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First look at Apple/Google contact tracing framework

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Re: First look at Apple/Google contact tracing framework

#81
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> 4) it helps stop others from becoming infected and possibly dying. how is that not a good thing? The virus will always be here, we cannot hide forever, we must find a way to cure it or reduce its biological effect. Once covid19 goes away (if ever), and a new virus appears, NO ONE will have that app turned on, and by then, the new virus will have spread just like covid19. I have a very simple solution to win time :…

> Once covid19 goes away (if ever), and a new virus appears, NO ONE will have that app turned on, and by then, the new virus will have spread just like covid19. Devil's advocate: so why not just keep the app running forever in the background? If there's no virus to report - that's fine. But the moment a new outbreak starts, the data is already there, you just have to report that you're sick.

Absolutely, and if it is indeed local only and encrypted until you say you are infected, it could be part of HealthKit and Android equivalent (don't know if it has a name)

Re: First look at Apple/Google contact tracing framework

#82
post #60

Again, this solution _cannot_ work and it is a _threat_ to a permanent loss of privacy. This is like the government and the adtech companies sleeping in the same bed, without any other power opposition in the balance. 1) The "solution" is created by a monopoly of 2 american private corporations. 2) It can only work reliably if everyone wear an (Apple or Android) phone at all time, and consent to give data 3) You are…

I am so terribly frightened by that move I am seriously considering getting rid of Android. Of what I have heard it's going to be backed into the OS and not installed as an app I could de-install / block, right? What truly open Smart phone OSes are available besides Android and iOS?

Librem is the usual answer, but aren’t there other, existing, baked in parts of Android that compromise your privacy? It won’t change much because of this project.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Librem_5

Re: First look at Apple/Google contact tracing framework

#83
post #60

Again, this solution _cannot_ work and it is a _threat_ to a permanent loss of privacy. This is like the government and the adtech companies sleeping in the same bed, without any other power opposition in the balance. 1) The "solution" is created by a monopoly of 2 american private corporations. 2) It can only work reliably if everyone wear an (Apple or Android) phone at all time, and consent to give data 3) You are…

From looking at the specification, I don't see any serious loss of privacy there, if this is implemented as stated. 2) You don't need 100%, you only need enough to drop the R0 below 1. You'll likely need a majority of people using this, which is hard enough, but you don't need everyone using it. 3) The apps are not supposed to include every single registered contact, only contacts that are over a bit longer timeframe…

Minor nitpick: the R0 is the basic reproduction number, it describes the infectivity if no measures are taken to control the spread.

You’re looking for R, the effective reproduction number, which is R0 plus all controls.

Re: First look at Apple/Google contact tracing framework

#84
post #9

Note that years ago, Moxie has studied a similar problem of how to let users know if their contacts use Signal or not without uploading the whole address books like e.g. WhatsApp does [0]. It's similar because in both instances you want to "match" users in some fashion using a centralized service while keeping their privacy. He ruled out downloads of megabytes of data (something that the Google/Apple proposal would i…

The proposed system requires download of 16 bytes per infected user per day. Unless this really gets out of hand that’s not in the megabytes range.

Yes, this is where OP lost me.

> Published keys are 16 bytes, one for each day. If moderate numbers of smartphone users are infected in any given week, that's 100s of MBs for all phones to DL.

"Moderate" rate of infections is not millions of new cases per week worldwide. That would be such a catastrophe that contact tracing would be useless.

Re: First look at Apple/Google contact tracing framework

#85
post #49

> Published keys are 16 bytes, one for each day. If moderate numbers of smartphone users are infected in any given week, that's 100s of MBs for all phones to DL. Seems like a usecase for bloom filters or k-anonymity.

16 byte keys for a quarter million people are only 4mb per day. We aren’t seeing remotely close to a quarter million infections per day. The data sizes are reasonable, even if you multiply it times n days for the backward tracing. I think his post is a little bit more fearmongering than is necessary.

> I think his post is a little bit more fearmongering than is necessary.

I think that is being unnecessarily charitable because of his high status. His math and his assumptions on this point are completely broken. So broken that if he were some rando, no one would have even read the rest of his thread, much less commented on it at on the front page of hacker news.

Re: First look at Apple/Google contact tracing framework

#87
post #60

Again, this solution _cannot_ work and it is a _threat_ to a permanent loss of privacy. This is like the government and the adtech companies sleeping in the same bed, without any other power opposition in the balance. 1) The "solution" is created by a monopoly of 2 american private corporations. 2) It can only work reliably if everyone wear an (Apple or Android) phone at all time, and consent to give data 3) You are…

1) and 2) - the fact that Google and Apple have what is essentially a monopoly on smartphone software is exactly what makes this a good approach. it's the easiest way to reach a high percentage of the population. 3) false positive are a hell of a lot better than having no way to trace back contacts while someone was asymptomatic but contagious. 4) it helps stop others from becoming infected and possibly dying. how is…

As both are untrustworthy American corporations no matter what they do or say it will always be a huge privacy issue. I would go back to my old SE810i phone the instant this was forced on iOS and Android users. People are already doing this (especially young people) so this will be apple and google shooting themselves in the foot.

Re: First look at Apple/Google contact tracing framework

#90
post #80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To ease on the fear mongering front here: This proposal relies on an app implementing these protocols, you're free to uninstall the app after the pandemic - or not install it in the first place. It is furthermore trivial to check if your device sends out these BTLE packets. It's not a "can we put the genie back in the bottle" scenario if the genie is wearing a bright warning vest announcing its presence everywhere. Y…

I'm not sure I'd count this as fearmongering. I think I know which way the tradeoffs work in my mind but there's not an unreasonable set of paths that lead to this being more permanent. Given the broad powers passed recently in the UK they could make having this app a legal requirement to go in any shop if they wanted, and whether apps can be uninstalled reasonably is down to whoever controls the OS. Would it not mak…

It's not like that scenario does not worry me either, sure. From a purely "fight the disease, nothing else matters" standpoint, yes, more installs mean better coverage and would make digital contact tracing work more efficiently. I haven't heard of any western government considering such a reductionist approach though, that would not be a proportional response and honestly a bit bizarre. Even in such a case the proposal by Google/Apple would be beneficial since it limits the usefulness of this data for other purposes, being designed with privacy in mind and far less intrusive than other tracking methods we could draw up.

I would still maintain that this nightmare scenario is a problem with any particular government that would implement and misuse such measures, not with an anonymization effort for the BTLE stack. We absolutely should push back against the former and insist on what's missing for a full system to be implemented in a sensible manner without infringing on basic human rights, that's a worthy hill to die on, this particular aspect is not.

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