Earlier quoted context omitted.
We criminalize other actions which result in harm to people. Why not software bugs too?
Well, there's two big differences... Planes have far fewer unknown unknowns than software: the specter bug in Intel chips is a great example of a place where the standard operating procedure was wrong, but no one ever knew it. It wasn't a case of negligence, though it had real world impact. The other big difference is that (for the most part) keeping a passenger plane in the air isn't an adversarial task. Actual brea…
Wang&already, 2006: “Information leakage through covert channels and side channels is becoming a serious problem, especially when these are enhanced by modern processor architecture features. We show how processor architecture features such as simultaneous multithreading, control speculation and shared caches can inadvertently accelerate such covert channels or enable new covert channels and side channels. We first illustrate the reality and severity of this problem by describing concrete attacks. We identify two new covert channels. We show orders of magnitude increases in covert channel capacities. We then present two solutions, Selective Partitioning and the novel Random Permutation Cache (RPCache). The RPCache can thwart most cache-based software side channel attacks, with minimal hardware costs and negligible performance impact.”
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.190...