This feels like missing the forest from the trees — Steve Jobs said many times to the effect ‘it doesn’t matter how any of this stuff happens, GigaHertz, Ram, Speeds, it only matters that the user gets what they want.’ Right now Apple’s biggest unhappy user is the DOJ. As it stands with the legislation coming down the pipe and both previous administrations building on a keenness to ‘get something done’ about big tech…
Why do elected officials act as fake representatives to the people that elected them in the first place? Has it always been this way? It doesn’t matter left or right. The governing bodies should obey the people not the other way around.
One Bad Apple
81–90 of 557 posts
Re: One Bad Apple
#82Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why do elected officials act as fake representatives to the people that elected them in the first place? Has it always been this way? It doesn’t matter left or right. The governing bodies should obey the people not the other way around.
If the people had their way, those suspected of child sex crimes wouldn’t even get trials. Things like privacy and due process only exist to the extent that a ruling class has the power to impose their own values, contrary to popular will.
I wonder where you got your data from.
Re: One Bad Apple
#83> To reiterate: scanning your device is not a privacy risk, but copying files from your device without any notice is definitely a privacy issue. Not a lawyer, but I believe this part about legality is inaccurate, because they aren’t copying your photos without notice. The feature is not harvesting suspect photos from a device, it is attaching data to all photos before they are uploaded to Apple’s servers. If you’re n…
And when they’re notified, Apple manually checks (a modified but legible version of) the images.
Re: One Bad Apple
#84This reads like a failure of the NCMEC, and the legal system surrounding it. It is insane that using perceptual hashes is likely illegal. As the hashes are actually somewhat reversible and so possession of the hash is a criminal offence. It just shows how twisted up in itself the law is in this area. One independent image analysis service should not be beating reporting rates of major service providers. And NCMEC sho…
It feels to me like they want to hide their detection algorithms so people don't find out how bad they are.
Re: One Bad Apple
#85Re: One Bad Apple
#86Earlier quoted context omitted.
That code is not accessible to us. The report to NCMEC would be generated by Apple after they have manually reviewed the derived images included in the security vouchers your device submitted after it analysed your photos.
> That code is not accessible to us. Not to tools like IDA and Ghidra
Now, I suppose you could DDoS Apple's verification process.
Either way, though, it's not like anyone who would do either of these things would win any points in the court of popular opinion. I can see the headlines now: "Hackers Disable Apple's CSAM Reporting Tools; Legitimate CSAM Reports Get Lost".
Re: One Bad Apple
#87Perhaps this is just the benefit of longevity but from my POV it was engineer early adoption and advocacy that made Apple, Google Search etc what they are, and it will be engineer early adoption and advocacy that dethrones these problematic companies from controlling the ecosystem..
Back 20 years ago, before the community filled with $_$ dollars-struck startup founders, software was built by people who wanted to use it.. rather than sell it. There are still some people doing this now, Look at Matrix network for instance.
What will it take for a grass-roots software industry to start building privacy-first apps and systems that don't suck, based on decentralised, distributed principles? We have the skills to build highly polished alternatives to these things, but it takes a determination to step away from convenience for a period of time for the sake of privacy.
How bad does it have to get before the dev community realise this? or are we in a frog boiling slowly scenario and it's hopeless?
Re: One Bad Apple
#88The CPPA had bans on virtual child porn (e.g. using look-alike adult actresses or CGI), that was overturned by SCOTUS, and then Congress responded with the PROTECT act which tightened up those provisions. These laws on possession are practically unenforceable with modern technology, peer to peer file sharing, onion routing, and encrypted hard drives.
Thus, in order to make them enforcement, the government has to put surveillance at all egress and ingress points of our private/secure enclaves, whether it's at the point of storing it locally, or the point of uploading it to the cloud.
While I agree with the goal of eliminating child porn, should it come at the cost of an omnipresent government surveillance system everywhere? One that could be used for future laws that restrict other forms of content? How about anti-vax imagery? Anti-Semitic imagery? And with other governments of the world watching, especially authoritarian governments, how long until China, which had a similar system with Jingwang Weishi (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jingwang_Weishi) starts asking: hey, can you extend this to Falun Gong, Islamic, Hong Kong resistance, and Tiananmen square imagery? What if Thailand passes a law that requires Apple to scan for images insulting to the Thai Monarch, does Apple comply?
This is a very bad precedent. I liked the Apple that said no to the FBI instead of installing backdoors. I'd prefer if Apple get fined, and battle all the way to the Supreme Court to resist this.
Re: One Bad Apple
#89Earlier quoted context omitted.
If the people had their way, those suspected of child sex crimes wouldn’t even get trials. Things like privacy and due process only exist to the extent that a ruling class has the power to impose their own values, contrary to popular will.
I’m one of the people and that’s not my way. I wonder where you got your data from.
Re: One Bad Apple
#90Earlier quoted context omitted.
These are not “claims.” The process by which they get access to only the safety vouchers for images matching CSAM is private set intersection and comes with a cryptographic proof. In no step of the proposal does Apple access the images you store in iCloud. All access is through the associated data in the safety voucher. This design allows Apple to switch iCloud storage to end to end encrypted with no protocol changes…
What good is end to end encryption if the OS is prebuilt with a method of breaking that encryption? This is definitional backdooring, and you’re back to trusting Apple’s goodwill (and/or willingness to resist governments) to keep your data safe (I.e., not add new decryptable triggers). Not having backdoors is a hard requirement for end to end encryption offering privacy guarantees.