Hacker News Board Hacker News, browsed like a classic message board
Live data from Hacker News

The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

functionalneurology.com

Post reply on HN
Print view View original

81–90 of 97 posts

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#81

Post by dang »

goto11 wrote: post #4

Sounds like a crackpot theory by someone not understanding literature. Because the Illiad does not contain the word "mind" and describes events and actions but not thoughts and mental states, it follows that people at the time did not have consciousness. I guess Hemmingway did not have consciousness either?

This comment breaks two of HN's most important guidelines:

"Please don't post shallow dismissals, especially of other people's work. A good critical comment teaches us something."

"Please respond to the strongest plausible interpretation of what someone says, not a weaker one that's easier to criticize."

If you'd review https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html and follow the rules when posting here, we'd appreciate it.

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#82

Post by thanatropism »

theoh wrote: post #80
thanatropism wrote: post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

About entering the Imaginary: you're in the right. That said, there are a number of stages in the development of Lacan's thought (Malcolm Bowie counts three); he starts out ostensibly as a clinician but gradually expands his concepts outwards until they're a generalized theory of subjectivity. From this point we can argue whether societies have structures somehow resembling subjectivity - as an economist I've spent a…

Well, I've never heard of Lacanian economics, but there are plenty of fields in which understanding a bit about Lacan is essential if you want to appreciate the canon. Lacan as a person/analyst doesn't seem appealing to me, but some kind of psychodynamic therapy surely has a future in the long term, as insight accumulates into the mind. So Lacan seems like something to cautiously sift through for insight. The social…

Economists don't use Lacan yet, no.

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#83

Post by akvadrako »

goto11 wrote: post #79
akvadrako wrote: post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I get that the analysis of the Iliad doesn't prove anything and it could just be a stylistic thing, but that doesn't mean the general story he lays out if totally wrong. The theory is valuable because it's a good explanation for a lot of things and it doesn't disagree with the evidence. That's the purpose of all scientific theories, in Popper's philosophy of science, which is still the most relevant. I haven't heard…

So what could theoretically disprove the theory?

I'm sure you can think of some things, but as long as it agrees with the available evidence and is the "best explanation", which includes some subjective and objective criteria, it's a valuable theory.

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#84

Post by goto11 »

akvadrako wrote: post #83
goto11 wrote: post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So what could theoretically disprove the theory?

I'm sure you can think of some things, but as long as it agrees with the available evidence and is the "best explanation", which includes some subjective and objective criteria, it's a valuable theory.

You specifically mention Popper. Poppers criteria of falsification states that it is not enough that a theory can explain everything. He observed that a lot of pseudoscience (astrology, marxism, freudian psychology at the time) really could be used to explain everything and couldn't really be disproved by any observation. Real scientific theories on the other hand could be used to make predictions which could be verified or shown to be wrong.

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#85

Post by goto11 »

dang wrote: post #81
goto11 wrote: post #4

Sounds like a crackpot theory by someone not understanding literature. Because the Illiad does not contain the word "mind" and describes events and actions but not thoughts and mental states, it follows that people at the time did not have consciousness. I guess Hemmingway did not have consciousness either?

This comment breaks two of HN's most important guidelines: "Please don't post shallow dismissals, especially of other people's work. A good critical comment teaches us something." "Please respond to the strongest plausible interpretation of what someone says, not a weaker one that's easier to criticize." If you'd review https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html and follow the rules when posting here, we'd appr…

Fair enough, I have elaborated my criticism in other comments. The reference to Hemmingway might seem flippant, but my point was that the Iliad is told in a certain genre or style where thoughts and mental states or not directly described, only events and actions. This is a particular style of narrative which is not confined to a specific stage in human development but exist throughout history, and even today is pretty popular ("show, don't tell"). Movies generally follow this form and voice-overs explaining the characters thoughts are the exception rather than the rule.

So to claim that the narrative style of the Iliad shows that the people does not have a concept of mind and did not have self awareness is just not justified. The narrative style certainly does not prove that, but on the other hand it is impossible to disprove that Achilles lacked consciousness. Which puts this theory into the realm of the nonfalsifiable.

This is akin to the crackpot theory that the ancient Greeks were not able to perceive the color blue, because that word does not occur in Homer. This is just an incredibly naive understanding of the connection between mind and language. While Homeric Greek might not have such a word, there is absolutely no evidence that their sensory system was different.

Furthermore, taking the Iliad as face value is highly problematic. While historians generally agree that there probably was a war, there is no evidence that any of the persons actually existed or existed at the time. The characters might be legendary or mythological. Note that basically all of them descends from gods a few generations back. Achilles is literally half-god. We know that Helen was worshiped as a deity in Sparta for example. If she was actually a mythological figure, we don't really need some complicated psychological theory to explain how one mythological being could talk to another!

So I think it is fair to say the theory have a naive approach to literature.

The second part of the criticism is that the theory does not actually explain anything. The bicameral mind is supposed to explain how people at the time interacted with Gods. It was actually just the other half of the brain giving advice. OK, but the theory also claims that the the integration of the mind happens some time between the composition of the Iliad and the Odyssey (because Odysseys clearly do have a concept of mind with first-person narrative and so on). Which means the theory can't explain the gods appearing in the Odyssey.

