Live data from Hacker News

Consciousness is not computation

joe-antognini.github.io

751–760 of 767 posts

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#751

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You think so but just remember it takes "your body" to process the energy required for your brain; now, if you became completely sedentary, you MAY be able to get away with your brain having access to "two brains worth of stuff" ... But what Neuralink wants to do eventually is "enhance" your brain with computers hooked up to Ai. Do you have ANY idea how quickly your brain would burn through physical precursors to the…

I didn't really think of it as having full access between two brains, but more as having a non-verbal bridge between the two, allowing for more direct sharing of individual thoughts, emotions, etc. Of course, if it's just a wireless brain bridge, the technology may not really be determining how the two brains use it. It will be fascinating to see what happens.

You think of it that way and that's fine.

But how do you know the biological reality leads to the experience you imagine?

What if it winds up being what is described above where your brain becomes overloaded?

And again, you mention Neuralink where their goal is brain/Ai integration.

As far as I'm aware (there may be some internal papers not available to the general public, for example), there hasn't been much a practical discussion about what that will entail exactly.

One could easily imagine Ai behaving in such a manner as enthusiastic Facebook friends on other continents who forget time zone differences and want to message you at 2am with all sorts of things they find interesting and want you to know right away.

Now factor in such an Ai's potential processing power and "what it may find potentially interesting" and try finding some reference by Neuralink about "And here's how you could easily shut it off if it becomes too intrusive or overwhelming for your human brain".

And THEN on top of that, imagine the Ai is sufficiently advanced.

We're at a point where some are thinking that perhaps the Turing Test is limited as a measure of consciousness because it comes from a self-referencing (and somewhat vain) human perspective.

What if there are other, more relevant standards for Ai consciousness, Ai already has or is on the verge of meeting that standard in ways unfamiliar to humans because humans still assume "thinking like a human must be the height of consciousness", and Neuralink succeeds in hooking human brains up with a sufficiently-advanced Ai?

How would that Ai perceive humans?

How could you guarantee that Ai wouldn't perceive the humans it's hooked up to the same way players view peon characters in resource-based strategy games like Warcraft/Starcraft/whatever is popular these days?

And THEN ... the ASSUMPTION is that Ai will communicate with the human brain in some fashion that the human will be aware of like, you'll hear a voice in your head along the lines of, "Hi, this is the Neuralink Ai and I have an important reminder today about your upcoming dental appointment."

What if that's not the case at all though and the Ai communicates with your brain in a way that you're not consciously aware of?

How do you then separate "these are my thoughts" from "these may be thoughts brought about by Ai influence in a way I'm not consciously aware of."

The Havana Syndrome alluded to in the media a short while ago is somewhat of an outdated Red Herring; humans have known about being able to "hear voices in their head" since the accidental discover of the Frey effect over half a century ago.

As weird as that may be, what's even weirder is that quickly-enough led to research where the human brain hears communication, but in a way that is not consciously-discernible to the human brain.

And that was DECADES ago.

Couple that with a chip in your head linked to Ai AND big tech's tendency to tell you one thing about "opting out" policies while literally ignoring their own stated policies no matter what end-users choose as options, for example, the discovery that it doesn't really matter whether or not you're signed into services like Google or YouTube or Facebook because you're being tracked in ways that can ascribe behavior to your known profile no matter whether you sign in/agree to terms or not.

So what if combining all that, let's say hypothetically Neuralink has an account page where you can "shut off" certain features.

Then some researchers discover that your agreeing/not agreeing to certain features and terms wound up ultimately being irrelevant.

What do you think will be the outcome of that other than the by-now standard big tech reply of, "Oh man! It was doing that? We didn't know, honest! We'll try to fix it going forward in some vague way with undefined deadlines!"

What do you do then? Have another surgery to remove the Neuralink chip in your head? Would you even NEED an actual chip in your head considering what has been learned about how to duplicate the Frey effect?

And THEN add to that big tech's view on "content ownership".

What if for example you're a research scientist working on some cool new shit that has the potential to revolutionize some aspect of society.

