Live data from Hacker News

Security through obscurity is not bad

mobeigi.com

71–80 of 228 posts

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#71
post #67

Obscurity can be fine but it's not security. I think of it like cover and concealment in the military. Security is cover. Something you can get behind so the bullets don't hit you. Obscurity is concealment. Harder to see, harder to find, so the enemy doesn't know where to shoot, but it's not stopping any bullets. Both have advantages and disadvantages and can complement each other depending on how they're used.

I don't think that really works because obscurity isn't harder to see or find. I don't know the analogy, it's like standing out in the open and being like "yeah but who would think to look here lol".

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#72
post #51

Obscurity is not security. But it can add a bit of delay to someone breaking actual security, so maybe they'll hit the next target first as that is a touch easier. Though with the increasing automation of hole detection and exploitation, even that might stop being the case if it hasn't already. The biggest problem with obscurity measures IMO is psychological: people tend to assume that the measures⁰ are far more effe…

> Obscurity is not security. So ASLR [1] is not a security control? I guess you are pretty alone with this opinion. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomiza...

No, because ASLR uses a secret.

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#73
post #30
post #2

Security through obscurity is NOT bad. Security ONLY through obscurity is bad (Kerckhoffs's Principle). Security through obscurity, as an additional layer, is good! I've been saying this ever since that phrase was coined. A layer or two of obscurity keeps a lot of noise out of logs, reduces alert fatigue and cuts down on storage costs especially if one is using Splunk as their SIEM and makes targeted attacks much eas…

>I've been saying this ever since that phrase was coined You have been alive since the 1880s?

Smart talking your elders!

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#74

> Security ONLY through obscurity is bad (Kerckhoffs's Principle). This is the crux of the article. (1) Kerckhoffs's Principle doesn’t say that. It says to design the system AS IF the adversary has all of the info about it except the secrets (encryption key, certificates, etc). (2) this rule is okay if you are a solo maintainer of a WordPress installation. It’s a problem if you work at a large company and part of the…

Kerkhoff's principle is not about security in general, it is about the design of cryptography. Assume your opponent knows everything about how your crypto system works. Your security then lies in the keys and not knowledge of the method. More broadly, anything that raises the cost of an attack helps security. Whether it is worth investing your defensive effort in that vs on more actual security is a different matter.

If it does not obscure your own view of the security or reasoning about the security stance.

For instance, with respect to url parameters, I have seen people being told they have an Insecure Direct Object Reference, then apply base64 encoding to it to obscure what is going on. To QA they don't notice it looks like junk, it is obscure, but base64 encoded parameters are catnip to hackers.

So in this case, the obscurity made the system worse over time.

Heck, the most cringeworthy phrase "Base64 Encryption" which I have heard many many times.

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#75
post #53
post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Obscurity is not security. So ASLR [1] is not a security control? I guess you are pretty alone with this opinion. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomiza...

No this is not what GP said, and I don't get how you reached this conclusion. This is like saying that AES is security through obscurity because it relies on key being secret. See [1] (linked in the OP) to understand the difference better. I am pretty sure everyone who works in security agrees that obscurity is not security. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerckhoffs%27s_principle

[deleted]

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#76
post #67

Obscurity can be fine but it's not security. I think of it like cover and concealment in the military. Security is cover. Something you can get behind so the bullets don't hit you. Obscurity is concealment. Harder to see, harder to find, so the enemy doesn't know where to shoot, but it's not stopping any bullets. Both have advantages and disadvantages and can complement each other depending on how they're used.

This is an especially good analogy because facing a well-resourced adversary in cybersecurity is like finding out that the enemy brought artillery -- hopefully you weren't relying entirely on obscurity because pretty soon there will be nowhere to hide

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#77
If the obscurity it is only an additional layer on top of a secure system, it is called "defense in depth".

It's a simple probability calculation. If some automated scanning tools can't find your service, a lot of attackers will never know of its existence. So even if it has an unpatched vulnerability, they won't attack it.

If 1000 attackers find the vulnerable system, the probability is high at least one is attacking it. If it's only or two one who find it, they might just ignore your system, because they found thousands of others they randomly chose first.

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#78

I get what this post is saying, but I'm going to push back that "security through obscurity" isn't just something that people parrot without understanding. Obscurity provides, effectively, no security. There may be other benefits to the obscurity, but considering the obscurity a layer of your security is bad . I hope we all agree that moving telnet to another port provides no security (it's easily sniffable, easily f…

> It quiets down the logs nicely, people aren't always knocking on the door. Q: If you've still done the right things - "disable[d] password auth, disable[d] root login, and only use ssh keys for access" - why do you care about how 'quiet' your logs are?

Whatever you've done, you should keep an eye on your logs for anything suspicious. A quieter log is easier to monitor.

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#79

Obscurity is not security. But it can add a bit of delay to someone breaking actual security, so maybe they'll hit the next target first as that is a touch easier. Though with the increasing automation of hole detection and exploitation, even that might stop being the case if it hasn't already. The biggest problem with obscurity measures IMO is psychological: people tend to assume that the measures⁰ are far more effe…

> But it can add a bit of delay

The delay can also be infinite in practice. If a really bad zero day is discovered, it might protect you from becoming a victim. No guarantees, but it can improve your chances.

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#80

Couldn't one argue that a password is also obscurity? It's only secure until someone figures it out, just like a secret URL on a website.

Secret storage isn't considered "security through obscurity". Everyone knows that when you find the key to the door, you've won. Security through obscurity is more like hiding the keyhole: it isn't going to stop anyone determined, but it can be effective against someone who isn't all that motivated (well, all that motivated to target you, anyway).
Post reply on HN