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Passkeys: They're not perfect but they're getting better

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Re: Passkeys: They're not perfect but they're getting better

#72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That works for you, but the website doesn't know you use a password manager, so they'll often want you to use SMS as a second factor. Passkeys require some kind of password manager. That's the main benefit. The adoption problems are because a lot of users don't really understand password managers.

I bet that Google+Apple+Microsoft could have gotten 95% of the world on password managers by building excellent password managers into the OS, and demanding that one can only login into their websites with passwords that have at least 100 bits of entropy. And it could have been done 10 years ago.

I don't think a password manager would get much adoption if it refused to save the passwords you already have?

Google's password manager does nag you about bad passwords, but it's easy to ignore.

Looks like it's been around ten years since it was introduced. It doesn't seem like enough.

Re: Passkeys: They're not perfect but they're getting better

#73

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I bet that Google+Apple+Microsoft could have gotten 95% of the world on password managers by building excellent password managers into the OS, and demanding that one can only login into their websites with passwords that have at least 100 bits of entropy. And it could have been done 10 years ago.

I don't think a password manager would get much adoption if it refused to save the passwords you already have? Google's password manager does nag you about bad passwords, but it's easy to ignore. Looks like it's been around ten years since it was introduced. It doesn't seem like enough.

Microsoft and Google forced organizations that were using their services to upgrade to 2FA over a few years. For a short bit it was optional, after that it's basically not possible to use these services without 2FA. Now even many grandmas are familiar with the idea that sometimes you have to copy a code from your sms to a website when logging into your bank account.

They could have done the same thing with passwords. They have 100s of millions of organizational users, who will do whatever corporate IT tells them to do. Microsoft can say, there is a password manager available on Windows. From now on, organizational users must use 100 entropy bit passwords. IT tells users - users must store passwords in the password manager and use the browser extension.

After three years of users resisting, everyone will give in. Same for university students, who will need it. After that the rest will adopt easily because it is the default thing to do.

Re: Passkeys: They're not perfect but they're getting better

#74

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I read about Passkey comittee being against open source passkey managers during start of this year (can't reference it, sorry) but with open source password/key managers already supporting passkeys, i don't think it turned out to be true. Here's an Okta employee threatening to use the attestation (anti)feature of passkeys to block open-source implementations, because they allow you to export your passkeys: https://…

Tim Cappalli is thoroughly misguided throughout that discussion, but he's not threatening anything. Okta lets users require attestation, but it will never, ever force attestation on anyone.

Tim's not threatening, but he is saying quite clearly that sites on the internet (Relying Parties) might just not accept Passkeys from KeePassXC:

> The unfortunate piece is that your product choices can have both positive and negative impacts on the ecosystem as a whole. I've already heard rumblings that KeepassXC is likely to be featured in a few industry presentations that highlight security challenges with passkey providers, the need for functional and security certification, and the lack of identifying passkey provider attestation (which would allow RPs to block you, and something that I have previously rallied against but rethinking as of late because of these situations).

Tim's talking the reality of KeePassXC and the reality is that this specification is being built in a way where the user is fundamentally out of control. Where the industry at large has total control over your material, gets to say how you can store your keys, and will refuse you credential managers that they don't like.

The proposed Credential Exchange Protocol draft also does not allow you to backup your key. A credential manager will only Export the key to another credential manager service, across public endpoints on the internet. Never transiting the user's control. So you have to trust your credential manager that they actually will let you export your credentials, to someone you can trust, at a future point in time. There's an issue open for this, but no real hope this ever gets better. https://github.com/fido-alliance/credential-exchange-feedbac...

Passkeys seem designed to never be trustable by users. There's always some online service somewhere holding your materials that governments will be able to legally strongarm the service into getting access to. You won't be able to Export when you need it. The security people seem intent on making sure computers are totally controlled by corporations and governments, in the worst ways. The top post is right. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45737608

Re: Passkeys: They're not perfect but they're getting better

#75
post #35

> websites which [...] also want to know how the passkey is being handled by the user’s device to keep their accounts safe This is exactly where passkeys go too far. "to keep their accounts safe" is always the excuse used to reduce the freedoms of users. Web sites have no business deciding how things are handled on user devices but it's precisely what passkeys enable. The boundary of control of a website used to stop…

I've seen this argument many times, but I don't understand it. Can you explain a scenario where this would be an issue? So, Netflix makes me log in with a passkey that comes from their own hardware, instead of my password manager. What's the danger there, beyond the fact that this seems to me extremely unworkable because I'd just never sign in?

