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2025 Iberia Blackout Report [pdf]

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Re: 2025 Iberia Blackout Report [pdf]

#71
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That... doesn't sound correct. Inverters are the cheap part, you can literally wire as many as you want in parallel. Batteries have immense power availability, with most chemistries you can trivially deliver the entire capacity in half an hour or so (more like 5 minutes with lithium cells). Basically I'm dubious. I'm sure there are grids somewhere that have misprovisioned their inverter capacity, but I don't buy that…

You can google "system inertia" as a starting point.

I understand the concept. I was asking for a cite about the seemingly-incorrect point about batteries. FWIW, that very search term doesn't produce the string "battery" anywhere on the first page.

Re: 2025 Iberia Blackout Report [pdf]

#73
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That... doesn't sound correct. Inverters are the cheap part, you can literally wire as many as you want in parallel. Batteries have immense power availability, with most chemistries you can trivially deliver the entire capacity in half an hour or so (more like 5 minutes with lithium cells). Basically I'm dubious. I'm sure there are grids somewhere that have misprovisioned their inverter capacity, but I don't buy that…

it is technically correct, but so are you. More inverters in parallel will achieve the same end goal - fast frequency response.

Are you actually certain there are insufficient inverters though? Again, that doesn't pass the smell test and I'd want to see a cite for "batteries don't work for high frequency spike buffering because of inverter shortfalls" or something.

Re: 2025 Iberia Blackout Report [pdf]

#74
post #66
post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The report goes to great lengths to avoid certain words or phrases. The market failed here, it didn’t price in risk of grid collapse correctly.

[flagged]

Except to point out that it's not nice that renewables arrive at random prices in the grid and start crapping all around it until they disappear when expensive again.

The stability of a nuclear plant vs the instability of a solar far when a cloud passes over.

Re: 2025 Iberia Blackout Report [pdf]

#75
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You don't need to build a dam, you just need the pipes and pumps for an existing dam (or elevated natural basin).

I thought you needed two dams. One higher than the other. You pump water back and forth between the two to generate or capture energy. Is it that common that dams are already existing in nearby-ish pairs with the sufficient height difference? And that we haven't done this already? Doing this is good where we can. But it has geographical limitations. Batteries don't so much.

You need two sufficiently large bodies of water close to each other at different elevations. You don't necessarily need two dams - for instance, the Ludington pumped storage plant adjacent to Lake Michigan uses the lake as the lower body.

Re: 2025 Iberia Blackout Report [pdf]

#76
post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> nor are brief periods of multi-gigawatt draw/dumping as needed. Actually this is typically an issue for grid batteries. Spinning generators can easily briefly go to 10x the rated current for a second or so to smooth out big anomalies. Stationary batteries inverters can't do 10x current spikes ever - the max they can get to is more like 1.2x for a few seconds. That means you end up needing a lot of batteries to prov…

A spinning generator is not outputting 10x it's rated current over any significant amount of time. You can only add so much steam or fuel to a turbine, and the rotor has a lot of inertia, but not enough to account for 10X its rated capacity for a second. The electrical switchyards would trip nearly instantaneously if it's connected plant output 10X its rated input.

Let alone the transmission lines totally catching fire after a 10X output increase.

Re: 2025 Iberia Blackout Report [pdf]

#77
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That... doesn't sound correct. Inverters are the cheap part, you can literally wire as many as you want in parallel. Batteries have immense power availability, with most chemistries you can trivially deliver the entire capacity in half an hour or so (more like 5 minutes with lithium cells). Basically I'm dubious. I'm sure there are grids somewhere that have misprovisioned their inverter capacity, but I don't buy that…

You can google "system inertia" as a starting point.

When it comes to the grid, there's a lot of outdated information left over from the 20th century, so any web search for "system interia" needs to also include some searches on "grid forming inverter"' to make sure that the info is complete.

(And "reactive power" could be good too but not absolutely necessary to understand at first...

