Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not at the cost of leaving end users vulnerable and in the dark, vendors can deal with the consequences of their choices. Hard lessons are needed, having attempted to disclose serious vulnerabilities in T-Mobile USA's APIs by reaching out repeatedly, most vendors will not patch in an urgent manner, and some (like T-Mobile) are content to leak customer info indefinitely. It is a culture problem, and it will take (fina…
So... It's okay to harm third parties, i. e. VirtualBox users, not just as an unfortunate but unavoidable side effect, but as your means to punish the vendor for their (neglient? wilful? morally depraved?) failure to follow the idealised processes you envision, and for not honouring your genius with whatever your ego believes it is owed?
VirtualBox E1000 Guest-to-Host Escape
81–90 of 118 posts
Re: VirtualBox E1000 Guest-to-Host Escape
#82I think the author brings up a good point about so-called "responsible disclosure" (a self-serving term by the vendors). I'm paraphrasing his 3 reasons for disclosing immediately: 1. It's unacceptable to wait half a year until a vulnerability is patched. 2. Bug bounties are riddled with tricks to delay you, shenanigans as to whether they'll pay you or not, and games to low ball the price. 3. It's arrogant to wait mon…
>SSDs that encrypt the drive with a key that doesn't depend on the password
AFAIK, this is the standard practice in software harddrive/filesystem encryption - LUKS, TrueCrypt, etc., for practical reasons, and with no negative impact on security if properly implemented. AFAIK again, this is also how Firefox handles encryption of stored website login/password credentials - they are always encrypted using locally generated & held key; in case user supplies her own password, this key is encrypted with that password, with no change to the actual login/password store.
Contrast the following two scenarios:
- derive encryption key from user-supplied password [potentially weak key]
- encrypt the whole device / filesystem with the key [very long process, prone to interruption]
- user wishes to change the password
- re-encrypt the whole device / filesystem with the new key [very long process, prone to interruption]
vs.
- generate a cryptographically secure random or pseudorandom key
- store the password in device
- encrypt device with the key from the first write onward
- when user sets password, encrypt the stored key [no change to content of device necessary]
- from that point the user password is necessary to use the decryption/encryption key
- when the user changes password, re-encrypt the stored key only [no change to content of device necessary]
The second scenario is also more amenable to implementing various multi-password schemes, password-recovery techniques, and encryption secured with both passwords and hardware tokens.
Re: VirtualBox E1000 Guest-to-Host Escape
#83The number 3. oh my. It's ridiculous what people do with the bugs their found since Heartbleed. I don't remember anything like that before, but ever since every security issue needs a logo and a catchphrase for some reason.
Re: VirtualBox E1000 Guest-to-Host Escape
#84Re: VirtualBox E1000 Guest-to-Host Escape
#85The number 3. oh my. It's ridiculous what people do with the bugs their found since Heartbleed. I don't remember anything like that before, but ever since every security issue needs a logo and a catchphrase for some reason.
Re: VirtualBox E1000 Guest-to-Host Escape
#86The author must be referring to third-party, vendor-agnostic programs such as the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI), SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure (SSD), or the Accenture iDefense VCP (unless he was planning to sell to a non-disclosing entity). Keep in mind that the main purpose of these programs is PR (in the case of SSD) or a specific part of a security product (TippingPoint). I am not surprised that the value of a vulnerability in these scenario varies heavily over time. For example, if your purpose is to write a blog post and highlight your security research, maybe it's not as interesting if you have written another post about the same software recently.
The real question is, what is a business model by which a third party can make money off of vulnerabilities despite reporting to the vendor. This is a tough problem to solve. Maybe it's time to have the users of software contribute financially in some way?
Re: VirtualBox E1000 Guest-to-Host Escape
#87This [1] gives a little more background. The same security researcher found another vulnerability in VirtualBox earlier this year, and didn't have a great experience with Oracle: “We reported this vulnerability to Oracle, the latest update from them is that they are still looking into it, while in fact the latest version of Oracle VirtualBox version 5.2.18 has silently introduced a patch without giving credit or ment…
Re: VirtualBox E1000 Guest-to-Host Escape
#88I think the author brings up a good point about so-called "responsible disclosure" (a self-serving term by the vendors). I'm paraphrasing his 3 reasons for disclosing immediately: 1. It's unacceptable to wait half a year until a vulnerability is patched. 2. Bug bounties are riddled with tricks to delay you, shenanigans as to whether they'll pay you or not, and games to low ball the price. 3. It's arrogant to wait mon…
While you raise very good points overall, this one I have beef with: >SSDs that encrypt the drive with a key that doesn't depend on the password AFAIK, this is the standard practice in software harddrive/filesystem encryption - LUKS, TrueCrypt, etc., for practical reasons, and with no negative impact on security if properly implemented. AFAIK again, this is also how Firefox handles encryption of stored website login/…
If the key were properly encrypted (as you describe) the password check could not have been bypassed.
Re: VirtualBox E1000 Guest-to-Host Escape
#89I think the author brings up a good point about so-called "responsible disclosure" (a self-serving term by the vendors). I'm paraphrasing his 3 reasons for disclosing immediately: 1. It's unacceptable to wait half a year until a vulnerability is patched. 2. Bug bounties are riddled with tricks to delay you, shenanigans as to whether they'll pay you or not, and games to low ball the price. 3. It's arrogant to wait mon…
The marketplace gives very few shits about security vulnerabilities, despite the constant stream of outrageous defects. The real market force is selling consulting and security gizmos imo. Nobody is ditching peoplesoft because it’s a a security disaster — they double down and buy accessories to secure it.
Big companies like Microsoft got security religion when the prospect of liability started becoming real, particularly when Blaster/Welchia paralyzed big networks in the 2000s.
Re: VirtualBox E1000 Guest-to-Host Escape
#90Earlier quoted context omitted.
Does Oracle have a track record of being The Worst about this or should I have assumed as such given my preconceived notions of them being the classic villain in the tech world?
From GP's link: > While the crashing bug was reported to the VirtualBox tracker ( https://www.virtualbox.org/ticket/16444 ), it was never considered a security vulnerability, and is not marked as one. This ticket is 15 months old at the time of writing this post and still marked as unresolved. They might not be The Worst, but at 15 months, they're not great.