Re: Passkeys: They're not perfect but they're getting better

#76
post #5

Losing your device and not having any passwords is like losing your fingerprints. >Device loss scenarios >Users are largely unsure about the implications for their passkeys if they lose or break their device, as it seems their device holds the entire capability to authenticate. To trust passkeys as a replacement for the password, users need to be prepared and know what to do in the event of losing one – or all – of t…

Also requires the device allows backup of passkeys. The infamous post where keepass was threatened if they were to continue to allow users to backup their own keys.

The person there requested that KeePassXC don't let users export their keys in plaintext, which seems reasonable. He asked that the software encrypt the keys with a user-selected password before exporting, so someone stealing the files wouldn't have the keys to literally all of the user's sites. That doesn't seem unreasonable to me.

Re: Passkeys: They're not perfect but they're getting better

#77
post #24

Until passkeys can pass the test of "my non-technical friends and family don't call me for help about them", passkeys aren't ready. Vendors keep making assumptions about how users behave which are not safe assumptions, and that keeps blowing up the interactions of non-technical users. (I'm sure there's an "assumptions developers make about user accounts" blog out there somewhere.) For example, my family has had to ca…

By that metric, passwords are even less ready, as I seem to always have to field calls for passwords getting stolen or compromised or accounts getting phished. I guess we're back to faxing ID.

Re: Passkeys: They're not perfect but they're getting better

#78

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm struggling to think of a reason why being "treated as an always-idiot" is an actual negative in this specific example. I use Bitwarden and when the password autofill doesn't work as expected my first assumption from many previous experiences is that it's because a website changed something slightly in their auth flow or a particular page has a weird redirect/embedded login scheme different than the primary login,…

Passkeys do protect you from such mistakes in a way the current implementation of the browsers/password managers/web-specs don't. But that is after 10s of millions of dollars or more have been poured into the development of passkeys, resulting in new standard specifications, diverse implementations of password managers, etc. Now, imagine the counterfactual world where those same dollars were devoted to improving the…

Except we already are living in that counterfactual world. Companies haven't been sitting on their hands while lamenting how bad passwords are, we've spent many times more money trying to make passwords secure than we've spent on developing passkeys.

Re: Passkeys: They're not perfect but they're getting better

#79
post #75
post #35

> websites which [...] also want to know how the passkey is being handled by the user’s device to keep their accounts safe This is exactly where passkeys go too far. "to keep their accounts safe" is always the excuse used to reduce the freedoms of users. Web sites have no business deciding how things are handled on user devices but it's precisely what passkeys enable. The boundary of control of a website used to stop…

I've seen this argument many times, but I don't understand it. Can you explain a scenario where this would be an issue? So, Netflix makes me log in with a passkey that comes from their own hardware, instead of my password manager. What's the danger there, beyond the fact that this seems to me extremely unworkable because I'd just never sign in?

The danger is that you now can no longer use netflix without they're approved hardware? Of course, that's essentially already the case with netflix, but this becomes dicey when services that actually matter take this approach.

And then suddenly you're debanked.

Re: Passkeys: They're not perfect but they're getting better

#80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Passkeys are a private key stored on your device with the public key registered with the server. Servers should allow multiple passkeys per user (so you can register multiple devices), but many don't.

That's an implementation detail users should not care about. The bigger question is... why don't we replace the login/password combination with just a string of randomly generated characters and call it a day? Why protect these strings of random characters from users, call them passkeys and advertise them on all street corners? Feels like a devil's plot to strip us from all the rights to our devices.

public/private keypairs (and therefore passkeys) provide cryptographically secure anti-phishing properties that passwords cannot.
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