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Tillitis Key – Mullvad spin-off inspired by measured boot and DICE

tillitis.se

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Re: Tillitis Key – Mullvad spin-off inspired by measured boot and DICE

#81

Post by transpute »

throwoutway wrote: post #62
kfreds wrote: post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Tillitis Key is a new kind of USB security key inspired by measured boot and DICE. Tillitis Key’s design encourages developers to experiment with new security key applications and models in a way that makes adoption easier and less risky for end-users. It offers both security and flexibility by being end-user programmable while also preventing applications loaded onto the device from knowing each other’s secrets.…

What is DICE? I’m searching but the only results are the company and not whatever you’re referring to

https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/work-groups/dice-architect...

> The DICE Architectures Work Group is exploring new security and privacy technologies applicable to systems and components with or without a TPM. The goal is to develop new approaches to enhancing security and privacy with minimal silicon requirements. Even simple silicon capabilities combined with software techniques can establish a cryptographically strong device identity, attest software and security policy, and assist in safely deploying and verifying software updates.

Re: Tillitis Key – Mullvad spin-off inspired by measured boot and DICE

#82

Post by fiat_fandango »

So basically a pluggable HSM? Curious if this should be considered more similar to the Yubi HSM 2 [0] (think dedicated HSM, not very useful for anything else but very secure) or the USB Armory [1], very adaptive small arm SBC with a USB port?

[0] https://www.yubico.com/product/yubihsm-2/

[1] https://inversepath.com/usbarmory

Re: Tillitis Key – Mullvad spin-off inspired by measured boot and DICE

#83

Post by fiat_fandango »

kfreds wrote: post #35
Havoc wrote: post #4

Am I right in thinking that this is basically like a yubikey except with openness as key differentiator? Or is it’s function something else ?

The Tillitis Key is a new kind of USB security key inspired by measured boot and DICE. Tillitis Key’s design encourages developers to experiment with new security key applications and models in a way that makes adoption easier and less risky for end-users. It offers both security and flexibility by being end-user programmable while also preventing applications loaded onto the device from knowing each other’s secrets.…

So basically a pluggable HSM? Curious if this should be considered more similar to the Yubi HSM 2 [0] (think dedicated HSM, not very useful for anything else but very secure) or the USB Armory [1], very adaptive small arm SBC with a USB port? (for this thread option 3 - more similar to a bone stock Yubikey?)

Also curious if there are plans to support BLS signatures natively?

[0] https://www.yubico.com/product/yubihsm-2/

[1] https://inversepath.com/usbarmory

Re: Tillitis Key – Mullvad spin-off inspired by measured boot and DICE

#84

Post by xani_ »

kfreds wrote: post #49
xani_ wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

* If you save secrets with application A, then install evil application B, it can't access the secrets from A. * And if you revert back to A, those saved secrets will still be there. What stops app B from pretending it's an app A ?

1. The hardware contains a UDS (unique per device secret) which can only be read once per boot cycle. 2. Firmware in ROM does unconditional measurement of the first mutable boot stage, which is loaded from the host, over USB. The KDF used for measurement is Blake2s(UDS, Blake2s(application), USS). Note that when I say hardware I mean FPGA hardware design.

Again, what stops malicious app B from just taking the A's id and presenting it to device ? token doesn't know who sent USB packet

Re: Tillitis Key – Mullvad spin-off inspired by measured boot and DICE

#85

Post by xani_ »

timando wrote: post #50
xani_ wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

* If you save secrets with application A, then install evil application B, it can't access the secrets from A. * And if you revert back to A, those saved secrets will still be there. What stops app B from pretending it's an app A ?

It would have to hash to the same value as app A

The device is not checking app's hash tho, it has no way to verify that the usb frame containing that hash is really from app A

Re: Tillitis Key – Mullvad spin-off inspired by measured boot and DICE

#86

Post by kfreds »

fiat_fandango wrote: post #82

So basically a pluggable HSM? Curious if this should be considered more similar to the Yubi HSM 2 [0] (think dedicated HSM, not very useful for anything else but very secure) or the USB Armory [1], very adaptive small arm SBC with a USB port? [0] https://www.yubico.com/product/yubihsm-2/ [1] https://inversepath.com/usbarmory

Yes, except YubiHSM boots using verified boot. In the case of Tillitis Key each program gets its own secret key, which it can use to e.g. derive a key pair.

Re: Tillitis Key – Mullvad spin-off inspired by measured boot and DICE

#87

Post by JoachimS »

fiat_fandango wrote: post #82

So basically a pluggable HSM? Curious if this should be considered more similar to the Yubi HSM 2 [0] (think dedicated HSM, not very useful for anything else but very secure) or the USB Armory [1], very adaptive small arm SBC with a USB port? [0] https://www.yubico.com/product/yubihsm-2/ [1] https://inversepath.com/usbarmory

Or CrypTech: https://cryptech.is/

There are things developed by the CrypTech project I would like to try and reuse for TillitisKey.

Re: Tillitis Key – Mullvad spin-off inspired by measured boot and DICE

#88

Post by kfreds »

WaitWaitWha wrote: post #67
kfreds wrote: post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Tillitis Key is a new kind of USB security key inspired by measured boot and DICE. Tillitis Key’s design encourages developers to experiment with new security key applications and models in a way that makes adoption easier and less risky for end-users. It offers both security and flexibility by being end-user programmable while also preventing applications loaded onto the device from knowing each other’s secrets.…

@kfreds thank you for the response, and the commitment you have for this project. >> ... this is basically like a yubikey ... > ... new kind of USB security key ... The things you have listed are indeed very nice, but they are not new kind, as they are available elsewhere. Can you give a bit more compare and contrast to the original question? Again, thank you.

> The things you have listed are indeed very nice, but they are not new kind, as they are available elsewhere.

Really? I wasn't aware that there is another USB security key with measured boot-based key derivation. Please provide a link!

> Can you give a bit more compare and contrast to the original question?

Except for Tillitis Key, all USB security keys I'm aware of either boot any software, or only boot software that has been signed with a key pair. Tillitis Key is different in that it measures the application, and uses that measurement to derive a secret specific to the application as well as the stick it's running on.

Re: Tillitis Key – Mullvad spin-off inspired by measured boot and DICE

#89

Post by stavros »

xani_ wrote: post #84
kfreds wrote: post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

1. The hardware contains a UDS (unique per device secret) which can only be read once per boot cycle. 2. Firmware in ROM does unconditional measurement of the first mutable boot stage, which is loaded from the host, over USB. The KDF used for measurement is Blake2s(UDS, Blake2s(application), USS). Note that when I say hardware I mean FPGA hardware design.

Again, what stops malicious app B from just taking the A's id and presenting it to device ? token doesn't know who sent USB packet

I think the app is installed on the stick itself, kind of like how you install coin apps on a Ledger.

Re: Tillitis Key – Mullvad spin-off inspired by measured boot and DICE

#90

Post by kfreds »

xani_ wrote: post #84
kfreds wrote: post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

1. The hardware contains a UDS (unique per device secret) which can only be read once per boot cycle. 2. Firmware in ROM does unconditional measurement of the first mutable boot stage, which is loaded from the host, over USB. The KDF used for measurement is Blake2s(UDS, Blake2s(application), USS). Note that when I say hardware I mean FPGA hardware design.

Again, what stops malicious app B from just taking the A's id and presenting it to device ? token doesn't know who sent USB packet

I'm not sure I understand your question.

If you're asking about applications running on the device (Tillitis Key) the answer is measured boot. You can read more on tillitis.se.

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