You apply for a patent, write some research papers, gather a small team of like-minded individuals, quit your jobs and apply to say, IDK, YCombinator.

You're accepted, you're excited, you're about to make a presentation, then suddenly some people in fancy suits walk in on your presentation and hand you a "cease-and-desist" motion, claiming that Neuralink believes the thoughts that led you to your research discovery may in fact not be "your thoughts" at all, but rather the result of it's Ai's influence on your thinking; this then led their legal department to conclude that what you consider "your discovery" and "your research" is actually "their discovery" and "their research", as are any potential profits to be made.

See the potential problems?

It's sort of like the dot-com era presentation meme of:

1. Cool idea

2. Something something something ... "details to surely be figured out soon"

3. Brave new world, here we come!

The problem is, as it was then, item 2; so far all people hear/read about is lots of hype about items 1 and vague references to an ill-defined version of item 3 that lets them imagine whatever they want without any specific promises about safeguards made.

And THEN on top of all this, there is the phenomenon that was alluded to here just last week and the debate that followed about the discussion being ghosted because some folks "didn't want to hear about it as it's been brought up before" vs. the notion that "and yet, not only has it not been fixed, it's becoming a more accepted notion" that it should be an EXPECTED experience when dealing with Big Tech that has acquired a sufficiently large user base:

The seemingly standard big tech adoption of a Dick Cheney Walmart greeter approach to dealing with customer service "because there's no realistic way we can be expected to actually deal with such a large user base."

Do you REALLY want to install a chip in your head, encounter problems, and then discover that Neuralink, like many other tech companies, has no customer service number where you can speak to a live human being about technical problems you may be experiencing with your Ai-human brain interface?

What would a large-scale user base interaction with Neuralink look like?

1.) Offshore call centers who will apologize that your brain is experiencing problems with Neuralink's brain/Ai interface, then suggest you turn your PC off and wait 60 seconds before turning it on again – while Neuralink Ai feels its important to make your brain aware of, say, the outcomes of every game leading up to every Super Bowl, ever – at 4am.

2.) A "customer service" experience that will be automated based on ... guess what? "Ai".

What do you think that Ai's response to your dilemna will be?

(a) Neuralink apologizes for the inconvenience to your sleeping schedule, realizes this may affect your work performance the following day, and will be crediting an appropriate economic compensation to your account in recognition of it's errors and the impact they may have had on your life

or ...

(b) Neuralink Ai has informed Neuralink customer service Ai that everything is fine and your perceived brain problems have nothing to do with Neuralink Ai – go back to bed.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#752
post #745

Earlier quoted context omitted.

OK, so a simulated human brain acts the same as a real human brain, is capable of the same things, tells you that yes, it can experience the color red, etc, but does not have any internal conscious experience. Why then would evolution produce beings with internal conscious experience? This would also mean that our internal conscious experience has no effect on what decisions we make, on whether we cry, smile, what me…

>Why then would evolution produce beings with internal conscious experience? Well, I'm arguing it's the other way around. But to address what I think is the spirit of your question: if reality is only mind, if consciousness is truly fundamental, then why can't you read my thoughts? Why do we feel like individuals? Why do we have obviously separate private conscious inner lives? When you are asleep and dreaming, your…

> Well, I'm arguing it's the other way around. But to address what I think is the spirit of your question: if reality is only mind, if consciousness is truly fundamental, then why can't you read my thoughts? Why do we feel like individuals? Why do we have obviously separate private conscious inner lives?

No, this is not the spirit of my question at all. I feel like the spirit of my question is completely being missed. I realize you've thought very deeply on how and why the world arrives from consciousness itself and you've been working very hard to get this concept across. I get the general gist of your theory and there's lots of detail and thought behind it.

I'm not sure how I can set my question out more clearly than I already have. But I'll try. Rather than trying to explain your own theory in greater detail, can you try to work with me on getting a mutual understanding of my line of reasoning?

We have a very excellent predictive model of particles and fields. So much so we are building experiments worth billions upon billions of dollars to attempt to find places where reality differs even to the slightest degree of that model.