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#86

Post by WaddyJones »

bloak wrote: post #12
goto11 wrote: post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well if the theory is bullshit then surely it does not actually help anyone understand religion? So the Gods are speaking to people in the Iliad because it was actually one half of the brain speaking to the other. But the Odyssey allegedly is composed after the watershed moment, but Gods are still speaking to people. So the theory does not actually explain anything about religion. The theory can "rationally" explain…

There are people today who hear voices, but they are a minority and we label them as mentally ill. The Jaynes hypothesis, as I understand it, is that in early civilisations the majority of the population heard voices and it was considered normal. If you see a reference in literature to a god speaking to someone, you can't easily tell whether that's fiction, metaphor, an exaggeration, a lie, a narrative style, or a li…

Dude you’re a fool. There is such a group, it’s called sleep deprived people.

Stay up for five days and I literally guarantee you will hear voices and realize that jaynes theory is 100% correct.

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#87

Post by WaddyJones »

hliyan wrote: post #24
bencollier49 wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'd be willing to bet that if you took a sample of people who'd trained themselves to lucid dream, you'd find a high proportion of people who heard voices. Specifically upon sleeping and waking.

I'd be a counter-example. I frequently dream lucidly. But I never hear voice or see anything even remotely resembling hallucinations. I'm also one of those individuals who are not susceptible to hypnosis (I've had a professional try and fail repeatedly).

There is no such thing as an individual who is not susceptible to hypnosis because all hypnosis is self hypnosis. In fact you had to hypnotize yourself into believing that you’re not susceptible to hypnosis, which proves that the opposite is true.

On another note—

Actually, you do hear voices. You just don’t notice them because you assume that they are your “inner voice.” If you just gave the process of thinking your thoughts a different label, you could easily call it “hearing a voice.” I’m not trying to be a smart ass here, don’t you think that this is true ? IMO, the idea that “thinking thoughts” and “hearing voices” are just different vague metaphorical labels for the same internal phenomenon makes a lot of sense.

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#88

Post by akvadrako »

goto11 wrote: post #84
akvadrako wrote: post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm sure you can think of some things, but as long as it agrees with the available evidence and is the "best explanation", which includes some subjective and objective criteria, it's a valuable theory.

You specifically mention Popper. Poppers criteria of falsification states that it is not enough that a theory can explain everything. He observed that a lot of pseudoscience (astrology, marxism, freudian psychology at the time) really could be used to explain everything and couldn't really be disproved by any observation. Real scientific theories on the other hand could be used to make predictions which could be veri…

I mentioned Popper because of his emphasis on good explanations. It’s a lot more than falsifiability.

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#89

Post by akvadrako »

apk-d wrote: post #36
goto11 wrote: post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is also non-falsifiable since it is impossible to prove or disprove whether ancient people were conscious or not. Or for that matter whether a present-day schizophrenic is conscious or not in the same sense.

Can we even prove whether a modern person is conscious? If so, shouldn't we be able to occasionally encounter such unconscious people, either occurring randomly by natural variation (especially given how recently the breakdown is claimed to have happened), or in people who had very little contact with language (hard but not impossible to come by)?

It’s easy to imagine that somebody raised by apes or otherwise totally isolated from humans would not be conscious, but without teaching them to think consciously how could we ever know?

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#90

Post by Communitivity »

I highly recommend anyone trying to understand this subject read the papers of Dr. Mica Endsley, former Chief Scientist of the US Air Force.

She makes a distinction between the 3 levels of Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding. Here are the 3 levels of Situational Awareness she proposed:

* Perception of Elements in Current Situation

* Comprehension of Current Situation

* Projection of Future Status

Here is a diagram: http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3044/2900713433_f295107549_o....

From: http://wikiofscience.wikidot.com/quasiscience:situational-aw...

Probably the best place to start is: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/210198492_Endsley_M...

I think this paper, and others of hers, should be recommended reading for any AI researcher. I also think "Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" should be recommended as well.

FYSA, the research community seems split on Dr. Endsley's theories, though there seem to be a majority that view them as correct, based on my own informal experience.

From Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mica_Endsley):

* Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors, 37(1), 32-64.

* Endsley, M. R. (1995). Measurement of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors, 37(1), 65-84.

* Endsley, M. R., & Garland, D. J. (Eds.). (2000). Situation awareness analysis and measurement. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

* Endsley, M. R., & Jones, W. M. (2001). A model of inter- and intrateam situation awareness: Implications for design, training and measurement. In M. McNeese, E. Salas & M. Endsley (Eds.), New trends in cooperative activities: Understanding system dynamics in complex environments (pp. 46-67). Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.

* Endsley, M. R. (2006). Expertise and Situation Awareness. In K. A. Ericsson, N. Charness, P. J. Feltovich & R. R. Hoffman (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (pp. 633-651). New York: Cambridge University Press.

* Endsley, M. R., & Jones, D. G. (2012). Designing for situation awareness: An approach to human-centered design (2nd ed.). London: Taylor & Francis.

Post reply on HN