Not sure about this one. I understand the need and the idea behind it is well-intentioned, but I can easily see denouncelists turn into a weapon against wrongthinkers. Said something double-plus-ungood on Twitter? Denounced. Accepted contribution from someone on a prominent denouncelist? Denouced. Not that it was not possible to create such lists before, but it was all informal. The real problem are reputation-farmer…
Vouch
71–80 of 507 posts
Re: Vouch
#72Re: Vouch
#73Initially I liked the idea, but the more I think about it the more this feels like it just boils down to: only allow contributions from a list of trusted people.
Re: Vouch
#74"Open source has always worked on a system of trust and verify" Not sure about the trust part. Ideally, you can evaluate the change on its own. In my experience, I immediately know whether I want to close or merge a PR within a few seconds, and the hard part is writing the response to close it such that they don't come back again with the same stuff. (I review a lot of PRs for openpilot - https://github.com/commaai/o…
Re: Vouch
#75Re: Vouch
#76If you get denounced on a popular repo and everyone "inherits" that repo as a source of trust (e.g. think email providers - Google decides you are bad, good luck).
Couple with the fact that usually new contributors take some time to find their feet.
I've only been at this game (SWE) for ~10 years so not a long time. But I can tell you my first few contributions were clumsy and perhaps would have earned my a denouncement.
I'm not sure if I would have contributed to the AWS SDK, Sendgrid, Nunit, New Relic (easily my best experience) and my attempted contribution to Npgsql (easily my worst experience) would have definitely earned me a denouncement.
Concept is good, but I would omit the concept of denouncement entirely.
Re: Vouch
#77Isn't it extremely difficult problem? It's very easy to game, vouch 1 entity that will invite lots of bad actors
The usual way of solving this is to make the voucher responsible as well if any bad actor is banned. That adds a layer of stake in the game.
Re: Vouch
#78Earlier quoted context omitted.
The usual way of solving this is to make the voucher responsible as well if any bad actor is banned. That adds a layer of stake in the game.
A practical example of this can be seen in lobsters invite system, where if too many of the invitee accounts post spam, the inviter is also banned.
Re: Vouch
#79It also addresses the issue in tolerating unchecked or seemingly plausible slop PRs from outside contributors from ever getting merged in easily. By default, they are all untrusted.
Now this social issue has been made worse by vibe-coded PRs; and untrusted outside contributors should instead earn their access to be 'vouched' by the core maintainers rather than them allowing a wild west of slop PRs.
A great deal.
Re: Vouch
#80"Open source has always worked on a system of trust and verify" Not sure about the trust part. Ideally, you can evaluate the change on its own. In my experience, I immediately know whether I want to close or merge a PR within a few seconds, and the hard part is writing the response to close it such that they don't come back again with the same stuff. (I review a lot of PRs for openpilot - https://github.com/commaai/o…
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