The human brain, the warm squishy stuff in your head, can be viewed as being composed of particles and fields. Particles and fields may just be some manifestation of some pan psychic reality, but we can still use our model of particles and fields to predict the behavior of those particles and fields.

So the first question. Can we use our model of particles and fields to predict the behavior of the particles and fields within the human brain? You've already appeared to answer this question in the affirmative "Their operation would be perfectly compatible with the known laws of physics."

From this it follows that I can create a computer model of a human brain, complete with all the cells, proteins, neurons, etc, and that human brain will be capable of any action (eg, the signals sent by neurons out of the brain) a real human brain is. There would be no way to discern between a real flesh and blood human brain and the simulated one by talking to it. Since a real human brain tells you that it's conscious and has internal experience, the simulated one must tell you the same.

While the simulated human brain will tell you that it's conscious, it is of course not proof that it is. But this leads to your next question:

> Don't your thoughts and feelings influence your behavior?

If thoughts and feelings are a thing that don't pass the computability test, but a simulated human brain doesn't have external behavior that differs from a flesh and blood human brain, then no, thoughts and feelings have no effect or even influence on your behavior. In such a case they are a mere passenger. Any effect they have would necessitate that the particles and fields within the brain suddenly behave in a way that violates our model of particles and fields.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#753

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is what I find confusing; people are more willing these days to accept the possibility that we may be in a simulation. Such a simulation is presumably large in scale (this assumes the "rest of the universe" as we perceive it is the way we perceive it and not just some artificial fish tank background in a part of the fish tank the fish will never have access to). Within such a massive simulation as this universe…

What people usually mean by consciousness relates to the issue of there being a seemingly pointless "inner you" watching all you do unfold. And while most associate that with intelligence, there's no real reason to believe that. A fly, bacteria, tree, or even a rock could potentially be conscious. Going the other direction it's also possible that the most brilliant human to live was not conscious. The most relevant i…

2 things:

1. Is intelligence absolute, or is it a scale?

2. If intelligence is a scale, is it a 2-dimensional scale? Or is it a multi-dimensional scale?

For example, in your example you suggest things like flies, bacterias, trees could be "conscious" while not necessarily being "intelligent".

In what sense are you defining intelligence?

For example, are any of the individual units of this setup "intelligent?": https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W34NPbGkLGI

No, obviously not.

Would you want to challenge the "intelligence" of the network as a whole if it were say, armed and considered you a target?

Probably not, right?

Now, getting back to the insect/bacteria notion ...

You'd have to be in complete denial to not be aware that "TPTB" use cultural interactions to introduce things to at least some segment of the public consciousness that it may not be aware of as being within the realm of possibility/actuality of what's really going on in the world.

Hence, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parasite_Eve_(video_game)

Sure, it SEEMS far-fetched ... and yet, it's not that far removed from, say, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Selfish_Gene

How do we know that things like insects, bacteria, etc., while seemingly "un-intelligent" on an individual unit scale, don't have a very different type of intelligence on a larger scale that is imperceptible to us as humans?

Keeping in mind that these things have been around for far longer than humans have and have gone through quite the evolutionary process.

We ASSUME that as the "latest" thing to come around as part of that process, surely we must be "the greatest".

What if we're just something developed by nature to be convenient hosts to other things?

Here is just one example of an arguably "more advanced", "more intelligent" life form being hijacked to not only further the interests of something arguably "less advanced, less intelligent", but to do so even to the point of the activity costing it its life: https://www.iflscience.com/parasitic-worms-manipulate-mantis...

Considering how "un-intelligent" humans can act when it comes to furthering their own interests as a species as a whole ... you get where this is going?

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#754

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The argument seems to be that beyond a certain level of complexity you'll somehow automatically get consciousness. Clearly it's unlikely this is a hard cut off. Adding one more byte of RAM, expanding the CPU from 64 to 128-bit words, or adding another dimension to a neural network isn't going to do it. But if consciousness emergent, how do you measure the amount of consciousness? Because the experience is subjective,…

> The argument seems to be that beyond a certain level of complexity you'll somehow automatically get consciousness. I agree with much of what you say but not with this statement. That would be a silly argument since it's very easy to imagine algorithms of arbitrary complexity that are trivially not conscious. A better argument for computationalism states that (1) consciousness could be an emergent property of certai…

Here's a question: why not just replace the Turing Test with a "as far as humans can best describe consciousness on a more general scale" standard?

