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Why Trello Failed to Build a $1B Business

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Re: Why Trello Failed to Build a $1B Business

#81
post #70
post #61

Not a billion dollar business yet != failed to build a billion dollar business. How do you keep scaling the revenue? Get bigger customers. Where do you get those big deep-pockets customers? The enterprise. How do you sell to big enterprise? With a big enterprise salesforce. Ok. With that, you can either build your own enterprise sales machine (which takes years), or you can sell out to someone who already has one. Li…

There are plenty of companies who have scaled their revenue beyond this point without an enterprise salesforce - Trello's acquirer is one of them Its not a hard rule that to reach beyond $x you need to become an enterprise

Google had no enterprise sales for a decade. They did fine.

Re: Why Trello Failed to Build a $1B Business

#83

As far as I recall (and I've been a Trello user nearly since it was released), it wasn't necessarily Fog Creek's intention to build a huge monetized business out of Trello. In fact, at some point, users started to get anxious that Trello was free and actually WANTED to throw money at the company. I suppose part of that was the perception that if you're paying for it, it will be more likely to survive and won't go awa…

Agreed. Furthermore, Atlassian is a 5 billion dollar business that Trello is now helping to build.

Re: Why Trello Failed to Build a $1B Business

#84
post #34

This is hilarious. Only in the bizarre world we live in could a half billion sale be spun out into a failure to get a billion. Would a billion have satisfied the author or would it have then needed to be two?

>Only in the bizarre world we live in could a half billion sale be spun out into a failure to get a billion. I can't speak for the author but selling Trello "for only $425m" is a failed outcome if the growth expectations was for it to become a massive $1 billion business. How do we know that? Because Trello took $10 million in VC money in 2014.[1] So we can just work backward from the $1 billion goal using basic math…

Your argument doesn't hold up. As you point out, most startups in the fund will turn out to be money losers. It therefore doesn't make sense to consider the opportunity cost of the $10m investment vs. only the unicorns but vs. the average return. An investment that returns more than the fund's overall target return is a winner. The opportunity cost is an investment in another company that will probably lose money, not a guaranteed unicorn.

Re: Why Trello Failed to Build a $1B Business

#85
This article should be titled how an MBA could have ruined a wonderful product. There is absolutely no way to maintain a useful horizontal product - which is what Trello is, and what makes it so great - and to simultaneously build a deep vertical product targeted at the enterprise. That is an entirely different thing (which Atlassian has already built and it's called Jira...and it's a rabbit hole of complexity out of the necessity to serve enterprise customers.)

Re: Why Trello Failed to Build a $1B Business

#86
post #69

As far as I recall (and I've been a Trello user nearly since it was released), it wasn't necessarily Fog Creek's intention to build a huge monetized business out of Trello. In fact, at some point, users started to get anxious that Trello was free and actually WANTED to throw money at the company. I suppose part of that was the perception that if you're paying for it, it will be more likely to survive and won't go awa…

I don't buy that narrative since Trello received $ 10M in funding [1] and you must convince investors to put that sum of money. [1] https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/trello#/entity

wait, WHAT?

if the investors got 16% of the company they got $80m, a ~8x return in 3 years.

And more likely they did better. Twitter did a series C, raised $17.4m at $104m valuation, and it was a pretty hot company to give up a bit less than 17%.

A great venture fund gets a unicorn, a legendary one gets two. A 1/2 unicorn that maybe returned most if not the entire fund is a great outcome. If 50% of the investments did that well it's a top-tier fund.

People are a little demanding if only decacorns are seen as wins. It's like expecting your team to win the World Series every year.

Re: Why Trello Failed to Build a $1B Business

#88
post #80
post #71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is regrettably out to lunch, my friend. A 10x return (and a nine-figure absolute return) in two years is "failure" all around? Only in the waning days of a market top would such an assertion (that such a return is a "failure" to anyone involved) even have a frisson of plausibility. Also, most of your numbers & ratios are order-of-magnitude right, but as they say, "horseshoes and hand grenades." A $442 M fund siz…

>is "failure" all around? It's definitely not failure all around. >A $442 M fund size is big enough that returning even a 3x-4x overall, with any consistency, would be downright virtuosic. A 3x return is 11.6%/year which isn't much more than Warren Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway (9.6% last time I checked) -- given the increased risk of VC funds. BH stock also doesn't have overhead of 2/20 fees. Every institutional inves…

11.6% a year for 10 years compounds out to 3x. If it was 10 years to 4x, that would be 15%. Which would be a very respectable risk premium over BH, the greatest publicly-traded large hedge fund/conglomerate of all time.

But, the "percent" returns, as opposed to cash-on-cash, aren't actually calculated that way. Most funds eventually call something close-ish to 100% of capital (1.0x paid-in), so you can meaningfully-ish talk about the "times money" on the entire fund. But it doesn't work for "percent" returns, which are necessarily annualized.

Funds call capital over time, not all at once. They also pay back distributions as they become liquid, not all at the end. Investors measure this with IRR, taking into account the timing and magnitudes of the cash flows. So a fund that posts up a 4x "times money" within ~ 10 years is going to have a substantially better IRR than 15%.

WRT LP expectations: institutional investors aren't just weighing VC against "safer investments." They look at long-term historical data about different asset classes, project out their best opinions about likely risk and return AND correlations among classes, and make a top-down decision about where to allocate. Then, within each bucket, they try to select a group of managers who can meet (or ideally safely beat) those assumptions. (If rather small, they may delegate this to a fund-of-funds; if rather large, they may further differentiate into various stages or strategies of venture, and the process is more or less fractal.)

Partly we may be talking past each other because "expect" here could mean various things. One thing that's clear is no major LP / institution is going to be invested only in one VC firm or only one vintage year. They think about these things in aggregate and over time.

If by "expect" you mean, "in aggregate and over time, some LPs project 20% IRR for the venture asset class (subject to a very high, like say 25%+ std dev)" I think that's very fair and you'd be right.

But if by "expect" you mean "LPs look at each venture investment and rely on it to consistently return 20% IRR, or that will have been deemed a failure" then you're not giving them enough credit.

#1 driver of venture performance: fund vintage year.

#2 driver of venture performance: manager persistence (manager skill/alpha).

But to bubble back up to the higher level: LPs who see 10x, 9-figure exits in 2 years coming out of the portfolio of a ~$400M fund are not going to say "why not $3B?" They are going to understand that it's a rare fund in a rare vintage year that is going to return 7x+ on the whole fund, and they are going to be exceedingly happy if the "off years" consistently return 3x.

Re: Why Trello Failed to Build a $1B Business

#90
I love Trello and used it a lot (before we moved on to something different and easier to understand for most people). However, even when it was important to our business and we had around 12 users (I know, still relatively small) using it, we never once felt and pressure to pay for the product.

Trello didn't build a $1B business because they never forced anyone to pay for their product, even when they were extracting significant value from the platform.

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