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DissidentX – Censorship resistance tool by Bram Cohen

github.com

71–80 of 93 posts

Re: DissidentX – Censorship resistance tool by Bram Cohen

#71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From the README: Q. Can someone detect that a file has messages encoded in it? A. That depends on the encoding used and the properties of the file the data is being encoded in. There's a whole field of academic literature on steganography, none of which is invalidated by this code. What this code does is vastly simplify the implementation of new steganographic techniques, and allow a universal decoder and encoding of…

The README should read: Q. Can someone detect that a file has messages encoded in it? A. If the file was generated with an encoder whose code is public (i.e. Github, bitbucket, ...) then yes. Always. And even if the code is private, it may not be secure. Unless you come up with an encoding scheme that's never been thought of before, then law enforcement will likely be able to detect the encoded messages unless they'r…

You're assuming that there isn't a shared secret between the sender and reciever.

Re: DissidentX – Censorship resistance tool by Bram Cohen

#72
post #39
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What do they use? Trusted couriers?

"Terrorists use web forums and couriers." From same source as previous comment: https://twitter.com/thegrugq/status/407662098093580288

Silly... seems like forums would be easier to snoop than phone calls.

Re: DissidentX – Censorship resistance tool by Bram Cohen

#73
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That is actually remarkably clever. Spam would indeed seem to be an excellent vector for sending hidden messages!

What in this makes it get past spam filters?

It doesn't matter, as long as it still gets delivered to a spam folder, you can still retrieve the message.

Re: DissidentX – Censorship resistance tool by Bram Cohen

#74

Stenography is one of the NSA's worst nightmares. Encrypted strings sent over the Internet they know are encrypted, and often know what algorithm and key length. But the fact that any image can contain an encrypted message, and there's know way to know whether or not something exists within, scares the shit out of them. So, good work.

I mean this in all seriousness ... Is there any evidence that anyone in the NSA is really that scared of stenography?

Re: DissidentX – Censorship resistance tool by Bram Cohen

#75

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Interestingly enough, stenography was already being decried pre 9/11 as a tool used by terrorists [1]: >"Uncrackable encryption is allowing terrorists — Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaida and others — to communicate about their criminal intentions without fear of outside intrusion," FBI Director Louis Freeh said last March during closed-door testimony on terrorism before a Senate panel. "They're thwarting the efforts of law…

> "Uncrackable encryption is allowing terrorists — Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaida and others — to communicate about their criminal intentions without fear of outside intrusion, You succeeded to put 3 different ethnic groups - I should say 2, the last one being an US product - in the same bag and doing then, a misleading association, fucking idiot!

:( Are you one of those people that doesn't like to call things what they are? I have noticed many problems in life are due to people know wanting to call things what they are.

Re: DissidentX – Censorship resistance tool by Bram Cohen

#76

I love the question in the FAQ: Q. Why can't it be given more than two alternates for one position to encode more information? A. Because of math. See Explanation.txt for a bit more detail. Because of math hilarious

i was actually thinking that the "of" was superfluous. since reading [0] on hn (discussion: [1]) i am more and more seeing the use of "because" without preposition. so i was expecting "Q. Why can't it be given more than two alternates for one position to encode more information? A. Because math. See Explanation.txt for a bit more detail." [0] http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/11/englis... [1] https:/…

Yeah, but it's sort of just a comical thing that is getting tired and played out... Let's be honest, it was a slow news day for the Atlantic.

Re: DissidentX – Censorship resistance tool by Bram Cohen

#77

Stenography is one of the NSA's worst nightmares. Encrypted strings sent over the Internet they know are encrypted, and often know what algorithm and key length. But the fact that any image can contain an encrypted message, and there's know way to know whether or not something exists within, scares the shit out of them. So, good work.

I mean this in all seriousness ... Is there any evidence that anyone in the NSA is really that scared of stenography?

Stenography ≠ Steganography

Re: DissidentX – Censorship resistance tool by Bram Cohen

#78
post #72
post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"Terrorists use web forums and couriers." From same source as previous comment: https://twitter.com/thegrugq/status/407662098093580288

Silly... seems like forums would be easier to snoop than phone calls.

I was thinking the same. Maybe they don't really use forums to plan and coordinate plots, but only to recruit and spread propaganda.

Re: DissidentX – Censorship resistance tool by Bram Cohen

#79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Here's one way it might go down in practice. After law enforcement seizes your computer, they'll scan your computer for any encrypted containers, along with any code that looks like it's used for steganography. They'll find DissidentX, since its README mentions "steganography," which is a keyword that their forensics tools will search for. Then they'll use each encoder in your DissidentX folder to scan your computer…

I just read it, and you are completely extrapolating what that paper says. It does not say steganography is hopeless. It contains no mathematical proofs, and it's also from over 15 years ago. More generally, "we do not have a proof" does not mean "we disprove". You also completely ignored my point about the secret, without which the encoder will not work when an attacker tries to run it.

It's highly likely that a safe algorithm will come with a proof, thus the lack of a proof demonstrates the lack of a safe algorithm.

Re: DissidentX – Censorship resistance tool by Bram Cohen

#80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can you elaborate? I don't see why this must be true. Just as good encryption is indistinguishable from random data, good steganography should be indistinguishable from whatever universe of target plaintexts you've chosen. In both cases, the code is public, but the secret key is needed to see that the message is non-random, or non-plaintext. I am interested in how this scheme is different from https://fteproxy.org/ t…

Here's one way it might go down in practice. After law enforcement seizes your computer, they'll scan your computer for any encrypted containers, along with any code that looks like it's used for steganography. They'll find DissidentX, since its README mentions "steganography," which is a keyword that their forensics tools will search for. Then they'll use each encoder in your DissidentX folder to scan your computer…

OK, so when you're talking about seizure of equipment, with all the tools and past encodes just sitting there on the machine for the taking, you're really far afield of the kind of argument you had seemed to be making. I understand now why you seem to assume that the adversary is near-omnipotent here - because you're assuming that the user is a dolt who is doing most of the hard work of damning themselves for the state.

An effective dissident is going to employ some reasonable opsec practices and have multiple layers of security, they're not going to be foolish enough to think that one program is a magic bullet.

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