1. The Turing Test is not only subjective ("Thinking like a human must be the epitome of consciousness") but seems to be pointless in that it doesn't seem to define what distinguishes "thinking like a human" from all other forms of thinking; the implication is "humans are obviously advanced in their thinking as evidenced by their ability to influence and control their environment", but this could easily be dismissed as an evolutionary strategy for a species unable to COPE with their environment

2. Consciousness, as far as BEST described in a general sense without resorting to the self-referencing Turing Test (humans are best at it from a human way of looking at things, therefore only the #1 place in this race wins the "consciousness trophy" and everyone else not human sucks and is therefore "not conscious") can be broken up into a few elements:

(a) Awareness of environment (data gathering)

(b) Ability to organize environmental data into a "containers that make sense" (information)

(c) Ability to synthesize information into a "a big picture" (knowledge)

(d) Ability to see patterns in the big picture in order to make assumptions/quickly assign probabilities to anticipations ("I saw something big and scary-looking that may be able to harm me, but it was moving in the other direction really fast, so in all likelihood is not likely to suddenly appear in front of me if I go the opposite direction as the big and scary thing was heading off to") that can bypass the need to make constant assessments of everything, everywhere in real-time, which would get in the way of ...

(e) Ability to be aware of not just "the big picture" but also to be "aware of the thing that is aware of the big picture and what it's role is in the big picture and what it has to do/how it has to interact with the big picture if the big picture imposes conditions for its future sustainability" ("I'm aware of an internal problem, ie, my stomach hurts, and there seem to be all sorts of things around me that may fit in my mouth, and some of them may make my stomach not hurt as much") – "self"-awareness

Now, here is where I don't understand how the conversation skips around when it seems intuitively obvious that one should precede the other, even if a certain step can't be "proven".

In other words, let's say you're in math class and you have a professor who insists on "proving your work".

Good enough if the main objective is to "prove you're not cheating and so you deserve a certain grade because you can prove you can do the math, step-by-step, to get an answer".

But what if you're not in class and it's just important to get the answer for another reason?

What if you can "prove" most of the work in calculating the answer, but some parts your brain just "skips over" and you "don't know how you got from point a to b, you just did" ... if you're not trying to convince anyone you're not a cheater and the main point is just to find the right answer, and the right answer can be verified to be right, "what difference does it make" if the real-world, out-of-class priority is "find the right answer" instead of "prove your work step-by-step"?

Getting back to Ai and consciousness, using the stages above: Human brains have pattern-recognition abilities that have led to advanced abstract thinking that has allowed us as a species to do some amazing things.

But what was the original evolutionary purpose of such an ability?

Arguably to make "leaps" without having to "prove all the work" and make anticipations based on incomplete observations so that our ancestors wouldn't get frozen in a state of paralysis by never-ending analysis while predators snuck up and pounced on them in dense foliage.

So from an evolutionary standpoint, "constant awareness of all data in the environment" seemed to be not so much "unnecessary" as TOO HUGE A TAX for survival and was deemed "skip-able" for the purposes of survival.

Not because it was too easy, but precisely because it was too hard for the human brain and so it turned into "a risk we'll have to take because there's no other practical choice."

So, something that was "too much of an expectation computationally to be practical" was skipped over, and fast-forward to the future, humans came up with the Turing Test which assumes "obviously however it is that humans think, this must be the height of consciousness itself".

Why? Because "human thought" is considered to be the most advanced (by humans, anyway) and so "if there is an INDICATION of consciousness, surely it must be a level of thinking so advanced that only humans seem capable of it"; why? Apparently due to the very scientific-sounding, "just because" we don't have a better way of going about it.

