A Message to Our Customers • Hacker News Board

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#761

Post by plorg » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 8:14 PM UTC

If I understand correctly, any piece of software that would be used would need to be signed by Apple. Furthermore, the FBI's warrant(?) says specifically that it would only need to work for one device ID. Thus it would be relatively straightforward to create an update for the FBI that could pretty clearly only be used on the phone in question. Unless the FBI had Apple's signing key they could not reuse the software (assuming they couldn't break the bootloader chain of trust, which they apparently cannot if this is the route they are taking). Capability is not the grounds on which they are arguing.

This is a very clearly political refusal. Apple is saying that about as explicitly as they can in this message. Whether or not they can do it, Apple doesn't want to be caught in the game of being a government surrogate or having to determine for themselves if government requests are legitimate (imagine, say, if the Chinese government asked for data from a dissident's phone - would Apple want to risk that market by denying a request that they have complied with in the US?). It's unfortunate for them that the FBI is making this request while people still own phones like the 5c for which they could theoretically disable security features, as opposed to the newer phones which it is possible they are completely unable to defeat.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#762

Post by ajross » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 8:17 PM UTC

hannibalhorn wrote: post #730

ajross wrote: post #709

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But "on update" isn't really the issue. If the code can be swapped underneath it, how does it know an "update" took place? Again you're in the situation where all of that process would have to be managed by hardware , when what is really happening is that the enclave is a computer running signed software that can be replaced.

Sure, but the signed firmware could be written to delete any stored keys when it accepts an update and the phone's passphrase has not been provided. That's assuming that it manages it's own update process, has the firmware securely stored within it's own die, etc. It's entirely possible ... but only Apple really knows. I would not actually be shocked if they originally did wipe out stored info on firmware update, but…

But... the firmware is stored in external storage. How does it even detect that an update was performed? You're saying that if the hardware had affirmative control over all the secure storage (e.g. the RPMB partitions on eMMC, etc...), then it could have been written to do this blanking.

Well, yeah. But then you'd have a system that couldn't be updated in the field without destroying the customer data (i.e. you'd have a secure boot implementation that couldn't receive bug fixes at all).

It's a chicken and egg problem. You're handling the problem of the "iPhone" not being a 100% snoop-and-tamper-proof device by positing the existence of an "interior" snoop-and-tamper-proof device. But that doesn't work, because it's turtles all the way down.

Ultimately you have to get to a situation where there is a piece of hardware (hardware on a single chip, even) making this determination in a way that has to be 100% right from the instant the devices go out the door. And that's not impossible, but it's asking too much, sorry. We're never going to get that.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#763

Post by Guvante » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 8:21 PM UTC

sandworm101 wrote: post #760

ChuckMcM wrote: post #549

Earlier quoted context omitted.

".. what this means is that even Apple can't break into an iPhone with a secure passphrase (10+ characters) and disabled Touch ID - which is hackable with a bit of effort to get your fingerprint." That is not exactly true. They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security…

>>> I am really glad that one of the most valuable companies in the world is drawing a bright line in the sand. So I really support Tim's position on this one. Tim's position today might not be apple's position tomorrow. Apple is a large publicly traded company. They owe a duty only to shareholders. Fighting this fight will probably impact the bottom line. Tim's continuation may turn on the outcome. Cooperation may s…

> Large contracts might be on the line should Apple not play ball.

That almost certainly isn't the case. It is doubtful whether any other government organization cares about how they handle this case. Heck the FBI likely doesn't care as long as Apple doesn't do anything illegal.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#764

Post by jaggederest » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 8:24 PM UTC

the8472 wrote: post #756

AceJohnny2 wrote: post #651

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> That is not exactly true. They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security. No, they can't. A quick update to recent hardware practices: modern SoCs like Apple's have something called "Secure Enclave Processor" that's on-die. This is the first thing to start when the c…

To play devil's advocate: If they can be compelled to produce de-novo firmware for the purpose of data extraction they could also be compelled to design the means necessary to extract the data from the secure enclave, e.g. by prying the chips open and putting it under a scanning tunneling microscope.

The packages on those chips are usually designed to be melded to the underlying structures enough that opening them destroys the keys they're attempting to hide.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#765

Post by nemothekid » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 8:26 PM UTC

stevehawk wrote: post #683

mkaziz wrote: post #634

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why would it cause a significant drop? Where would those people go?

They'd go to Android. Apple only has a significant share of mobile users in the USA. Most other countries they are losing (globally they have something like 8% vs Android's 85% market share).

>Most other countries they are losing (globally they have something like 8% vs Android's 85% market share).

I'm not sure this is true once you factor in price range. The general knowledge is a lot of those Android devices are sub-$250.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#766

Post by return0 » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 8:27 PM UTC

plorg wrote: post #761

If I understand correctly, any piece of software that would be used would need to be signed by Apple. Furthermore, the FBI's warrant(?) says specifically that it would only need to work for one device ID. Thus it would be relatively straightforward to create an update for the FBI that could pretty clearly only be used on the phone in question. Unless the FBI had Apple's signing key they could not reuse the software (…

> would be relatively straightforward to create an update for the FBI that could pretty clearly only be used on the phone in question

How? Wouldn't the FBI reverse engineer it?

It seems like apple would have to update all phones to a new version (which would prevent the exploit provided to the FBI) before handing it to them.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#767

Post by maxnaut » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 8:29 PM UTC

Many may hate Apple, however it's undeniable that they're so committed to user security.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#768

Post by joezydeco » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 8:30 PM UTC

LeicaLatte wrote: post #284

Possible or not, the FBI seems to have formalized the issue using this opportunity. They are asking the questions they have been wanting to ask since the release of smartphones.

Didn't they try this with another (smaller, less publicized) case about 4 months ago?

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/10/apples-eula-gives-it-l...

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#769

Post by dfar1 » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 8:31 PM UTC

I know that because this is on hacker news, everyone is talking about whether it's possible to access the data, and if possible... how easy or how hard it is. But the focus should be on the whether there should be a clear line/understanding between security and privacy, or should we keep everything black and white as it is now, just looking at extreme cases?

If they cannot co-exist, I'd rather have more security and less privacy. But ideally, I shouldn't have to choose between them.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#770

Post by the8472 » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 8:32 PM UTC

jaggederest wrote: post #764

the8472 wrote: post #756

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To play devil's advocate: If they can be compelled to produce de-novo firmware for the purpose of data extraction they could also be compelled to design the means necessary to extract the data from the secure enclave, e.g. by prying the chips open and putting it under a scanning tunneling microscope.

The packages on those chips are usually designed to be melded to the underlying structures enough that opening them destroys the keys they're attempting to hide.

I think you're missing my point here.

Some people trot the argument that it's OK for the government to compel apple to deliver the backdoored firmware because the measures it would circumvent are not of cryptographic/information-theoretical nature.

Then one could expand that argument by saying that compelling physical reverse-engineering is also OK because the devices are not built to be physically impossible (read: laws of nature) to pry open.