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Blackphone

store.blackphone.ch

71–80 of 102 posts

Re: Blackphone

#71
post #62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Great point. While you still could be spied on, for instance with a bug stuck onto your back or classified nano-drone (if it exists yet)... that would be extremely expensive. If they wanted you that bad, it's like, fine. Listen to me talk about my motorcycle. The issue with computers is they are so, so, so cost effective to tap & data mine. And storage just keeps getting cheaper. Hence, illegal mass surveillance. Als…

EXACTLY. By providing ready access to a stream of digital data and metadata about yourself, you're making their job easier. Even if you use crypto, the mere fact that you use crypto is interesting enough to draw attention. The point is to blend into the background. Do you think that crossing a border using the Blackphone isn't going to raise eyebrows? In denied areas the idea is to use equipment that looks ordinary a…

It seems like you're saying "we should all use encryption as much as possible so it becomes the background". It also seems like you don't think you're saying that.

Re: Blackphone

#72
post #69
post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If they do, that would go a long way to convincing me this is a tidbit more secure than any other random Android device. They should really have released their code at the same time they released their phone though.

I've talked to Silent Circle at conferences and what not. It is not like they have some crypto noob working on their project...They have Phil Zimmerman. But, knowing nothing about them, when I asked them ``How does your protocol compare to TextSecure's Axolotl?'' the response was ``We have Phil Zimmerman''. So....I'm still a bit put off by them. Some of their code is already open-sourced here. https://github.com/Sile…

As someone who works at Silent Circle (though not someone who can speak FOR SC), I'd say "Axolotl and SCIMP are both very good". Also, I don't know who you talked to, but keep in mind that not everyone working for SC is technical and can explain (or sometimes even knows) what Axolotl is/how it works.

Re: Blackphone

#73
post #5

I hate to break it to you, but this is not going to keep you safe from a state-level adversary. I could drone on about this for pages and pages, but the sad fact is that if you are a target, it doesn't matter that you are using a "secure phone", "secure OS", or "encryption". Time and time again, these systems have been broken or breached with simple tradecraft and subtle sabotage. The Pentagon has a concerted (and ex…

Of course by "state-level adversary" you mean the United States. There are plenty of states with very poor computer attack capabilities, in fact most states aren't very good at it.

Its not merely being a target that is the problem, it is being a high priority target for a long period of time. Eventually they'll find a way to get your communications, but how many days or months does a technology buy you, at what cost to you and to them. Why do you think they are willing to spend that cost on people that aren't Snowden, Greenwald? It isn't win or lose, its mitigation.

We should judge security technologies not on absolutes but on relative merits given the reasonable security goals we wish to achieve (note that Snowden was able to achieve communications security against the NSA/GCHQ long enough to complete his goal).

Re: Blackphone

#76
post #8

For $629 you could by quite a few one-time or short-time use trac phones that you buy with cash. Wouldn't that be more secure/private than this?

Burners are an effective defense against single-phone-number taps.

But in an era of dragnet surveillance and meta-data analysis [1] they're not very useful.

Unless you're calling varying phones, at varying places, from varying places, at varying times, all with no discernible pattern or schedule -- it would be easy enough for them to identify a network of burners and determine which ones belong to which individuals on the network based on that meta-data. And if anyone in the network carried or used a 'real' phone alongside the burner, it would only get easier.

And you can Google search on the news wires to see how well people do at this game, even when they know their lives are literally on the line and thus devote a significant portion of their effort toward it.

[1] Done well-enough to be confident-enough to lob hellfire missiles at SIM cards in not-quite-friendly countries...

Re: Blackphone

#77
post #4

Transparently marketing fear. Apparently this phone is for you if you ever [0]: > speak personally with a partner > worry about your kids Shameful. [0] https://www.blackphone.ch/individuals/

I think most people need some fear about state spying. Most are still treating it like it's no big deal. It's like the Stasi are here and no one gives a damn. That should scare people. Maybe we're deeper into Huxley's world than we thought.

Um, I think you mean Orwell's world. Unless you're trying to compare us to people who are too busy getting high and going to senso-movies to care about anything important.

Or are you implying we make babies in factories?

Re: Blackphone

#78
"Select 3rd party apps". Now there's a crazy idea -- what if the maker of the device vetted the apps that run on the device?

Crazy idea. It just might work.

Re: Blackphone

#79
post #68
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I hate to break it to you, but this is not going to keep you safe from a state-level adversary. I don't really like this kind of anti-crypto argument. At this point I think making normal communications between normal people less embarrassingly mass-snoopable is a very worthy goal. For the time being, people who really, really have something to hide need to be extra careful (as has always been the case). Which is no…

I think the problem with a device like this is that the kind of person who would be interested to use this just may be precisely the kind of person that the NSA would like to keep tabs on, just in case. Enough so, that an NSA worried about the Snowden leaks could theoretically come up with this idea as a way to corral folks trying to escape the "conventional" channels. Particularly with an ex-Navy Seal as CEO (no lon…

I would like to think that the business folks that purchased Blackberry devices for the security mechanisms would be interested in a device like this now that it's been made clear that Blackberry was compromised. Of course if someone really wants you, they're going to get your data. But a device like this might be (imho) a good solution for most business level data protection of the sort people thought they would be getting from Blackberry.

Re: Blackphone

#80
post #5

I hate to break it to you, but this is not going to keep you safe from a state-level adversary. I could drone on about this for pages and pages, but the sad fact is that if you are a target, it doesn't matter that you are using a "secure phone", "secure OS", or "encryption". Time and time again, these systems have been broken or breached with simple tradecraft and subtle sabotage. The Pentagon has a concerted (and ex…

Of course by "state-level adversary" you mean the United States. There are plenty of states with very poor computer attack capabilities, in fact most states aren't very good at it. Its not merely being a target that is the problem, it is being a high priority target for a long period of time . Eventually they'll find a way to get your communications, but how many days or months does a technology buy you, at what cost…

It is naive to think the US is the only country with means and motivation to launch major cyber-spying campaigns. http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2014/Kaspersky-Lab...
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