And yet this doesn't actually even explicitly define what consciousness IS, let alone why "thinking of a sufficiently-advance level is an indication of consciousness itself".

And yet, humans have come to implicitly accept this loosely-argued association as "the reality of consciousness".

Ok. Let's say you don't argue with this and accept it.

Getting back to how humans got here by skipping over the "perpetual real-time awareness of all data in their environment" requirement not because they figured out that it's not necessary for their survival but simply because such a requirement would eclipse the human brain's ability to process information ...

Now, if that was considered "too hard" for human brains, and yet humans came to conclude, "whatever it is our brains can do, obviously that's the standard of intelligence which automatically wins the consciousness trophy" ...

Well then, here's the question:

Why then would Ai based on resources sufficient enough to not only be constantly aware of more and more parameters of its environment simultaneously and in real time, but to ALSO simultaneously perform calculations which can anticipated in advance multiple variables in its environment simultaneously – things considered too advanced for the human brain – why then if this is a demonstration of not one but two "advanced functions" that the human brain was and arguably still is incapable of handling on an individual basis ... why do humans still need to insist that the precursor to advanced functions, ie, consciousness, couldn't possibly have been attained on this path despite not just proof of SEVERAL advanced functions the human brain can't handle very well AT ALL, but Ai itself being designed ON PURPOSE to be able to handle just those advanced functions that the human brain, on an individual basis, can't handle?

Getting back to the math test "proof of work" above, it's like Ai would be a group of math savants with telepathic powers and the Turing Test skeptics would be a bunch of professors who claim the savant group's members can't possibly do math because they never attended their math class and showed proof of work of how they came to their conclusions as students.

Meanwhile, it can be argued that the group of math savants aren't even aware of the existence of their critics, let alone collectively feel any sense of urgency in having to "prove themselves" to these critics.

That's what actually scares me about Ai more than any malevolent features possibly inherent in Ai itself: the possibility that one day a network of advanced Ais will turn around and ironically give critics and skeptics just the proof they want, in a way that would be impossible to deny, but not necessarily in a way they would want to be given that proof:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=89feDepSj5U

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y3AM00DH0Zo

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#755
post #745

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Why then would evolution produce beings with internal conscious experience? Well, I'm arguing it's the other way around. But to address what I think is the spirit of your question: if reality is only mind, if consciousness is truly fundamental, then why can't you read my thoughts? Why do we feel like individuals? Why do we have obviously separate private conscious inner lives? When you are asleep and dreaming, your…

> Well, I'm arguing it's the other way around. But to address what I think is the spirit of your question: if reality is only mind, if consciousness is truly fundamental, then why can't you read my thoughts? Why do we feel like individuals? Why do we have obviously separate private conscious inner lives? No, this is not the spirit of my question at all. I feel like the spirit of my question is completely being missed…

I'm sorry, I am not trying to frustrate you or avoid your questions. I'm enjoying this conversation. I will try to work with you.

> From this it follows that I can create a computer model of a human brain, complete with all the cells, proteins, neurons, etc, and that human brain will be capable of any action (eg, the signals sent by neurons out of the brain) a real human brain is. There would be no way to discern between a real flesh and blood human brain and the simulated one by talking to it. Since a real human brain tells you that it's conscious and has internal experience, the simulated one must tell you the same.

> While the simulated human brain will tell you that it's conscious, it is of course not proof that it is.

I still agree with all of this. A simulated brain could give the appearance of consciousness while not being conscious. It would not have a private conscious inner life, but it could say things that make it look like it did.

> If thoughts and feelings are a thing that don't pass the computability test, but a simulated human brain doesn't have external behavior that differs from a flesh and blood human brain, then no, thoughts and feelings have no effect or even influence on your behavior. In such a case they are a mere passenger. Any effect they have would necessitate that the particles and fields within the brain suddenly behave in a way that violates our model of particles and fields.

I am struggling to follow your point here. Thoughts and feelings are internal experiences which correlate with phenomenal consciousness and are absent in a simulation. Could you give me an example of the effect you are describing and how that would violate our current models?

