How useful are such measures when Intel has backdoored each and everyone of their CPUs with its "Intel Management Engine" [0] (and AMD has a similar mechanism)? If Intel/AMD have a backdoor into every PC and server, then so does the US gov't (NSA, CIA, FBI, etc.) and of course other uninvited hackers from even hostile countries. And how did Western society just accept all of this anti-democratic craziness? [0] https:…
So I guess you just use 12345678 as your password everywhere?
Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2
81–90 of 94 posts
Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2
#82Earlier quoted context omitted.
> How useful are such measures when Intel has backdoored each and everyone of their CPUs with its "Intel Management Engine" [0] (and AMD has a similar mechanism)? If you trust this YubiHSM but not Intel CPUs, then it is very useful since encryption/decryption occurs on the YubiHSM, not the connected CPU. Just plug it into a computer with a CPU you do trust first to get the official public key(s) for future verificati…
If an attacker controls your computer, there is always the possibility of a man in the middle, even if you use a Yubikey. The attacker could simply wait for a request to the HSM and intercept the response.
Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2
#83Earlier quoted context omitted.
But they don't have the private key, that's the whole point of the hardware device! They can't MITM the encrypted data without it. plaintext crypto blob *compromised server/anything but quantum computing* blob crypto / YubiHSM Edit: I'm not talking about this: *my compromised PC* plaintext crypto blob crypto / Yubikey In practice, getting anything done involves some CPU doing something useful with plaintext, if that'…
There are two potential attack scenarios, assuming some attacker A has full control of the PC connected to the Yubikey: 1. A somehow convinces the remote party that the actual public key is X' instead of X. Ciphertext comes in, attacker decrypts it. Done. 2. A intercepts ciphertext, feeds it to Yubikey for decryption, and gets the resulting plaintext over USB (or whatever). Note: this is assuming that the Yubikey doe…
As long as you mitigate the current exploit, you've stopped any forgeries from that point forward.
Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2
#84How much of a market is there for HSMs that are not FIPS 140-2 certified?
I've worked on several FIPS projects, and there's not a big demand for FIPS 140-2 unless the customer is handling government contracts and/or data. It's a good checkmark to have though.
Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2
#85$650 is cheap?
Yup. Hsm pcie cards are around $5k, maybe more. The pizza box versions are upwards of 10k... that’s the last price I seen.
This HSM has limited key storage capabilities to a hundred or so security objects.
The "pizza box vendors" stores hundreds to thousands of keys.
We typically employ key wrapping to reduce HSM key storage requirements, but only in certain situations.
Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2
#86The SC4-HSM also includes dedicated I/O (a display and two buttons) which makes it more secure than the Yubikey.
Disclosure: this is my product.
Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2
#87How useful are such measures when Intel has backdoored each and everyone of their CPUs with its "Intel Management Engine" [0] (and AMD has a similar mechanism)? If Intel/AMD have a backdoor into every PC and server, then so does the US gov't (NSA, CIA, FBI, etc.) and of course other uninvited hackers from even hostile countries. And how did Western society just accept all of this anti-democratic craziness? [0] https:…
> How useful are such measures when Intel has backdoored each and everyone of their CPUs with its "Intel Management Engine" [0] (and AMD has a similar mechanism)? If you trust this YubiHSM but not Intel CPUs, then it is very useful since encryption/decryption occurs on the YubiHSM, not the connected CPU. Just plug it into a computer with a CPU you do trust first to get the official public key(s) for future verificati…
A HSM does make attacks more difficult, and that is important. On the other hand, computers without backdoors would be _the_ significant step, though, to change the game.
I fundamentally dislike Intel and AMD for their stance on this. And I'm not alone.
Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2
#88Earlier quoted context omitted.
> How useful are such measures when Intel has backdoored each and everyone of their CPUs with its "Intel Management Engine" [0] (and AMD has a similar mechanism)? If you trust this YubiHSM but not Intel CPUs, then it is very useful since encryption/decryption occurs on the YubiHSM, not the connected CPU. Just plug it into a computer with a CPU you do trust first to get the official public key(s) for future verificati…
If your computer is backdoored, then a HSM does not protect effectively against that attacker. At some point the computer will see the data, at which point it can be extracted. The key is not important to the attacker which can read the unencrypted data. A HSM does make attacks more difficult, and that is important. On the other hand, computers without backdoors would be _the_ significant step, though, to change the…
Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2
#89An even lower cost (and open-source) alternative: https://sc4.us/hsm The SC4-HSM also includes dedicated I/O (a display and two buttons) which makes it more secure than the Yubikey. Disclosure: this is my product.