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What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

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Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#71
post #31

I read this article since it was referred to often in philosophy of mind, including by Daniel Dennett in "Consciousness Explained". Yet... while I expected some deeper dive into Umwelts, I got (in my experience) a tautology around the word "be". Which, IMHO, should be tabooed in all serious philosophical discussion, as "be" is the mother of word-lockpicks. Vide E-Prime, English without "be", https://en.wikipedia.org/…

I'd love to respond, but I am shadowbanned.

Try sending an email to their contact address (bottom of page). Unless there's a good reason your comments are being auto killed, they will fix it.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#72
post #17

Random thought I had on bats since they "see" by hearing reflected sounds: Can bats know what another bat is looking at or even see what another is seeing by listening to the other's echoes? I imagine they can also recognize each other's voices and so identify individuals in flocks with the images they are seeing. I imagine this would be like being able to beam a stream of visual information into another's head.

I think the answer to your first question is mostly yes, because we know that when traveling in large swarms, many bats go quiet so they don't overwhelm the signal, yet they still manage to navigate fine.

Maybe they're just following the sound of the other bats directly, they way you would if you were blindfolded and told to walk with a group of people.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#73

> I assume we all believe that bats have experience. Humorously enough, earlier he refers to those who believe that non-human mammals are not all conscious people as "extremists", so it's clear he understands this is not a fully accurate assumption. Two separate meanings of "have experience" are being swapped interchangeably, I think: one is "brain can sense the world around the entity, react to changes, and act or p…

I think he makes it pretty clear he's only talking about the second one of your two definitions

>What it is like to be a bat could be rephrased as what it would be like to experience being a bat if a person were being a bat

He says:

>[what] it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat

The point is that bats do have a subjective experience of the world which is very different from a person's. It seems like you think only humans have this?

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#74
For a non-bat to experience what it is like to be a bat, you have to embrace one of two philosophies: - Dualism: body and soul/consciousness are separate), or - Panpsychism: consciousness is fundamental and doesn't emerge from the material physiology.

For a materialist, and someone who thinks consciousness arises from the physical aspects, the idea of a human experiencing bat consciousness is not possible. Our evolution developed algorithm for processing the world is wired to our senses. Similarly a bat's perception of the world has evolved along with bat senses and is not the same as ours.

Without any of the evolutionary pre-wiring, a human conscious dropped into a bat would be deaf, dumb and blind.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#75
I think we have a pretty good explanation today - it's like embeddings from AI models. Experience is both content and reference, we represent new experience in relation to old experience. That makes representation personal, being made of one's own past experience. This does not explain away pure feeling, but explains how we make discriminations of similarity and difference between our experiences, the contents of qualia, the qualitative aspects.

We also know brains are locked inside a bone box only connected to the outside world by a bundle of unlabeled nerves, there is no direct access. So the brain can only compare patterns of signals it receives from outside. But since this representation-action-learning loop is recursive it cannot be inhabited or known from outside, 3p needs to pay the price of recursion to execute in order to get to 1p.

The gap is that between description and execution, which cannot be crossed for free with cheap description. Execution costs, and that cost is part of what is like being a bat. We can't inhabit their cost pressures since we don't have their context and body. You can't remove the costs of being a bat from "what it is like being a bat" and still get your answer from the comfort of the philosophical armchair.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#76

One of the seminal papers of the 20th century. And like any truly good philosophy paper the argument is very clear and a real head-scratcher.

I've read this paper several times, over the years, and I've never understood why its considered such a landmark. I think it could be losslessly compressed to one paragraph of modest length.

Would you care to share that paragraph with the rest of the class in that case?

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#77
post #74

For a non-bat to experience what it is like to be a bat, you have to embrace one of two philosophies: - Dualism: body and soul/consciousness are separate), or - Panpsychism: consciousness is fundamental and doesn't emerge from the material physiology. For a materialist, and someone who thinks consciousness arises from the physical aspects, the idea of a human experiencing bat consciousness is not possible. Our evolut…

This seems like a clear false dichotomy.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#78

What it's like - the gestalt of a bat (or other thing) as it engages its sensing-deciding-reacting loop. This gestalt isn't just for biological organisms, but any system for which its decision making engages with representations of the external environment unified with a self-representation to form a coherent representation of a persistent entity engaged with an external world. Why do such systems need this gestalt?…

I don't think that it is appropriate to use "gestalt" here. The word used in the field is "qualia", it has a precise meaning and is precisely what Nagel was writing about. Gestalt, to my understanding, is quite different, even when used in english psychology writing.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#79
post #75

I think we have a pretty good explanation today - it's like embeddings from AI models. Experience is both content and reference, we represent new experience in relation to old experience. That makes representation personal, being made of one's own past experience. This does not explain away pure feeling, but explains how we make discriminations of similarity and difference between our experiences, the contents of qua…

You nailed it. Asking the question is asking to define from the outside what is an inner recursive process. The question is a simple confusion of domains. This is Humbert Maturana’s main point in Autopoiesis and Cognition (1980, now reissued). Recommend the whole book, as does Terry Winograd. The most intense part is the appendix specifically about the nervous system. Nagel and others knew no neuroscience and are clueless about recursion.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#80
post #75

I think we have a pretty good explanation today - it's like embeddings from AI models. Experience is both content and reference, we represent new experience in relation to old experience. That makes representation personal, being made of one's own past experience. This does not explain away pure feeling, but explains how we make discriminations of similarity and difference between our experiences, the contents of qua…

You nailed it. Asking the question is asking to define from the outside what is an inner recursive process. The question is a simple confusion of domains. This is Humbert Maturana’s main point in Autopoiesis and Cognition (1980, now reissued). Recommend the whole book, as does Terry Winograd. The most intense part is the appendix specifically about the nervous system. Nagel and others knew no neuroscience and are clu…

Oh, I’d say they had some good clues.
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