81–90 of 128 posts
I like this person's work. Check it out: https://github.com/janmojzis - tinyssh - TinySSH is a small server with less than 100,000 words of code. Language: C. Stars: 1.1k. Forks: 65. - acmeshell - Shell-style client for LetsEncrypt. Language: Python. Stars: 31. Forks: 6. - dq - Recursive DNS/DNSCurve server and command-line tool to debug DNS/DNSCurve. Language: C. Stars: 23. Forks: 1. - pstree - Unix process tree vie…
I like this person's work. Check it out: https://github.com/janmojzis - tinyssh - TinySSH is a small server with less than 100,000 words of code. Language: C. Stars: 1.1k. Forks: 65. - acmeshell - Shell-style client for LetsEncrypt. Language: Python. Stars: 31. Forks: 6. - dq - Recursive DNS/DNSCurve server and command-line tool to debug DNS/DNSCurve. Language: C. Stars: 23. Forks: 1. - pstree - Unix process tree vie…
I use dqcache, the DNSCurve-aware recursive resolver from the dq package, and love it.
tinyssh is great. One use case for it that people may not know about: using it during Linux boot so you can remotely unlock encrypted drives. I have a headless NAS server that uses dm-crypt/LUKS under ZFS. When I update my kernel/ZFS I remotely reboot the server, wait a few seconds, and then ssh into a tinyssh powered encryption key prompt to unlock the drives. (I am immediately booted from ssh, as tinyssh exits.) I…
https://packages.debian.org/bookworm/dropbear-initramfs https://packages.ubuntu.com/jammy/dropbear-initramfs
tinyssh is great. One use case for it that people may not know about: using it during Linux boot so you can remotely unlock encrypted drives. I have a headless NAS server that uses dm-crypt/LUKS under ZFS. When I update my kernel/ZFS I remotely reboot the server, wait a few seconds, and then ssh into a tinyssh powered encryption key prompt to unlock the drives. (I am immediately booted from ssh, as tinyssh exits.) I…
Question: when remotely unlock the boot disk via ssh, how do you make sure the boot has not been compromised and that you are not just sending the password to the bad guys? At some point I wanted to do something with utrablue [1], to work over network rather than Bluetooth, but then it was in go and I got lazy suddenly :) [1] https://github.com/ANSSI-FR/ultrablue
The server itself may have been physically breached, and if so you can’t trust anything. But, if your host key matches, you should be confident that at least you’re logging into the correct machine (there was no IP takeover).
Poor, poor site. They got HN hug of death.
tinyssh is great. One use case for it that people may not know about: using it during Linux boot so you can remotely unlock encrypted drives. I have a headless NAS server that uses dm-crypt/LUKS under ZFS. When I update my kernel/ZFS I remotely reboot the server, wait a few seconds, and then ssh into a tinyssh powered encryption key prompt to unlock the drives. (I am immediately booted from ssh, as tinyssh exits.) I…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Question: when remotely unlock the boot disk via ssh, how do you make sure the boot has not been compromised and that you are not just sending the password to the bad guys? At some point I wanted to do something with utrablue [1], to work over network rather than Bluetooth, but then it was in go and I got lazy suddenly :) [1] https://github.com/ANSSI-FR/ultrablue
What are the best options to solve this problem? It’s a hard problem imho for most threat models. If the booting machine has been compromised and i use my usb connected keyboard to enter the full disk encryption key I would run into the exact same issues, no?
Cool but something i saw that was weird, this may be the first repo i've ever seen to advertise ... words of code, i've always seen secure repos advertise their "in only X LOC" seeing words of code as a metric was funny
Wren is small. The VM implementation is under 4,000 semicolons. You can skim the whole thing in an afternoon. It’s small, but not dense. It is readable and lovingly-commented.
tinyssh is great. One use case for it that people may not know about: using it during Linux boot so you can remotely unlock encrypted drives. I have a headless NAS server that uses dm-crypt/LUKS under ZFS. When I update my kernel/ZFS I remotely reboot the server, wait a few seconds, and then ssh into a tinyssh powered encryption key prompt to unlock the drives. (I am immediately booted from ssh, as tinyssh exits.) I…
Question: when remotely unlock the boot disk via ssh, how do you make sure the boot has not been compromised and that you are not just sending the password to the bad guys? At some point I wanted to do something with utrablue [1], to work over network rather than Bluetooth, but then it was in go and I got lazy suddenly :) [1] https://github.com/ANSSI-FR/ultrablue
This is for my personal hosting which if someone wants to take over, I guess I'd be more curious than upset.