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Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought (2023)

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Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought (2023)

#71

How does web fingerprinting work with things like iPhones, where many people have the same screen, browser, os version, etc?

The browser version will have some variance because releases are rolled out to clients over time, and users don't restart their browser immediately. I don't know all the signals FingerprintJS use but they obviously depend significantly on the user agent string (which has the precise version) seen by how the author could spoof it with Tor's UA randomizer.

BTW, the article is incorrect that Chrome doesn't allow for user agent modification or other fingerprint resistance; you can: https://developer.chrome.com/docs/devtools/device-mode/overr... and there are extensions for more convenience. The article is also incorrect about third party cookie leakage from ads but it was possible to sniff the session ID in some cases, back a decade ago before everything went cookieless and dropped session identifiers from the protocol entirely. However, it is possible for advertisers to parameterize their campaigns and analytics to such a detail that they can link demographics to their internal user IDs, though it's against policy it is easy to go unnoticed. And things like location exfiltration in too many Android apps, I'm not trying to give Google a complete pass on privacy but it's clear the author made some assumptions based on bias.

Back to your question, though, there are other things you can use as part of the fingerprint. The fonts that are installed are a proxy for which applications have been installed. The artifacts at the edge of text rendered onto a canvas can indicate which graphics chip and drivers are installed, sometimes with differences even within the same GPU model and driver version. Touch tracking can tell whether you swipe with your left hand or your right hand. Timing signals can indicate CPU specs and even hint at whether you're in a VM or behind a VPN, etc. There are more, accessible from JS in most cases, and really most of it is more reliable than what's in the user agent string.

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought (2023)

#72
It's really "cool" when you get vendors like 6sense that combine browser fingerprinting with semi-licit data brokers to do full deanonymization of visitor traffic. Why bother doing marketing when you can just get a report of the name, email address, mailing address, and creditworthiness of every person who's visited your website?

I've seen people argue with a straight face that these tools and their reports don't run afoul of GDPR/CCPA because they don't involve information that a user gave you on purpose, so it's not protected. Ghouls, all of them.

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought (2023)

#73

Would be curious how Brave handles fingerprinting, I’ll have to look into that.

Brave has built in fingerprinting protection (https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/wiki/Fingerprinting-P...), that's enabled by default. It seems like it's less aggressive than firefox's though (since firefox's fingerprint protection is disabled by default because it breaks things), and it doesn't seem to be able to block this companies fingerprinting tech. I got the same ID in a regular window and private browsing window.

The brave shields setting section also has an option for blocking scripts, which may work. It prevents the demo from being able to show an identifier for the user at all, but I'm not sure if it's preventing identification or just preventing the displaying of the identification.

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought (2023)

#74

> go to about:config and setting privacy.resistFingerprinting = true in your Firefox browser Two questions jump to mind: Why isn't this the default in Firefox? What is the downside? I.e., what can break by enabling this parameter?

The most obvious downside for me was remote terminal windows (e.g. using ttyd) being unusable because canvas rendering was "broken".

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought (2023)

#75

It's a little unclear to me - does Brave prevent it or not? Edit: some interesting background on what they do here: https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/wiki/Fingerprinting-P...

Tested with Brave on my phone using fingerprint.com. Visited the website, took note of the ID, closed the tab, cleared browsing data, and opened the website again. The ID remained the same.

This is on Android, so Brave is using their own browser engine, so I don't think things will be different on desktop.

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought (2023)

#76
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Or... You could read GDPR and realize that "cookie dialogs" were never about cookies: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44670345

So does that mean that fingerprint.com, which records your fingerprint without asking for your consent, is operating illegally?

Yes, almost certainly so. You did not consent, they have no legitimate interest to track you, and you were never informed about the what and why in plain language.

The GDPR isn’t the complex legislation monster people make it out to be, but for the most part common sense about handling sensitive data.

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought (2023)

#77
I turned on resistfingerprinting and started getting sites in light mode. The horror!

This doesn't look to be among the available toggles, and I hope that changes. I realize the light/dark setting is a data point for fingerprinting, but it's also something I have a genuine strong preference about.

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought (2023)

#78
post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is a technical problem, not a legal one. The solution is for browsers to provide users with the ability to limit the information being sent. There's no need for the vast majority of websites to know my OS, number of CPUs, screen or window size, or most of the other fingerprinting metrics.

I think it's both. It wasn't a problem when browsers were simple content display engines, but now that they are full VMs for application software, they need some of that capability just to function. FWIW, I think this was a mistake, but the genie is out of the bottle. I suppose one technical mitigation might be a permissions dialog when a script requests access to a high-risk API like canvas or WebGL. But that's unfo…

I'm loathe to suggest it, but perhaps LLM's could help here? Once local LLMs are a couple orders of magnitude better and resource efficient, a user agent LLM could decide what features are actually needed for each page.

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought (2023)

#79
post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes by a lot.

This comes with some downside because to protect privacy Safari blocks some useful APIs. For example, you can't tell if the user is running Apple silicon or Intel. That means you have to ask them whether they want the Intel or Apple silicon version of a download. This is a non-trivial question for a lot of Mac users. And, sure, you can always publish through the App store but that comes with its own drawbacks.

A price I’ll gladly pay in favor of increased privacy, and I haven’t heard of too many people stumped by the question. In the worst case, you can just try it out.

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought (2023)

#80
This really saddens me. The fingerprinting even works when using Mullvad browser with VPN. I am so tired of this new internet, I hope someone is working on figuring out an alternative to this type of fingerprinting. I understand it is a cat and mouse game, but whatever, this is absolutely shitty.

I was wondering why can't browsers just fake the hardware (assuming that is what it is using to recognize)? I understand sometimes these javascripts run some type of algorithm to detect how fast it was processed to fingerprint, but even those could potentially be faked by the browser. Is anyone working on such stuff?

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