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EU CRA disallows shipment of non-accredited binaries in "critical" software categories.
Okay so are they going to block foreign github repos? This seems totally unenforceable.
Is CSA really that widespread in Europe that everyone's chat messages have to be monitored? And if it is that widespread, shouldn't they try to address it socially to prevent CSA as much as possible rather than try to catch just the subset of tech-savvy abusers, that too after they've already committed CSA?
For example, an individual can generate AI images of Hollywood actors using Stable Diffusion and a decently powerful computer. Said individual had the right to share those images online with a community.
Now however the sharing and distribution of said images is considered illegal in my USA state.
So, are the images said individual created and shared three years ago subject to prosecution? Even if the law went into effect 3 months ago?
Is CSA really that widespread in Europe that everyone's chat messages have to be monitored? And if it is that widespread, shouldn't they try to address it socially to prevent CSA as much as possible rather than try to catch just the subset of tech-savvy abusers, that too after they've already committed CSA?
CSAM is just the excuse, as it is with any other laws of this nature in the past.
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The accepted solution is to have a constitution that says otherwise. Which is a bit complicated here, as the EU has no real constitution and this 'law' (really a regulation) is a blatant violation of the constitutions of countries that did choose to establish secrecy of correspondence.
> The accepted solution is to have a constitution that says otherwise And the willingness and ability to enforce it. The current iteration of ChatControl is pushed by Denmark, which is at present the President of the Council of the European Union. The Danish Constitution itself enshrines the right to privacy of communication [0], but this is not stopping Denmark from wanting to ratify ChatControl anyway. [0]: https:/…
What the TLDR of the motivation behind this? Is it just politicians playing to their base (think of the children) or corporate lobbying. or religion, etc?
Seems to me that the negatives of passing something like this are super obvious and dystopian.
Is CSA really that widespread in Europe that everyone's chat messages have to be monitored? And if it is that widespread, shouldn't they try to address it socially to prevent CSA as much as possible rather than try to catch just the subset of tech-savvy abusers, that too after they've already committed CSA?
What would prevent me from writing my own program to do something simple like sending encrypted messages? Or just emails...
Like the TPM & Microsoft scare when TPM first started arriving in hardware, and we all thought it would be used to lock out other OSes. Only it's for real this time.
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> The accepted solution is to have a constitution that says otherwise And the willingness and ability to enforce it. The current iteration of ChatControl is pushed by Denmark, which is at present the President of the Council of the European Union. The Danish Constitution itself enshrines the right to privacy of communication [0], but this is not stopping Denmark from wanting to ratify ChatControl anyway. [0]: https:/…
> but this is not stopping Denmark from wanting to ratify ChatControl anyway. What the TLDR of the motivation behind this? Is it just politicians playing to their base (think of the children) or corporate lobbying. or religion, etc? Seems to me that the negatives of passing something like this are super obvious and dystopian.
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> prevent them from being pushed over and over Solve the problem it's trying to solve, then it won't be proposed again.
The problem it's trying to solve is mass surveillance...
That's already here. I think you should consider that this law might be aiming at some other goal.
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If only we could show them how this kind of things may go wrong. I don't know, the case of some leader of a nation they are having trouble with, abusing of a similar access with their data. But they will probably think that is only bad when others do it to them.
> If only we could show them how this kind of things may go wrong. We can. This has already happened with the fairly recent SALT TYPHOON hacks. China (ostensibly) abused lawful wiretapping mechanisms to spy on American (and other) citizens and politicians. The news at the time wasn't always explicit about the mechanism, but that's what happened. China wouldn't have been able to do this if those mechanisms didn't exis…