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The soccer ball that survived the Challenger explosion

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Re: The soccer ball that survived the Challenger explosion

#81

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What is worse and worse about this post?

The subject of it.

People who think of themselves as "hackers" ought to be keenly interested in the entire Shuttle program, especially failure cases, and perhaps even more strongly interested in the human elements related to them.

These things were truly marvels of engineering (in both positive and negative respects). The kinds of thought that goes into these kinds of things, and so many other in the physical engineering world, make "hacking" look trite in many ways.

Re: The soccer ball that survived the Challenger explosion

#82
post #15
post #2

I did not know what to expect from ESPN, this was a really well written article.

espn's more long-form storytelling is top notch. check out their 30 for 30 documentary series, they're fantastic.

Thanks for the heads up - I'll check them out!

Re: The soccer ball that survived the Challenger explosion

#83
post #10

"the solid rocket boosters ignited and somewhere in the right booster, a 0.280-inch-wide O-ring failed due to the cold." The 'solid rocket boosters' being constructed in segments because they had to be transported by rail from Utah. They had to be constructed in that state as part of the deal to get the politicians to vote in the finances.

I see what you're getting at, but the separate construction and transport was not the issue here. The O ring was a necessary pressure valve, but it failed because the cold made it brittle. The bigger issue here was the politics between Nasa and it's contractors. The contractors told them that the launch would be dangerous at the temperature, but they were ignored.

>The O ring was a necessary pressure valve

Do you have a reference for this? Seems very intriguing to me. To me it seems the last thing you would want, under any circumstances would be to have hot gases coming out anywhere near the hydrogen tank and you'd make every effort to contain any overpressure until it exited beyond the hydrogen tank.

Re: The soccer ball that survived the Challenger explosion

#84
post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is a well studied problem, it wasn't overthinking, it was "go fever", specifically in the form of "Normalization of Deviance" [1]. Morton-Thiokol and NASA set criteria for safety margins on the Shuttle system. And the Shuttle kept on violating those safety margins again and again. Instead of grounding the fleet or studying the problem further or attempting to ameliorate the problem the safety margins were loosen…

> that a Shuttle loss was a 1 in 100,000 probability I'm not sure how anyone could say that with a straight face. Serious events happen with commercial aircraft at a rate of about 1 in 1M. Figure that a rocket is inherently 100X more dangerous. And that the lack of repetitive experience with rockets bumps the risk another 1:100. Meaning you build a lot of aircraft and fly them all the time you get good at knowing whe…

The '80s in particular were a time of greater trust in government and greater mass conformity in popular culture. The media by and large did not challenge these absurd estimates, nor did schools, nor did, largely, the public. At the time NASA was near the peak of its reputation. It had achieved the moon landing, it was the middle of the Cold War were NASA's achievements were an important battleground, and so on. Overall the tendency was to simply defer to NASA's judgment.

There was also a bit of self-delusion going on. The Shuttle system was, by design, the backbone of spaceflight (manned and unmanned) in the US at the time. On the one hand you could believe that the Shuttle system was a modern miracle, fully capable of achieving (or nearly so) its design promises of cheap and ubiquitous spaceflight, ushering in a new space age, including the launch and assembly of a next generation space station in the near future, and possibly including the realization of manned missions to Mars within the next decade or two. The competing view, that the Shuttle was a risky launch system that could never achieve its design promises even within an order of magnitude, was a vastly depressing (though in retrospect realistic) one. Holding that view meant that we would have to go back to the drawing board and spend maybe another decade building a new launch system that would reset us back to the way things were in the 1960s, and then we'd have to slowly crawl our way toward incremental progress. That was a very difficult truth to accept, ironically more difficult the more you were invested in space exploration.

Sometimes reality is a tough pill to swallow.

Re: The soccer ball that survived the Challenger explosion

#85
post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> that a Shuttle loss was a 1 in 100,000 probability I'm not sure how anyone could say that with a straight face. Serious events happen with commercial aircraft at a rate of about 1 in 1M. Figure that a rocket is inherently 100X more dangerous. And that the lack of repetitive experience with rockets bumps the risk another 1:100. Meaning you build a lot of aircraft and fly them all the time you get good at knowing whe…

The '80s in particular were a time of greater trust in government and greater mass conformity in popular culture. The media by and large did not challenge these absurd estimates, nor did schools, nor did, largely, the public. At the time NASA was near the peak of its reputation. It had achieved the moon landing, it was the middle of the Cold War were NASA's achievements were an important battleground, and so on. Over…

> There was also a bit of self-delusion going on.

What I think is interesting is how you could judge the success of the Apollo missions. One one hand they succeeded if your willing to ignore the Apollo 1 fire. But as I referenced the four critical failures. I think sober hindsight paints a picture of luck on the ragged edge.

One thing though I I think one needs to be aware of how risk gets amortized over time. Airliners are in heavy service and so the catastrophes due to design and operation holes is atomized over a lot of flights, where the shuttle never really was ever anything more than a few prototypes. Consider Boeing's first three 787's. Boeing planned to sell those but they've been written off. One can guess why.

Re: The soccer ball that survived the Challenger explosion

#86
post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> that a Shuttle loss was a 1 in 100,000 probability I'm not sure how anyone could say that with a straight face. Serious events happen with commercial aircraft at a rate of about 1 in 1M. Figure that a rocket is inherently 100X more dangerous. And that the lack of repetitive experience with rockets bumps the risk another 1:100. Meaning you build a lot of aircraft and fly them all the time you get good at knowing whe…

A much more rigorous analysis was done for the Shuttle program, and the estimate of the risk of vehicle loss turned out to be very close to reality. There was some coverage of the relatively high risk values in the popular science press well before Challenger happened.

Are you talking about the analysis after the program, or before? I presume you mean after....

Re: The soccer ball that survived the Challenger explosion

#87
post #23

I was visiting farmers reviewing plans for the next crop year. I'd just arrived and the farmer says do you mind if we watch the Challenger launch before starting? It's got that teacher going up in space. I told him that my high school government teacher had been one of the ten finalists so I took a pretty keen interest myself. I can remember the numbness I felt in his living room as we watched the Challenger explode.…

> The night before the launch, Ebeling and four other engineers had tried to stop the launch. Their managers and NASA overruled them. That night, he told his wife, "It's going to blow up." This sent chills down my spine... the world just shouldn't be like this.

Texas A&M's engineering program has a required course called Engineering Ethics. A portion of the course is devoted to analyzing the Challenger disaster.

During a late-night teleconference the night before the launch, the engineers pleaded with their managers not to launch. One decision maker was told, "Take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat," and he reluctantly changed his mind (a decision he has regretted for decades, of course).

It's also telling that, after the decision was made to approve the launch, none of the engineers agreed to sign off.

https://www.engineering.com/Blogs/tabid/3207/ArticleID/170/c...

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