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Earlier quoted context omitted.
Zero fatalities though. You could do a lot worse for a massive air traffic control failure.
Unfortunately shutting down air traffic generally does not result in zero excess deaths: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3233376/
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Unfortunately shutting down air traffic generally does not result in zero excess deaths: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3233376/
Your source says “the fatality rate did not change appreciably”.
You know there's a software engineer somewhere that saw this as a potential problem, brought up a solution, and had that solution rejected because handling it would add 40 hours of work to a project.
I'd rather deal with designing tables to properly represent names.
I've posted this here before, but they really need globally unique codes for all the airports, waypoints, etc, it's crazy there are collisions. People always balk at this for some reason but look at the edge cases that can occur, it's crazy CRAZY
Coming up with a globally unique waypoint system is trivial. Convincing the aviation industry to spend many hundreds of millions of dollars to change a core data type used in just about every single aviation-related system, in order to avoid triggering rare once-a-decade bugs? That's a lot harder.
I wonder what 1,500 cancelled flights and 700,000 disrupted passengers adds up to in cost? And that’s just this one incident.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Your source says “the fatality rate did not change appreciably”.
Injuries did increase, though, and I can't think of a plausible mechanism that would somehow cap expected outcomes at "injury but not death".
Increased number of injuries but not deaths could be, for example, (purely making things up off the top of my head here) due to higher levels of distractedness among average drivers due to fear of terrorism, which results in more low-speed, surface-street collisions, while there’s no change in high speed collisions because a short spell of distractedness on the highway is less likely to result in an accident.
People posting on this forum saying "ah well software's failure case isn't as bad" > This forced controllers to revert to manual processing, leading to more than 1,500 flight cancellations and delaying hundreds of services which did operate.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The question isn't really how many would think it meant nanonmeters, it's how many would recognise it as nautical miles.
In aviation? Literally everyone. Context clues should make it obvious.
So, essentially the system has a serious denial of service flaw. I wonder how many variations of flight plans can cause different but similar errors that also force a disconnect of primary and secondary systems. Seems "reject individual flight plan" might be a better system response than "down hard to prevent corruption" Bad assumption that a failure to interpret a plan is a serious coding error seems to be the root…
CORRECT the flight plan, by first promoting the exit/entry points for each autonomous region along the route, validating the entry/exit list only, and then the arcs within, would be the least errant method.