Earlier quoted context omitted.
Hmm, I'd disagree. The fact that Anapaya Systems (the for profit company mentioned) has the only commercial implementation/adjacent software is a problem, yes. But "snake oil" doesn't quite match up with the fact that SCION right now provides the backbone for the Swiss financial network moving 200 billion CHF each day [1], so at least some level of workable technology has to be there. And for no one to be taking it s…
> SCION right now provides the backbone for the Swiss financial network moving 200 billion CHF each day This is a meaningless benchmark - for a small group of trusted big enterprises with insurance policies and mutually signed contracts you could've just as well used OSPF with zero filters. The benchmark would be adoption by an actual large number of parties that don't/can't talk to eachother spread across the world.…
Is BGP safe yet?
71–80 of 98 posts
Re: Is BGP safe yet?
#72Re: Is BGP safe yet?
#73RPKI doesn't make BGP safe, it makes it safer . BGP hijacks can still happen. RPKI only secures the ownership information of a given prefix, not the path to that prefix. Under RPKI, an attacker can still claim to be on the path to a victim AS, and get the victim's traffic sent to it. The solution to this was supposed to be BGPSec, but it's widely seen as un-deployable.
I think RPKI is good enough. As we have TLS on top it doesn't need to be perfect.
Re: Is BGP safe yet?
#74> A BGP hijack occurs when a malicious node deceives another node, lying about what the routes are for its neighbors. Without any security protocols, this misinformation can propagate from node to node, until a large number of nodes now know about, and attempt to use these incorrect, nonexistent, or malicious routes. But with HTTPS, they wouldn't be able to actually pose as another website, just delay/black hole the…
If you can inject arbitrary malicious routes, you can make ACME requests for a new cert.
Re: Is BGP safe yet?
#75RPKI doesn't make BGP safe, it makes it safer . BGP hijacks can still happen. RPKI only secures the ownership information of a given prefix, not the path to that prefix. Under RPKI, an attacker can still claim to be on the path to a victim AS, and get the victim's traffic sent to it. The solution to this was supposed to be BGPSec, but it's widely seen as un-deployable.
Re: Is BGP safe yet?
#76RPKI doesn't make BGP safe, it makes it safer . BGP hijacks can still happen. RPKI only secures the ownership information of a given prefix, not the path to that prefix. Under RPKI, an attacker can still claim to be on the path to a victim AS, and get the victim's traffic sent to it. The solution to this was supposed to be BGPSec, but it's widely seen as un-deployable.
I think RPKI is good enough. As we have TLS on top it doesn't need to be perfect.
Re: Is BGP safe yet?
#77rpki adoption is the new ipv6 adoption. it looks great until you realize it only validates who owns the prefix, not the path to get there lol
Re: Is BGP safe yet?
#78RPKI doesn't make BGP safe, it makes it safer . BGP hijacks can still happen. RPKI only secures the ownership information of a given prefix, not the path to that prefix. Under RPKI, an attacker can still claim to be on the path to a victim AS, and get the victim's traffic sent to it. The solution to this was supposed to be BGPSec, but it's widely seen as un-deployable.
I think RPKI is good enough. As we have TLS on top it doesn't need to be perfect.
Re: Is BGP safe yet?
#79I guess the attack could still be used for denial of service.
Re: Is BGP safe yet?
#80The graphic that shows that a hijacker can route traffic to their malicious website is a little misleading. Since the SSL certificate would be invalid, browsers would block the connection and show a warning. I guess the attack could still be used for denial of service.