle gates or gone around the side or underneath...
The cases where that's common are lightly-monitored scenarios though: railway or metro.
As the saying goes, the wall is only as good as how frequently the guards patrol it.