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The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

plato.stanford.edu

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Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#81

Post by taneq »

claudiawerner wrote: post #79
taneq wrote: post #77

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The core tenet of science is testing of hypotheses. Any hypothesis that's not falsifiable is by definition not scientifically testable. Astrology itself is not scientific but, if you use a version of it that's falsifiable, you absolutely can do a valid scientific study on it by making astrological predictions and then testing to see whether they come true. I think it's pretty widely agreed that we've already done thi…

>Any hypothesis that's not falsifiable is by definition not scientifically testable. This is beside the point. The point of contention is whether or not falsifiability is what makes science what it is, or should be. Genuine science (such as exploratory papers) very often does not start by specifying a falsifiable hypothesis. Bad science, such as astrology, does often propose falsifiable hypotheses. Therefore, astrolo…

> Genuine science (such as exploratory papers) very often does not start by specifying a falsifiable hypothesis.

There is plenty of useful work which doesn't specify a falsifiable hypothesis, but it's not science until it does so.

> Therefore, astrology can be falsifiable. Therefore, according to Popperian demarcation, astrology counts as science, or it's scientific

No. Again, being falsifiable means that astrology can be a subject of scientific study. It doesn't make it science in and of itself.

Science is work that follows the scientific process: Choose a question to answer, formulate a hypothesis, make testable predictions based on the hypothesis, test the predictions, analyze and report the results. We can come with a new term (maybe 'pondering'?) for trying to answer questions without testing hypotheses, but by definition it won't be science.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#82

Post by claudiawerner »

taneq wrote: post #81
claudiawerner wrote: post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Any hypothesis that's not falsifiable is by definition not scientifically testable. This is beside the point. The point of contention is whether or not falsifiability is what makes science what it is, or should be. Genuine science (such as exploratory papers) very often does not start by specifying a falsifiable hypothesis. Bad science, such as astrology, does often propose falsifiable hypotheses. Therefore, astrolo…

> Genuine science (such as exploratory papers) very often does not start by specifying a falsifiable hypothesis. There is plenty of useful work which doesn't specify a falsifiable hypothesis, but it's not science until it does so. > Therefore, astrology can be falsifiable. Therefore, according to Popperian demarcation, astrology counts as science, or it's scientific No. Again, being falsifiable means that astrology c…

>There is plenty of useful work which doesn't specify a falsifiable hypothesis, but it's not science until it does so.

That's quite a bold statement which is not supported by current work in the philosophy of science. Would you be willing to claim that most papers submitted to Nature don't count as science?

>No. Again, being falsifiable means that astrology can be a subject of scientific study. It doesn't make it science in and of itself.

The claim was that falsifiability is necessary and sufficient to count as science - so really we're in agreement. Making falsifiable claims is not necessary and sufficient demarcation of science and pseudo-science. You need something more than falsifiability to distinguish science from pseudo-science. The question is: what is that thing?

>but by definition it won't be science.

By whose definition? You're sending mixed messages - why is physics a science, rather than merely capable of being a subject of scientific study? We can make claims in physics that are just as falsifiable as the ones in astrology.

It's also unwise to paint an idealistic vision of science (falsificationism) in contrast to how it's actually practiced; from SEP:

>Popper’s focus on falsifications of theories led to a concentration on the rather rare instances when a whole theory is at stake. According to Kuhn, the way in which science works on such occasions cannot be used to characterize the entire scientific enterprise. Instead it is in “normal science”, the science that takes place between the unusual moments of scientific revolutions, that we find the characteristics by which science can be distinguished from other activities.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#83

Post by TuringTest »

yters wrote: post #32
TuringTest wrote: post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful. I do know that I have a conscious experience, so that's quite meaningful - to me. I cannot check that any other being has similar feelings, so the doubtful question would be whether "an X other than me can have conscious experience"; but people with good manners ma…

Why is it polite to assume non concious entities are conscious?

How do you know they are non-conscious?

If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck...

For example, I'm assuming you're conscious, because you posted a reply that was on-topic and coherent with the conversation above it.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#84

Post by TuringTest »

criddell wrote: post #53
yters wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What is an illusion without consciousness?

The conscious experience might be there but at the same time it could be an entirely deterministic thing. Maybe you and I having this exchange was determined in the instant of the big bang.

Being deterministic doesn't make it any less conscious. We're talking perception here, not free will.

In fact, there's pretty good evidence that what we call consciousness is a post-facto rationalization of the subconscious brain processes that determine an automatic answer of your brain to stimulus (not that it makes them deterministic, but certainly they're not "rational" in the classic sense).

