It's tempting to blame the inexperienced first officers, their training, or the CRM failures on this flight, but the blame for this crash has to land squarely on the atrociously bad UX of the Airbus cockpit. Sensory overload and no clear readout of what is actually broken (pitot tube icing in this case) is bad but the fly-by-wire joystick configuration is what really doomed this flight. In Boeing airliners and many o…
Someone in my extended family works at Airbus as an engineer (hence the throwaway account) When I asked him about this accident, I brought up this specific point - the mechanical non-linkage. Sure, the Airbus is fly by wire (there are no "mechanics"), but you can still program one joystick to mimic the other joystick, right? As far as I know, the Airbus plane actually averages the inputs..?? [0] Anyway, he sorta-angr…
The crash of Air France flight 447 (2021)
81–90 of 231 posts
Re: The crash of Air France flight 447 (2021)
#82Earlier quoted context omitted.
Also, the PNFs hesitancy to shout "my controls" and/or hitting the priority button, especially as he moves to pitch the plane down when it was probably still recoverable. That the off-duty captain standing behind them is the first to vocalize they're at 10000 ft and stalling is indeed not great.
He did hit the priority button and say "Controls to the left." Bonin hit his priority button to take back control but didn't say he was taking back control.
Aircraft emergencies are all about keeping you out of panic so that your natural instincts don't surface, because pretty much every natural or intrinsic human instinct, if followed, will just result in you flying the plane into the ground. Every sense you have is overwhelmed with "things aren't working the way I know they are supposed to and my control inputs seemingly have random results", and in a panic, your brain REALLY wants to revert to "just keep going up, away from danger", which is the opposite of what you need to do 95% of the time.
The only fix in this case would have been literally evicting that pilot from the cockpit, and there's no button for that.
Re: The crash of Air France flight 447 (2021)
#83Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Unlike most other airliners, the control sticks on Airbus models are not mechanically linked and the pilots cannot directly feel what the other pilot is doing. This is a very bad design - at a bare minimum an incredibly loud and annoying alarm should go off if the pilots are fighting controls, because neither knows what the plane is receiving as an input.
It has been changed after this incident. There is now an alert for dual input. The resulting Airbus system is better than traditional connected yokes, because it doesn't have the unexpected opposite input anymore (with the alert) but it does also have an override switch for the captain's side. Which means you can overpower the first officer with just a button instead of physically having to wrestle for the controls.…
Re: The crash of Air France flight 447 (2021)
#84I strongly recommend Mentour Pilot[0] and his many stories about airplanes issues on YouTube. [0]: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=e5AGHEUxLME
Re: The crash of Air France flight 447 (2021)
#85Earlier quoted context omitted.
The most likely thing to help in something like this, is for the plane to realize it's going to die, and just take over. And that has usually been the "airbus way", whereas Boeing has more had a notion of throw things to the pilots often enough so they know what they're doing.
The plane can't take over when it has no idea of what it's airspeed is. That's what caused this whole chain of problems in the first place.
Even leveling the plane off would probably have recovered from the stall, if done early enough.
And the plane knew it was stalling, it kept yelling "STALL, STALL" - the stall warnings are triggered by another sensor, not the pitot tubes.
Re: The crash of Air France flight 447 (2021)
#86It's tempting to blame the inexperienced first officers, their training, or the CRM failures on this flight, but the blame for this crash has to land squarely on the atrociously bad UX of the Airbus cockpit. Sensory overload and no clear readout of what is actually broken (pitot tube icing in this case) is bad but the fly-by-wire joystick configuration is what really doomed this flight. In Boeing airliners and many o…
Armchair amateur, Pitot tube failure is such a frequent occurrence that I’m angry we display any other warning than this one. - It should have a needle to eject caps on it, so that pilots don’t forget the caps (Brisbane accident, among many), - The needle should also sense, if not remove, the ice (Air France accident), - It should wake up the pilots and reset controls to fixed values for the current altitude, since w…
Re: The crash of Air France flight 447 (2021)
#87Earlier quoted context omitted.
Also, the PNFs hesitancy to shout "my controls" and/or hitting the priority button, especially as he moves to pitch the plane down when it was probably still recoverable. That the off-duty captain standing behind them is the first to vocalize they're at 10000 ft and stalling is indeed not great.
He did hit the priority button and say "Controls to the left." Bonin hit his priority button to take back control but didn't say he was taking back control.
I think my sibling comment is probably right, Bonin would've required much more severe shouting to take his hand off the stick.
Certainly worth reading: https://bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/annexe.01.en.pdf
Re: The crash of Air France flight 447 (2021)
#88"All of this happened near instantaneously, leaving the pilots completely in control of the airplane with little advance warning."
Complex systems have such a low-window for handling or preventing failure that it is impossible to deal with it at manual scale unless we have a super-good control panels and copilots.
Why we need a lot more work on observability and interpretability while operating complex systems.
Re: The crash of Air France flight 447 (2021)
#89This brings up an interesting question: If the control was fully automated, the computer entirely in charged, would this have happened?
Pitot tube icing is one of those issues where automation becomes useless entirely.
Re: The crash of Air France flight 447 (2021)
#90Earlier quoted context omitted.
Even as a flying novice, I was screaming to myself when they kept trying to pull up in a stall. I guess there had to have been some element of panic clouding their judgement, which is why pilots need to drill routine into their head so hard.
In normal law an Airbus doesn't stall with full back stick, that would just result in maximum AoA not a stall. In this case it had degraded to loose some of those protections due to icing of the sensors. That was confusing to the junior co-pilot, and they skipped basic procedures on who has control resulting in opposite inputs and a loss of control.
Bonin just went to primal instincts, full fight or flight, and was "taking matters into his own hands" even despite the fact that he was aware he wasn't doing anything useful. The other pilot even told him to stop, but he didn't. He wasn't a copilot in this scenario, but rather a direct adversary to recovery of the plane.
He should have been treated as a rogue pilot the second he started panicking, but the other guy was kinda busy. He was not acting rationally in any way. Had he dropped dead from a heart attack, AF447 would be an interesting anecdote instead of a tragedy.
How do you train pilots for: "In very rare cases, especially during a crisis, you may need to physically harm your coworker to prevent them from causing the death of hundreds of people, but definitely don't do it if you're the one causing the problem, which you will never figure out if you ARE the one causing the problem"