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Code from the FBI’s Anom encrypted messaging app

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Re: Code from the FBI’s Anom encrypted messaging app

#81

Post by drdaeman »

mandelbrotwurst wrote: post #68
richbell wrote: post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Unfortunately Google is failing me right now. There was a case within the last few years where someone was convicted because their VPN provider was sharing raw traffic (not logs) with the government. If anyone knows what I'm referring to, please chime in. But given the existence of Room 641A[0], and other extra-judicial mass surveillance, I am confident in my assertion. Moreover, the explosion of VPN companies with l…

What does raw traffic that is not in the form of logs look like? Maybe you mean that they are streaming logs in real-time rather than sending log files in batches periodically? You don't mean sharing raw traffic as in forwarding actual requests, I wouldn't think?

It could be either mirroring all the traffic to an agency-provided black box, or sending just NetFlow (or sFlow) metadata about the traffic.

And if someone thinks the first option is not realistic - this is how almost every ISP in Russia works (search for SORM-2 and SORM-3 for more detail, typically traffic is mirrored at ISP's border gateway(s)). Sure, Russia or China wouldn't be great examples, but the point is that it's technically possible, even at scale, and all the real problems are in the meatspace (legal enforcement or coercion).

Re: Code from the FBI’s Anom encrypted messaging app

#82

Post by onionisafruit »

itintheory wrote: post #78
onionisafruit wrote: post #47

Last year the author of this story was on Darknet Diaries talking about ANOM and encrypted phones in general. It was a good episode. https://darknetdiaries.com/episode/105/

Great podcast, I really like the stories. Unfortunately it's a little basic technically. Any suggestions for more techy podcasts on netsec / the scene?

Not really. I have trouble following technical podcasts. I prefer to read technical details and listen to stories, so all the podcasts I like are focused on story telling.

Re: Code from the FBI’s Anom encrypted messaging app

#83

Post by _jal »

mandelbrotwurst wrote: post #68
richbell wrote: post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Unfortunately Google is failing me right now. There was a case within the last few years where someone was convicted because their VPN provider was sharing raw traffic (not logs) with the government. If anyone knows what I'm referring to, please chime in. But given the existence of Room 641A[0], and other extra-judicial mass surveillance, I am confident in my assertion. Moreover, the explosion of VPN companies with l…

What does raw traffic that is not in the form of logs look like? Maybe you mean that they are streaming logs in real-time rather than sending log files in batches periodically? You don't mean sharing raw traffic as in forwarding actual requests, I wouldn't think?

> You don't mean sharing raw traffic as in forwarding actual requests, I wouldn't think?

The usual method is either to use a splitter or switch configuration to mirror traffic to another interface, attached to a machine running packet capture/analysis tools.

Re: Code from the FBI’s Anom encrypted messaging app

#84

Post by vorpalhex »

asdff wrote: post #66
oceanplexian wrote: post #53

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You also have to keep in mind that spreading FUD about secure messaging apps can be a type of manipulation, in some cases planted by the FBI. If you don't have confidence in say, iMessage, which is pretty secure, you might instead go for a "secure" messaging app that's actually a plant (Like Anom).

I would be bewildered if the FBI doesn't have a back door into every messaging app allowed on american cell phones. That being said there is one chat app that cannot be easily broken by the FBI: Pictochat on the nintendo DS. You would need an FBI agent with a nintendo DS searching for chat rooms in physical proximity to the communicators.

I always encourage people who have this positive of a view of the FBI to go read the FBIs own case records and accounts.

Re: Code from the FBI’s Anom encrypted messaging app

#85

Post by vorpalhex »

nojito wrote: post #72
dmix wrote: post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Lots of "secure" messaging apps do this for intel and surveillance and not just the white hats. It's how Apple would do iMessage intercepts for the FBI.

You can't really do this in iMessage.

What makes you think that?

Re: Code from the FBI’s Anom encrypted messaging app

#86

Post by nojito »

vorpalhex wrote: post #85
nojito wrote: post #72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can't really do this in iMessage.

What makes you think that?

Because it's impossible to "hide" recipients/devices. The get request will reveal that you're messaging someone you didn't want to and anyone adding a "stealth" device to a number auto-notifies all devices linked to that number.

Re: Code from the FBI’s Anom encrypted messaging app

#87

Post by danso »

mjreacher wrote: post #73
asdff wrote: post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would be bewildered if the FBI doesn't have a back door into every messaging app allowed on american cell phones. That being said there is one chat app that cannot be easily broken by the FBI: Pictochat on the nintendo DS. You would need an FBI agent with a nintendo DS searching for chat rooms in physical proximity to the communicators.

I'm not sure if this is 100% serious but if it is, how could the FBI having a backdoor into every messaging app fit in with the relative ineffectiveness of the FBI?[0] If they truly did have the ability to spy on any messaging app without issue then you would expect them to have far more success than they actually do. For comparison, a quick Google search says China has a 99.9% conviction rate. Remember security and…

This is kind of a nitpick, but U.S. prosecutors also boast 99+% conviction rates. Note that conviction rate is not necessarily indicative of a systems effectiveness (or lack of fairness). Prosecutors only pursue charges in very few cases, and very few of those cases go to trial

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-f...

Re: Code from the FBI’s Anom encrypted messaging app

#88

Post by more_corn »

drawkbox wrote: post #2

> The code shows that the messages were secretly duplicated and sent to a “ghost” contact that was hidden from the users’ contact lists. Lots of "secure" messaging apps do this for intel and surveillance and not just the white hats. Other areas that "secure" messaging apps have holes in is the anti-spam/moderation systems that need to view messages and in the clients themselves who have access to the unencrypted cont…

Anom wouldn’t pass a security review. Certainly not a successful decompile. Certainly not code review.

Re: Code from the FBI’s Anom encrypted messaging app

#89

Post by dmix »

nojito wrote: post #86
vorpalhex wrote: post #85

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What makes you think that?

Because it's impossible to "hide" recipients/devices. The get request will reveal that you're messaging someone you didn't want to and anyone adding a "stealth" device to a number auto-notifies all devices linked to that number.

I was talking about using a 3rd party key and copying during transit, not explicitly adding an additional contact to the message and sending it using standard channels. There has been papers in the past based off of Apple's own documentation that showed it was possible.

But based on some googling Apple hasn't provided this capability, at least to the FBI (they claimed it would require modifying the iMessage key server, so we have to trust them on that they haven't done that yet), mostly because they don't need to - the iCloud backups are usually enough for pen-register intercepts. A leaked FBI's document backs this claim up:

https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/what...

Re: Code from the FBI’s Anom encrypted messaging app

#90

Post by nojito »

dmix wrote: post #89
nojito wrote: post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because it's impossible to "hide" recipients/devices. The get request will reveal that you're messaging someone you didn't want to and anyone adding a "stealth" device to a number auto-notifies all devices linked to that number.

I was talking about using a 3rd party key and copying during transit, not explicitly adding an additional contact to the message and sending it using standard channels. There has been papers in the past based off of Apple's own documentation that showed it was possible. But based on some googling Apple hasn't provided this capability, at least to the FBI (they claimed it would require modifying the iMessage key serve…

Again..this isn't possible because we would have seen its use already and why the FBI uses the iCloud backup strategy for investigations.
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