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#85

Post by TuringTest »

antonvs wrote: post #72
TuringTest wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, but we don't know how to check that an entity has a conscious experience, so we can not falsify that a Turing machine has one, either. That's the whole reason for the Turing Test, btw.

Yes, we can't falsify that a Turing machine has conscious experience, but we have no reason or explanation to suggest that it does have one. To come back to the original claim: > Simple: Find something that the brain does that could not, in principle, be emulated by a Turing machine or equivalent. So far we don't know of any such thing We may not "know" of such a thing with certainty, but we have a strong candidate i…

> Yes, we can't falsify that a Turing machine has conscious experience, but we have no reason or explanation to suggest that it does have one.

I don't have no reason or explanation that suggests that you have a consciousness either. You could be a very elaborate chatbot that posts coherent replies at online forums. Also, I do know whether I'm a chatbot myself or not, but you can't tell about me just from the replies written here.

> We may not "know" of such a thing with certainty, but we have a strong candidate in consciousness.

The problem with that is, you don't have a test for consciousness. There's a strong candidate in MRI brain scans (at least for humans), but you can't really be sure.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#86

Post by yters »

claudiawerner wrote: post #82
taneq wrote: post #81

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Genuine science (such as exploratory papers) very often does not start by specifying a falsifiable hypothesis. There is plenty of useful work which doesn't specify a falsifiable hypothesis, but it's not science until it does so. > Therefore, astrology can be falsifiable. Therefore, according to Popperian demarcation, astrology counts as science, or it's scientific No. Again, being falsifiable means that astrology c…

>There is plenty of useful work which doesn't specify a falsifiable hypothesis, but it's not science until it does so. That's quite a bold statement which is not supported by current work in the philosophy of science. Would you be willing to claim that most papers submitted to Nature don't count as science? >No. Again, being falsifiable means that astrology can be a subject of scientific study. It doesn't make it sci…

So if it is not possible for the computable mind theory to be false, what is its scientific value?

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#87

Post by claudiawerner »

yters wrote: post #86
claudiawerner wrote: post #82

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>There is plenty of useful work which doesn't specify a falsifiable hypothesis, but it's not science until it does so. That's quite a bold statement which is not supported by current work in the philosophy of science. Would you be willing to claim that most papers submitted to Nature don't count as science? >No. Again, being falsifiable means that astrology can be a subject of scientific study. It doesn't make it sci…

So if it is not possible for the computable mind theory to be false, what is its scientific value?

I don't know about this specific case; I was only taking issue with the idea of pure falsificationism to distinguish science from pseudo-science. There are other demarcations (listed in the SEP article linked a few comments ago) which may also list the computational theory of mind as pseudo-scientific, but not just because it's unfalsifiable (if it really is).

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#88

Post by QuanticSausage »

naasking wrote: post #60
mjburgess wrote: post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's an argument for a research paradigm, its not an argument for the truth. If there are fatal problems with Theory-A, Theory-A isn't true. No matter how much Theory-A might help with some other problem you have. The CCTM is the research paradigm for modern AI, parts of cognitive science, etc. -- and insofar as it provides a clear set of assumptions to arrive at useful models, so be it. Alexa can turn the lights o…

> I doubt she will ever know what a "light" is, or what she is doing when she turns it "on". You mean Alexa may never know what we mean by "light" or "turning it on". Neither would an intelligent alien that doesn't rely on sight. That doesn't entail that such a creature isn't intelligent, or doesn't have a mental life, or its operations doesn't operate on a model consisting of a set of propositions. > There is no "lo…

> An intelligent alien that doesn't rely on sight. You don't have to go that far. A person blind from birth is enough an example.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#89

Post by pegasus »

BadThink6655321 wrote: post #59
mLuby wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>biological intelligence works like a Turing machine We know it doesn't. There's no metaphorical linear tape in the brain; it's a network of neurons. But a Turing machine can simulate a network of neurons (see Machine Learning), just as a brain can model a Turing machine (see Programmer). There are currently things a brain can think about that a Turing machine cannot, but the question is whether that will continue to…

> There are currently things a brain can think about that a Turing machine cannot... Such as? Are these things forbidden by theory, or just simply beyond current engineering practice?

Richard Penrose has written extensively on this subject in his book "Shadows of the Mind".

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#90

Post by yters »

claudiawerner wrote: post #87
yters wrote: post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So if it is not possible for the computable mind theory to be false, what is its scientific value?

I don't know about this specific case; I was only taking issue with the idea of pure falsificationism to distinguish science from pseudo-science. There are other demarcations (listed in the SEP article linked a few comments ago) which may also list the computational theory of mind as pseudo-scientific, but not just because it's unfalsifiable (if it really is).

I just use falsifiability as a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition.
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