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Tarsnap is cozy

til.andrew-quinn.me

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Re: Tarsnap is cozy

#71
post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you're interested in safeguarding data for the future, then I don't think the model of “my backup immediately disappears once the account runs out of money” gives me anything resembling a cozy feeling at all.

That's actually one of my favorite features. That should never happen under the limited circumstances I use it for. If something goes so wrong that my account actually runs out of money before I notice, then I far prefer the default to be "intruder alert, intruder alert, wipe everything ". There's a reason it's marketed as backups for the truly paranoid.

Then why bother backing up at all? Buy some gasoline and set your laptop on fire, you'll never get more secure than that.

Re: Tarsnap is cozy

#73
post #46

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I disagree, strongly. Here are the relevant docs: https://restic.readthedocs.io/en/stable/030_preparing_a_new_... I would like to see an explicit discussion of what permissions are needed for what operation. I would also like to see a clearly specified model in which backups can be created in a bucket with less than full permissions and, even after active attack by an agent with those same permissions, one can enumer…

Again, this isn’t at all in the scope of restic’s docs. If you’re using S3 as the storage, it’s on you to understand how S3 works and what permissions are needed, just like it’s on you to understand how your local file system works and file permissions work if you use the local file system as a backend. If you don’t understand S3 or don’t want to learn, then that’s fine, and you can pay the premium to tarsnap for sim…

I think you two may be talking past each other a bit here. Bear in mind I am not a security expert, just a spirited hobbyist; I may be missing something. As stated in my digital resilience audit, I actually use both Tarsnap and restic for different use cases. That said:

Tarsnap's deduplication works on the archive level, not on the particular files etc within the archive. Someone can set up a write-only Tarsnap key and trust the deduplication to work. A compromised machine with a write-only Tarsnap key can't delete Tarsnap archive blobs, it can only keep writing new archive blobs to try to bleed your account dry (which, ironically, the low sync rate helps protect against - not a defense for it, just a funny coincidence).

restic by contrast does do its dedupe at the file level, and what's more it seems to handle its own locks within its own files. Upon starting a backup, I observe restic first creates a lock and uploads it to my S3 compatible backend - my general purpose backups actually use Backblaze B2, not AWS S3 proper, caveat emptor. Then restic later attempts to delete that lock and syncs that change too to my S3 backend. That would require a restic key to have both write access and some kind of delete access to the S3 backend, at a minimum, which is not ideal for ransomware protection.

Many S3 backends including B2 have some kind of bucket-level object lock which prevent the modification/deletion of objects within that bucket for, say, their first 30 days. But this doesn't save us from ransomware either, because restic's own synced lock gets that 30 day protection too.

I can see why one would think you can't get around this without restic itself having something to say about it. Gemini tells me that S3 proper does let you set delete permissions at a granular enough level that you can tell it to only allow delete on locks/, with something like

        # possible hallucination.
        # someone good at s3 please verify
        {
            "Sid": "AllowDeleteLocksOnly",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": "s3:DeleteObject",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::backup-bucket/locks/*"
        }
But, I have not tested this myself, and this isn't necessarily true across S3 compatible providers. I don't know how to get this level of granularity in Backblaze, for example, and that's unfortunate because B2 is about a quarter the cost of S3 for hot storage.

The cleanest solution would probably be to have some way for restic to handle locks locally, so that locks never need to hit the S3 backend in the first place. I imagine restic's developers are already aware of that, so this seems likely to be a much harder problem to solve than it first appears. Another option may be to use a dedicated, restic-aware provider like BorgBase. It sounds like they handle their own disks, so they probably already have some kind of workaround in place for this. Of course, as others have mentioned, you may not get as many nines out of BB as you would out of one of the more established general-purpose providers.

P.S.: Thank you both immensely for this debate, it's helped me advance the state of my own understanding a little further.

Re: Tarsnap is cozy

#74

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I readily admit I'm a nerd about this stuff, and this is primarily a hobby of mine. I am explicitly not 80/20'ing this because it's fun. [1] One use case: I don't like the idea of having any accounts at all which I log into without the aid of a password manager. That creates a bootstrapping problem - how am I supposed to log into Google Drive to get my Google Drive password? A prepaid keyfile-based model is one parti…

Google supports printable 2fa codes https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/1187538?sjid=3244... print those and password, stick the printout in a fireproof safe

You're on the right path! Alas, I am a heretic and think recovery codes under my approach may cause more problems than they solve. [1]

Caution may be justified when it comes to doing this for something with as wide a surface area as a Google account. For me, if I'm going to have to compromise on 2FA somewhere anyway, I might as well go full hog and get an honest to goodness keyfile.

[1]: https://andrew-quinn.me/digital-resiliency-2025/#wait-what-a...

Re: Tarsnap is cozy

#75

For the price, there better be some plan for this service to exist in 10/100 years. With a bus factor of 2, that gives me little confidence.

I don't actually know what the bus factor for Tarsnap's infrastructure is. 2 is just the absolute lower bound from what I know of the company itself. It is in all likelihood much higher.

I can't read the founder's mind, but if I were them I would probably have some Kongō Gumi style designs on making it a 1000-year company just because that's a fun intellectual exercise. [1]

[1]: https://www.tofugu.com/japan/oldest-businesses-in-japan/

Re: Tarsnap is cozy

#77
post #8

It can be whatever it wants I am not paying $25 to store 100GB. I used to use Tarsnap a decade or so ago but pricing makes no sense at all nowadays. Looks like much for both Colin and us could be solved moving this away from AWS

Tarsnap has always been expensive. More than a decade ago (April 2014, to be precise), @patio11 suggested that tarsnap should increase its pricing. [1] Here’s the HN thread on that post. [2]

All the granular calculations (picodollars) on storage used plus time are fine. But tarsnap was always very expensive for larger amounts of data, especially data that cannot be well deduplicated.

[1]: https://www.kalzumeus.com/2014/04/03/fantasy-tarsnap/

[2]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7523953

Re: Tarsnap is cozy

#78
post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

OP here, thanks for using the cost estimator! [1] I'm glad you got some use out of it. I use Backblaze B2 myself for most of my general purpose backup needs. It's actually $6/month, I believe. Tarsnap fills but one niche in my overall system. It's a very important niche for which I haven't found any other providers who do anything similar (keyfiles, prepaid, borderline anonymous etc), but it's not where I store the v…

I just don't really understand what the niche is. If you have a tiny bit of data that you want to keep backed up and rarely access, you can encrypt it with any number of easy command-line or GUI tools and upload it to Google Drive, Dropbox, or anywhere else with a free tier. If it's securely encrypted, there's no reason to care that the storage provider knows who you are. Tarsnap definitely has nerd appeal, but I can…

>but I can't think of a real problem that it actually solves.

Maybe it's good for storing stuff that's illegal to possess?

Re: Tarsnap is cozy

#80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's actually one of my favorite features. That should never happen under the limited circumstances I use it for. If something goes so wrong that my account actually runs out of money before I notice, then I far prefer the default to be "intruder alert, intruder alert, wipe everything ". There's a reason it's marketed as backups for the truly paranoid.

Then why bother backing up at all? Buy some gasoline and set your laptop on fire, you'll never get more secure than that.

For me, personally? I do it for kicks. But in general, there do exist many data loads in the world which are valuable to the holder, valuable enough to be worth the low cost of a backup, up until time T in the future. After T, however, they become more of a liability than an asset to hold. A self-destructing backup model is the obvious fit for such situations. Both the positive-sum and the negative-sum periods need to be considered to truly safeguard your data properly.
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