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Apple pulls data protection tool after UK government security row

bbc.com

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Re: Apple pulls data protection tool after UK government security row

#721

Post by grahamj »

JohnFen wrote: post #320
grahamj wrote: post #278

Earlier quoted context omitted.

IMO the only thing you can have a high level of trust in is your own *nix server. Backup those devices to it then encrypt there before being sent to the cloud.

Handling the encryption yourself is the way to go, but for maximum security, don't send that encrypted data to the cloud. Keep it all on your own server(s). That doesn't help people who aren't technically capable, of course. But at least those who are can protect themselves.

Depends what kind of security. Local doesn't help if your house burns down or is robbed.

Re: Apple pulls data protection tool after UK government security row

#722

Post by ruined »

sneak wrote: post #704
freeqaz wrote: post #198

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's why it's important to use apps like Signal where you can set the retention of your messages. I've got everybody I know using it now!

I use a patched Signal client that disables retention deletion and remote delete messages.

and that's awfully rude of you, but if you were concerned about message retention you wouldn't do that. so what's your point?

Re: Apple pulls data protection tool after UK government security row

#723

Post by grahamj »

shuckles wrote: post #636
kbolino wrote: post #424

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not exactly. It generates the keys for you and stores them on device in the Secure Enclave. You cannot "bring your own" encryption key, but the primary benefit of doing so--that Apple does not have access to it--is intentionally accomplished anyway by the implementation.

I’m not sure I appreciate the value of literally bringing your own keys. My device generating them on my behalf as part of a setup process seems sufficient. You’d use openssl or something and defer to software to actually do keygen no matter what.

It depends what kind of backdoor the UK is asking for but "encryption backdoor" sounds like cryptographic compromise. I don't know if that's what it means but either way the only way to be sure your keys are secure is to generate them yourself.

Re: Apple pulls data protection tool after UK government security row

#724

Post by [deleted] »

marcprux wrote: post #627
nomel wrote: post #619

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My assumption is that Google has keys to everything in its kingdom [1]. [1] https://qz.com/1145669/googles-true-origin-partly-lies-in-ci...

> My assumption is that Google has keys to everything in its kingdom If that were true, then their claims to support E2E encrypted backups are simply false, and they would have been subject to warrants to unlock backups, just like Apple had been until they implemented their "Advanced Data Protection" in 2022. Wouldn't there have been be some evidence of that in the past 7 years, either through security research, or t…

[deleted]

Re: Apple pulls data protection tool after UK government security row

#725

Post by Aloisius »

reader9274 wrote: post #682

"Existing users' access will be disabled at a later date." Hmmm how? How can they decrypt your already end-to-end encrypted and uploaded data without you entering the passphrase to do so? I can understand them removing the data from iCloud completely, or asking you to send the keys to Apple, but I don't understand how they can disable the feature for already uploaded data.

They will lock UK users out of iCloud until they manually disable ADP.

When a user turns off ADP in settings, their device uploads the encryption keys to Apple servers.

Re: Apple pulls data protection tool after UK government security row

#726

Post by acka »

kali_00 wrote: post #579
AutistiCoder wrote: post #520

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They wouldn't even be able to. WA is end-to-end encrypted.

With almost everyones backups stored in plain-text, making it all a little silly. Think about it for a second: you can re-establish your WA account on a new device using only the SIM card from your old device. SIM cards don't have a storage area for random applications' encryption keys, and even if they did, a SIM card cannot count as "end-to-end" anymore. Same goes for whatever mobile cloud platform those backups mi…

Reestablishing your WhatsApp account on a new device doesn't give access to your old chat messages, you need to restore a WhatsApp backup for that. The backup doesn't need to be stored in the cloud, you can choose to create a local file and manually transfer that to your new device.

In any case, as soon as you start using WhatsApp on a new device, users in the chats you participate in will receive a message informing them that your encryption keys have changed.

Re: Apple pulls data protection tool after UK government security row

#727

Post by kbolino »

madeofpalk wrote: post #221
ComputerGuru wrote: post #199

Note that this doesn’t satisfy the government’s original request, which was for worldwide backdoor access into E2E-encrypted cloud accounts. But I have a more pertinent question: how can you “pull” E2E encryption without data loss? What happens to those that had this enabled? Edit: Part of my concern is that you have to keep in mind Apple's defense against backdooring E2E is the (US) doctrine that work cannot be comp…

When you disable ADP, your local encryption keys are uploaded to Apple's servers to be read by them. Apple could just lock you out of iCloud until you do this.

The hardware will not allow this, at least not without modifications. The encryption keys are not exportable from the Secure Enclave, not even to Apple's own servers.

Re: Apple pulls data protection tool after UK government security row

#728

Post by dk1138 »

The more I live I’m less concerned about what are often described as “bad actors”. The bad actors are often the state, and this kind of information is collected without thought to the risk of future politicians who don’t follow the rules or who don’t have any respect for the laws.

Re: Apple pulls data protection tool after UK government security row

#729

Post by maeil »

elfbargpt wrote: post #86
ziddoap wrote: post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What would that change, effectively, other than have Apple lose money? The UK would still lose ADP (and then also just Apple products in general). A precedent would still be set. Your posing a strictly worse third option. Sure, it's an option, I guess. Apple could also just close down globally, as a fourth option. Or sell off to Google as a fifth. But I was trying to present the least-bad option (turn off ADP), rathe…

I totally get your point, but calling the UK's bluff could work. Are they really willing to ban Apple products in the UK? Maybe, maybe not

Depends on if the US emperor and his cronies have the UK's backs on this issue. If they don't, calling the bluff would work, there's zero chance the UK gov would ban Apple products without US approval. The backlash among the public would be far worse than the TikTok ban. Imagine all companies using Macs. The order of power here is US > Apple > UK.

Re: Apple pulls data protection tool after UK government security row

#730

Post by fc417fc802 »

barsonme wrote: post #676
scripturial wrote: post #652

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is possible to set up end to end encryption where two different keys unlock your data. Your key, and a government key. I assume google does this. 1. encrypt data with special key 2. encrypt special key with users key, and 3. encrypt special key with government key Anyone with the special key can read the data.the user key or the government key can be used to get special key. This two step process can be done for g…

E2EE means only your intended recipients can access the plaintext. Unless you intend to give the government access to your plaintext, what you described isn’t E2EE.

> E2EE means only your intended recipients can access the plaintext.

No, it does not. It means that only endpoints - not intermediaries - handle plaintext. It says nothing about who those endpoints are or who the software is working for.

Key escrow and E2EE are fully compatible.

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