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The 1975 Buffett memo that saved the Washington Post's pension

finance.fortune.cnn.com

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Re: The 1975 Buffett memo that saved the Washington Post's pension

#71
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There are managers who excel at investing money and unlocking value. Just because most managers in assets and investment vehicles afforded by those whose worth is not of a sufficient level does not mean they do not exist. People who can, do. They happen to charge 2 and 20 for the privilege of working your money.

> There are managers who excel at investing money and unlocking value. From a scientific standpoint, that is false. You need to realize that it's not possible to show (prove, demonstrate) that such stories arise from anything but chance. A certain number of people are going to do very well because of chance, and some of those people are going to try to pose as experts. But don't take my word for it -- instead, think…

And yet Ed Thorpe, from 1969-88, had 227 months where he made money, and 3 where he lost. Over that time frame, he had a mean return of well north of 15%, with a standard deviation of 4%. What precisely did you prove? Edit - your arguments are incoherent - I, or most others who claim that some people can consistently beat the market, are not relying upon some mythical, eternal method. You're correct in that any such method will become public and therefore worthless. I imagine consistently winning takes constant work and innovation.

Furthermore, no is claiming that [i]anyone[/i] can "make huge sums of money systematically without risk," or that successful hedge funds that can turn 1 dollar into 1+r dollars can always turn 1e9 dollars into (1+r)e9 dollars, or even that there exists a single financial genius that can entirely eliminate risk.

What a collection of straw men you have succeeded in knocking down!

Re: The 1975 Buffett memo that saved the Washington Post's pension

#72
post #26

Warren Buffet also said: "I’d be a bum on the street with a tin cup if the markets were always efficient”

I think one particular problem with the strong-form efficient market hypotheses is this:

A stock should already be priced for all of the publicly available information. However, that information has to be analyzed and interpreted. That's the catch.

"Today company XYZ announced their purchase of Chinese company ABC."

There are probably many different ways to interpret that information. Maybe the purchase will result in increased profit, maybe it will bankrupt the company. Nobody knows.

If all public information were easily interpreted, i.e. if X happens the stock will drop by 5%, then the markets probably would be efficient.

Re: The 1975 Buffett memo that saved the Washington Post's pension

#73
His point is that playing the market is "speculation", not investing. He differentiates this with "investing", where you simply try to assess the intrinsic value of a stock, and if the stock is trading at a significant discount to it, then you buy it.

Further, once you've bought it, you keep it. You don't try to time the ups and downs of the market, buying moving and out of the position quickly. Since this is how Buffett likes to invest, one of his key principles is investing in owner-operators or people that are behaving as such. You want the executives of the company to treat it as if they owned all the stock and could never sell it. Because when you have the people running the company worrying about next quarter, you're not worrying about next decade.

Also related, Buffett's two key rules to investing:

Rule #1. Never lose any money

Rule #2. Never break rule #1

Re: The 1975 Buffett memo that saved the Washington Post's pension

#74
post #65

Quoting from page 13: A further problem is that in no case were the superior records (returns) I have observed based upon institutional skills which could be maintained despite changes in the faces. Rather, the good results have been accomplished by a single individual or, at most, a few, working in fairly specialized areas in which the great bulk of investment money simply had no interest. So... he seems to predict…

He's been planning for his retirement/demise for a very long time. He's pretty good at playing the long game, so I wouldn't bet against him.

Re: The 1975 Buffett memo that saved the Washington Post's pension

#75
post #68
post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Indeed, 50 may do worse than the market... but it's not because of a faulty appeal to "statistics." haliax is pointing out that 100 fund managers may not be an unbiased sample. It's perfectly possible to find a biased sample of 100 individuals capable of beating the market (eg. a group of 100 insiders trading illegally). EDIT: The "correct" thing to say is... "Based on evidence, fund managers do not outperform the ma…

> haliax is pointing out that 100 fund managers may not be an unbiased sample. My point is that, of 100 typical managers, 50 will beat the averages. Not any specific set of 100 managers, just typical ones. > ... and (2) that 100 is a sufficiently large sample to overcome the error bounds. You're completely missing the point that it's not about any particular set of 100 managers -- they're just a representative sample…

Arg... Assume the entire population of fund managers, which is smaller than the population of the entire "market", has a mean return of 15%. Further, assume the market as a whole (superset including fund managers) has a mean return of 10%.

Under those conditions... in a sampling of 100 "typical fund managers", more than half would still produce higher returns than the market.

You made an implicit assumption, which I believe is probably correct, that fund managers as a population are an unbiased sampling of the entire market -- ie. that their returns are the same as the market (or worse) -- but provided no evidence to back it up.

Re: The 1975 Buffett memo that saved the Washington Post's pension

#76
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There are managers who excel at investing money and unlocking value. Just because most managers in assets and investment vehicles afforded by those whose worth is not of a sufficient level does not mean they do not exist. People who can, do. They happen to charge 2 and 20 for the privilege of working your money.

> There are managers who excel at investing money and unlocking value. From a scientific standpoint, that is false. You need to realize that it's not possible to show (prove, demonstrate) that such stories arise from anything but chance. A certain number of people are going to do very well because of chance, and some of those people are going to try to pose as experts. But don't take my word for it -- instead, think…

[deleted]

Re: The 1975 Buffett memo that saved the Washington Post's pension

#77
I read all this 1975 dated letter and while I enjoyed every piece of it, this phrase contained in the very last page is what caught my attention the most:

"Conventional approaches to money management should not be expected to produce above average results."

It basically means that if you want to perform better than your competitors you logically should act differently from them. As in distancing yourself from the status quo.