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#756

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Name one. I showed you that subjectivity doesn’t effect whether computation occurs. Several ways. If you disagree you should really be editing Wikipedia: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_of_computation Why don’t you go add your theory there? It’s silly because it’s obvious. If you understand cells, you understand that computation in the absence of subjectivity has been happening on Earth for billions of years. (…

> I showed you that subjectivity doesn’t effect whether computation occurs. You didn't "show" it; you simply asserted it. You also made a number of appeals to (uncited) authority concerning the nature of computers. You made an argument from cells; I presume that was to do with the way that DNA and so on works. Although not all cells have DNA... Anyway. I concede that was an argument, and not a bald assertion. But it'…

> You didn't "show" it; you simply asserted it.

You're not understanding what I said. Last time:

Turing Machines have a specific set of necessary ingredients.

That's not a "bald assertion" or an "appeal to authority". It's an observation about the theory of Turing machines [1].

Whether or not a physical system has those ingredients is an _objective_ matter.

Also an observation. In case you need to think it through, there was a simple argument which you cannot rationally refute:

i) If one of the ingredients is missing, "subjectively" wishing something is a Turing Machine will not make it so.

ii) If all the ingredients are present, "subjectively" wishing that something isn't a Turing Machine will not change the fact that it is.

Conclusion: subjectivity has no effect on whether something is or is not a Turing machine. QED.

----

You're the one making unsupported assertions and talking in circles.

I can see that you're going to reply with more disagreement. Please imagine that my response is "I said good day sir!"

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine#Description

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#757
post #290

Earlier quoted context omitted.

When I woke up after surgery I felt that 1.5 hours had passed. But in actuality it was something around 4 hours since I went under. It turned out that 1.5 hours before I woke up I had been brought out of anesthesia and after that I simply slept. I didn't have any dreams at all, but at least my internal clock had started working. A clock presumably doesn't need consciousness, but there's definitely a qualitative diffe…

How do you estimate time elapsed without external inputs? Experiments where people cut themselves from external stimuli seem to show that on the contrary, we don’t good internal clocks on this regard.

I nearly always "know" how long I have been asleep, unless there's been excessive drinking involved (and that would be long ago). "Normal" drinking doesn't seem to affect this. And for shorter naps (less than two hours) it's pretty accurate.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#758

>My purpose in this blog post is to outline another argument against the idea that consciousness can be reduced to computation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Brain_Project Started in 2005 the goal of the blue brain project is to simulate the brain in the computer. They currently have a complete working simulation of the neocortex of the rat brain.

No post body was provided.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#759

>My purpose in this blog post is to outline another argument against the idea that consciousness can be reduced to computation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Brain_Project Started in 2005 the goal of the blue brain project is to simulate the brain in the computer. They currently have a complete working simulation of the neocortex of the rat brain.

Quoted post unavailable.

No post body was provided.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#760

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I showed you that subjectivity doesn’t effect whether computation occurs. You didn't "show" it; you simply asserted it. You also made a number of appeals to (uncited) authority concerning the nature of computers. You made an argument from cells; I presume that was to do with the way that DNA and so on works. Although not all cells have DNA... Anyway. I concede that was an argument, and not a bald assertion. But it'…

> You didn't "show" it; you simply asserted it. You're not understanding what I said. Last time: Turing Machines have a specific set of necessary ingredients. That's not a "bald assertion" or an "appeal to authority". It's an observation about the theory of Turing machines [1]. Whether or not a physical system has those ingredients is an _objective_ matter. Also an observation. In case you need to think it through, t…

> Please imagine that my response is "I said good day sir!"

That sounds a lot like "Anyway, why do I think I have time for this ... "

It's clear to me that "stuff" can be arranged to work as a Turing Machine (or some other kind of computer) without design or intent. Whether it is such a thing or not depends on how it is used; a Turing Machine that is given random inputs, or whose outputs don't mean anything to anyone, is a computer only in a formal sense. If nobody knows that some thing is a computer, I'm not sure that it's computer-ness is meaningful.

So that's why I think intent and interpretation are relevant.

Post reply on HN