Re: 2025 Iberia Blackout Report [pdf]

#78
post #60

So, the problem was a local voltage oscilation, where the high voltages caused generators to shut off. How do these oscilations start? I understand that voltage isn't necessarily equal across the network, where frequency is. But that only allows oscillating, it doesn't cause it. Is this a basis inductor capacitor oscillation? Is it the small delay in inverters between measuring voltage and regulating their output? (s…

Sort of:

For the oscillations, the European grid in general is large enough that the time it takes for the energy to flow (at some fraction of the speed of light!) from one side of it to the other is not negligible: it's not a case of delays at the power plant, but delays in the network itself which can cause the various natural and artificial feedback loops in the circuit to start to become unstable and oscillate. In this specific incident, there's some implication in the report that the largest oscillation was unusual and may have been generated by single plant essentially oscillating on its own, for reasons unknown.

In either case, the oscillations were not the direct cause of the blackout: they were controlled, but the steps to control them put the system into a more fragile state. This is because of reactive power. The voltage in the system is due to both the 'real power', i.e. the power generated by the plants and consumed by consumers in the grid each cycle of the 50Hz AC, but also 'reactive power', which is energy that is absorbed by the consumers and the grid itself (all the power lines and transformers) and then bounced back to the generators each cycle. This is the basic 'inductor-capacitor' oscillation. This reactive power is considered to be 'generated' by capacitance and 'consumed' by inductance, though this distinction is arbitrary.

So, after the grid operator had stopped the oscillations, the grid was 'generating' a lot more reactive power, because damping down the oscillations generally involves connecting more things together so they don't fight each other as much. It also _lowered_ the grid voltage on average, so various bits of equipment were essentially adjusting their transformer ratio with the high-voltage interconnect to try to adjust for it.

Apart from these measures, the generators on the grid are generally supposed to contribute towards the voltage regulation, which helps with both damping these effects and reducing the change of the runaway spike that happened. But crucially, there's a difference between what they (by regulation, not necessarily technical capacity!) do. The traditional generators have active voltage control, which means they actively adjust how much reactive power they generate or absorb depending on the voltage on the lines. Renewable generators, by contrast, have a fixed ratio: they will be set to generate or absorb reactive power at a certain percentage of the real power (a few percent usually), they don't actively adjust this (they're not allowed to under the rules of the grid).

So, after the oscillation, the grid is generating a lot of reactive power and the power plants are absorbing it, but there's a lot of renewables around, which can't actively control voltage, they're just passively contributing a certain amount. Then there's a fairly rapid drop in real power output, which seems to be related to the energy market as some plants decide to curtail. This is expected, but renewables can do it pretty quickly compared to conventional plants. This means that the amount of reactive power being absorbed drops, i.e., counterintuitively a plant producing less power means the voltage rises.

In theory, there should be enough voltage control from conventional sources to deal with this, but in general they prove to not absorb as much reactive power as they were expected to, and the report calls out one plant which seems to just not be doing any control at all, it's more or less just doing something random. This means the voltage keeps rising, and, perhaps in part due to the adjustments in the transformer ratios, this means another plant trips off, at a lower voltage than it should (this is, basically, for protection: the equipment can only take so much voltage before it's damaged, but there's rules about what level of voltage it should withstand and, in extreme cases, for how long). This then makes the voltage rise more, and it's a fairly rapid cascade of failure from there, and many plants kick offline in a matter of seconds, and only then does the frequency of the grid start to drop significantly, but it's already too late because there's too much demand for the supply.

The recommendations of the report basically boil down to:

- Figure out why the plants (renewable and conventional) didn't have the capabilities the grid operator thought they did (or why they were actively causing problems), and fix them.

- Fix the regulations so renewable plants are allowed to contribute to active voltage control, and incentivize them to do so.

- Adjust the market rules so that plants have to give more notice before increasing or decreasing supply in response to prices

- Improve the monitoring of the grid and add other tools to help with voltage control (including better interconnects with the rest of Europe)

Re: 2025 Iberia Blackout Report [pdf]

#79
post #3

[flagged]

It's worth pointing out that the worst part of the behaviour of renewables specifically in this incident (a fixed power factor for managing reactive power), is currently mandated by the regulations in Spain, even though many of them are already equipped to do voltage control.

Re: 2025 Iberia Blackout Report [pdf]

#80
post #8
post #3

[flagged]

What I'm reading from that quote is that the issue wasn't renewables as such, but an issue of power generation reacting too quickly and too intensely to price fluctuations. "Renewables" only matter insofar as they're the sort of generation that, under the current regulatory regime, get to react to those pricing changes.

That wasn't the core issue. It was the spark to the powder keg, so to speak.
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