I can see this advice being spot on for startups as well, it has everything to do with thinking outside of the box and redefining the rules of the game.

Good ole Warren nailed it decades ago.

Re: The 1975 Buffett memo that saved the Washington Post's pension

#78
post #75
post #68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> haliax is pointing out that 100 fund managers may not be an unbiased sample. My point is that, of 100 typical managers, 50 will beat the averages. Not any specific set of 100 managers, just typical ones. > ... and (2) that 100 is a sufficiently large sample to overcome the error bounds. You're completely missing the point that it's not about any particular set of 100 managers -- they're just a representative sample…

Arg... Assume the entire population of fund managers, which is smaller than the population of the entire "market", has a mean return of 15%. Further, assume the market as a whole (superset including fund managers) has a mean return of 10%. Under those conditions... in a sampling of 100 "typical fund managers", more than half would still produce higher returns than the market. You made an implicit assumption, which I…

> Further, assume the market as a whole (superset including fund managers) has a mean return of 10%. Under those conditions... in a sampling of 100 "typical fund managers", more than half would still produce higher returns than the market.

No, because we're comparing manager performance with market indices, like the DJIA, both of which include overall market growth.

The "average market" is measured by market indices, each of which tries to characterize a typical buy & hold portfolio. Thus, market indices ascend with overall market growth. That's what an average manager has to beat.

And the WSJ Dartboard Contest, which compares market indices with submitted manager performances, proves that managers cannot beat the market, even if their fees aren't included in the tallies.

> Under those conditions... in a sampling of 100 "typical fund managers", more than half would still produce higher returns than the market.

No, just half. not more, not less. Both the market indices and the managers would ride the ascending average value of the market as a whole. The only difference would be the theory being tested -- that some managers have special abilities that would give them an edge.

> You made an implicit assumption, which I believe is probably correct, that fund managers as a population are an unbiased sampling of the entire market -- ie. that their returns are the same as the market (or worse) -- but provided no evidence to back it up.

I keep proving my point with examples like the Dartboard Contest, and people keep ignoring the evidence. Don't you understand that submitters to the Dartboard Contest had every incentive to display their best performance -- a success would assure them of fame and wealth. But none of them could do it, over a period of years.

Re: The 1975 Buffett memo that saved the Washington Post's pension

#79
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> There are managers who excel at investing money and unlocking value. From a scientific standpoint, that is false. You need to realize that it's not possible to show (prove, demonstrate) that such stories arise from anything but chance. A certain number of people are going to do very well because of chance, and some of those people are going to try to pose as experts. But don't take my word for it -- instead, think…

And yet Ed Thorpe, from 1969-88, had 227 months where he made money, and 3 where he lost. Over that time frame, he had a mean return of well north of 15%, with a standard deviation of 4%. What precisely did you prove? Edit - your arguments are incoherent - I, or most others who claim that some people can consistently beat the market, are not relying upon some mythical, eternal method. You're correct in that any such…

> And yet Ed Thorpe, from 1969-88, had 227 months where he made money, and 3 where he lost.

First, he didn't beat the market average 227 times in a row -- for most of those periods, he didn't lose money, but then a buy & hold investor also didn't lose money. A meaningful comparison would have to compare his outcomes with that for a buy & hold investor riding the ascending market value by holding a boring, geriatric index fund.

Second, I wish people would study probability theory and statistics before trying to have conversation like this one. A totally random computer-generated market, with random trades, produces a handful of very spectacular outcomes, by chance alone. The larger the investor pool, the greater the chance for a spectacular chance performance.

http://arachnoid.com/equities_myths/index.html#Market_Model

In the above market model, which is a computer market driven by random trades, no intelligence, essentially flipping coins, out of 100 investors, the best performance over 30 years is $233,000 from an initial stake of $10,000 (an average performance would be $51,800). And if you increase the investor pool to millions like in real life, you greatly increase the size of the most spectacular performances.

Now imagine that the best performer is a human being instead of a computer model. What are the chances that he will say, "Oh, I was just lucky." For one thing, he might not understand enough probability theory to even grasp that chance could explain the outcome. For another, he might want to set himself up as a financial expert and make more money exploiting other people's stupidity than he ever made in equities.

> I imagine consistently winning takes constant work and innovation.

Imagine anything you like. There are no secrets of the winners. Prove this false using scientific evidence. Prove that spectacular performances cannot result from the workings of chance, as my computer model proves.

> ... your arguments are incoherent ...

Only to someone who has his mind made up and who cannot evaluate evidence. Imagine a group of people flipping coins -- how many people need there be, flipping fair coins, for one of them to have a 50% chance to flip heads 20 times in a row? And what is the chance for the lucky winner to say, "Oh well, it was probably a chance outcome"?

answer: 2^20 = 1,048,576 people.

Re: The 1975 Buffett memo that saved the Washington Post's pension

#80

The title is incorrect because Buffett doesn't say playing the market is futile. In fact, he clearly states he believes a few will outperform due to skill (but that you can't distinguish which outperformers did so on skill versus luck). What he does say in the quoted part is that a large fund of say 20 billion likely can't outperform due to it's size. That is a big difference from saying that it's futile to play the…

> Buffett has always felt efficient market theory is wrong

People often refute the EMH without understand that it is a family of hypotheses, from the Strong to the Weak form, with a great deal of subtlety in their concept and meaning.

Buffet's argument in the linked excerpts is actually pretty close to a weak form of the EMH: all participants start with broadly similar information and capabilities, so performance naturally regresses to the mean.

Here's my favourite discussion of the EMH:

http://skepticlawyer.com.au/2013/05/29/bubble-trouble-all-in...

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