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Privacy Pass Authentication for Kagi Search

blog.kagi.com

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Re: Privacy Pass Authentication for Kagi Search

#71

Post by lukev »

mortar wrote: post #65

I’m not insinuating for even a second that Kagi actually do this, but as a general rule, isn’t any privacy claim dubious at the moment given that more and more governments appear to be able to compel companies to identify their users (especially those searching for illegal content) and further forcefully insist they not disclose it? It’s disheartening to think the great progress we’re making in this sector could be u…

XKCD #538 strikes again, and definitely extends to forcing people to lie about algorithms and possible backdoors.

I don't think, however, that this means we need to give up on crypto entirely. Just... be aware of the threat model for what you're encrypting.

Re: Privacy Pass Authentication for Kagi Search

#72

Post by echoangle »

I don’t really understand how the protocol can ensure that the server can’t identify the client.

As far as I understand, the client sends some information A to the server, the server applies some private key X and returns the output B to the client, which then generates tokens C from the output.

If the server uses a different X for every user and then when verifying just checks the X of every user to see which one is valid, couldn’t the server know who created the token?

Re: Privacy Pass Authentication for Kagi Search

#74

Post by mortar »

pavon wrote: post #63

This is very cool. I'm curious about why there is a limit on the number of tokens generated per month, when this is only currently offered to unlimited accounts. Since the tokens all expire at the end of the month, tokens can't be horded to use Kagi after a subscription ends. Perhaps it is instead a resource issue where token generation is expensive. In that case though, I would think limiting tokens/day would be mor…

The reason they give in their docs is to “prevent abuse” (https://help.kagi.com/kagi/privacy/privacy-pass.html).

It feels like they picked a number no user should hit, while keeping it low enough to not pass Kagi out “free” to all their friends.

Re: Privacy Pass Authentication for Kagi Search

#75

Post by miohtama »

frereubu wrote: post #60
MyOutfitIsVague wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know nor do I really care what other search companies are making. I pay $10/month for Kagi because it works for me and it's good. I don't even care about Kagi as a company (I don't care about any company); their search works. It's a good product, and I'm happy to keep paying for it as long as it keeps being useful while all the free competitors are still terrible. I use about 2k searches per month. edit: Even…

So funny that blocking Pinterest comes up in all discussions on Kagi (I've mentioned it myself in the past). I almost think people might pay $1 a month just to block Pinterest.

HackerNews discussion to remove Pinterest from Google search results (2018)

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16613996

Re: Privacy Pass Authentication for Kagi Search

#76

Post by echoangle »

mortar wrote: post #65

I’m not insinuating for even a second that Kagi actually do this, but as a general rule, isn’t any privacy claim dubious at the moment given that more and more governments appear to be able to compel companies to identify their users (especially those searching for illegal content) and further forcefully insist they not disclose it? It’s disheartening to think the great progress we’re making in this sector could be u…

Isn’t the whole point that this method is secure by design so even if they wanted, they couldn’t track you?

Or are you saying the method is designed to look secure but there’s an intentional weakness that makes tracking possible?

Re: Privacy Pass Authentication for Kagi Search

#77

Post by mortar »

echoangle wrote: post #76
mortar wrote: post #65

I’m not insinuating for even a second that Kagi actually do this, but as a general rule, isn’t any privacy claim dubious at the moment given that more and more governments appear to be able to compel companies to identify their users (especially those searching for illegal content) and further forcefully insist they not disclose it? It’s disheartening to think the great progress we’re making in this sector could be u…

Isn’t the whole point that this method is secure by design so even if they wanted, they couldn’t track you? Or are you saying the method is designed to look secure but there’s an intentional weakness that makes tracking possible?

Definitely suggesting the method is secure, assuming the company does all the things they’ll say they do, which I also agree they’ll do. I’m just concerned the government can destroy this all, just by compelling them not to, and change a well intentioned method at any moment.

Re: Privacy Pass Authentication for Kagi Search

#78

Post by abound »

pavon wrote: post #63

This is very cool. I'm curious about why there is a limit on the number of tokens generated per month, when this is only currently offered to unlimited accounts. Since the tokens all expire at the end of the month, tokens can't be horded to use Kagi after a subscription ends. Perhaps it is instead a resource issue where token generation is expensive. In that case though, I would think limiting tokens/day would be mor…

[I worked on building this at Kagi]

Since we have no idea who is issuing search requests in Privacy Pass mode, if there was no limits on token issuance, you could simply generate infinite tokens and give them out (or use them as part of some downstream service), and we'd have no other recourse for rate-limiting to prevent abuse.

Setting a high, but reasonable limit on issuance helps prevent abuse, and if you run out of tokens, you can reach out to support@kagi.com and we'll reset your quota.

Re: Privacy Pass Authentication for Kagi Search

#80

Post by echoangle »

mortar wrote: post #77
echoangle wrote: post #76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Isn’t the whole point that this method is secure by design so even if they wanted, they couldn’t track you? Or are you saying the method is designed to look secure but there’s an intentional weakness that makes tracking possible?

Definitely suggesting the method is secure, assuming the company does all the things they’ll say they do, which I also agree they’ll do. I’m just concerned the government can destroy this all, just by compelling them not to, and change a well intentioned method at any moment.

But what would the government compel them to do? If the method is secure, you don’t need to trust the server. And if they backdoor the open source client, people could notice it in an audit.
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