Earlier quoted context omitted.
This all hinges on "mainstream". For example, in combinatorics, combinatorial species are a vast organization of the all-important concept of generating function . They were developed by category theorists and are most tidily organized along categorical lines. If you don't think this is close enough to mainstream, I can't dispute that. It's a value judgment. There is often an undercurrent of category theory within a…
Respectfully, I disagree. The question of what's mainstream and valued by the community is empirical and can be answered by looking at what's published in the leading combinatorics journals. And anyone can check those out and see that categories are basically absent. So as a sociological fact, I maintain it's far from the mainstream. Whether combinatorialists ought to elevate certain work is of course of a question o…
I think it is also a reasonable interpretation to take "mainstream" as "pertaining to the main subject matter of the field". Anyway, I think it is the case that the mainstream of combinatorics or probability is yet so big that a particular researcher or even group of researchers can be comfortably in the mainstream and yet have never cared for or even heard of some other line of research that is also mainstream.
The founding paper of combinatorial species [1] has hundreds of citations including many in what I gather are top journals in combinatorics, and even some in the Annals of Probability. So, what are we to make of that? Some people who are serious enough about combinatorics or probability to get published in serious journals have read, perhaps understood, and maybe even taken seriously some of these categorical ideas?
In any case, I respect your viewpoint. In my youth I was a bit category-crazy, trying to use it to organize all of my mathematical knowledge. I'm much more prudent about it these days but I'm still an optimist that we will find more unifying ideas in mathematics through it.
[1] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0001870881...