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Entrust Certificate Distrust

security.googleblog.com

71–80 of 118 posts

Re: Entrust Certificate Distrust

#71

> This approach attempts to minimize disruption to existing subscribers using a recently announced Chrome feature to remove default trust based on the SCTs (signed certificate timestamps) in certificates. I was wondering how Chrome was able to revoke a certificate based on time without trusting the CA to not back date certificates and it looks like this is due to being able to trust certificate transparency logs inst…

Even before CT, policies generally trusted the CA to not backdate. Of course a CA could try that, but if caught, all certificates, including previous ones, would be treated as invalid, so it worked.

Re: Entrust Certificate Distrust

#72

It always fascinates me when this happens. Don't the CAs understand that the browser vendors can and will kill their business if they don't comply with the rules? It's not like a fine that can be ignored. How dysfunctional does a company have to be to let this happen?

All you need is one single [cc]?.gov as your client and you are in business forever.

How? If you want to sell public certs you need Google (and apple and Microsoft) to grant permission.

Private certs are not that big a business.

Re: Entrust Certificate Distrust

#73
post #69
post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Right up until the next contract renewal. "Not trustworthy enough to secure a basic website" isn't exactly a great look.

Untrusted by Google is what most laypeople will get out of it.

The others will probably follow

Re: Entrust Certificate Distrust

#74
post #68
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

CYBS Engineer here. We're already working on it. Keep an eye for merchant notifications if you use certificate pinning. Now, back to rotating certificates....

Maybe you (or anyone) could shed light on something for me? I'm sure leaf certificate pinning is very common among your customers. Assuming that pinning is a manual process where customers decide to implicitly trust a specific cert, what's the point of using a third party CA for those customers all? Does anybody self-sign or use a private CA on specific endpoints with longer certificate validity, and let the pinning…

We have explicitly told customers not to pin our certificates and if they suffer downtime due to pinning it will not be considered a breach of our SLA.

We have one customer who has demonstrated enough competence with certificates that we create a private ca endpoint and let them use that. The private root lasts around 5 years, and they pin to that.

Re: Entrust Certificate Distrust

#75
post #53

> Additionally, should a Chrome user or enterprise explicitly trust any of the above certificates on a platform and version of Chrome relying on the Chrome Root Store (e.g., explicit trust is conveyed through a Group Policy Object on Windows), the SCT-based constraints described above will be overridden and certificates will function as they do today. This continues to annoy me. Chrome (and other browsers) have detai…

I don't understand what is annoying about this. Wouldn't it be more annoying for Chrome not to offer end users a way to override policy decisions they make in a Google office halfway across the world about what websites you can view on your own laptop?

I think they're complaining that as an administrator, you only get a binary decision: trust all certificates signed by this CA, or trust none of the certificates signed by this CA. The Chrome devs can implement more fine-grained decisions, such as trust all certificates signed by this CA with SCT<October 2024, but they don't expose this type of control to admins.

Re: Entrust Certificate Distrust

#76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't understand what is annoying about this. Wouldn't it be more annoying for Chrome not to offer end users a way to override policy decisions they make in a Google office halfway across the world about what websites you can view on your own laptop?

I think they're complaining that as an administrator, you only get a binary decision: trust all certificates signed by this CA, or trust none of the certificates signed by this CA. The Chrome devs can implement more fine-grained decisions, such as trust all certificates signed by this CA with SCT<October 2024, but they don't expose this type of control to admins.

Exactly. I’d also like to be able to trust a certificate for a limited set of domains. This would be extremely valuable for all kinds of use cases.

Re: Entrust Certificate Distrust

#77
post #72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

All you need is one single [cc]?.gov as your client and you are in business forever.

How? If you want to sell public certs you need Google (and apple and Microsoft) to grant permission. Private certs are not that big a business.

None of this is a "big business". I think thirty years ago there was probably a perception that it could be a big business, it's potentially a license to print money, but sufficient incompetence got them here instead. Look at ISRG's volumes, that's the potential volume available in the Web PKI, but that's at $0, we know the resistance to even low prices is fierce.

If you asked people from the for-profit CAs about Let's Encrypt before it launched, the impression you'd get was that they're issuing a lot more certificates and this doesn't matter. Millions per day? Ha, we'd barely notice. That was all bluster, they were never doing that.

I think Apple probably had the best shot to turn this into free money. Apple's customers are very willing to pay more than something appears to cost on the basis that it's Apple so it's worth it. I think you'd struggle a lot more to undercut a $10 Apple PKI product with a free offering that's identical because Apple's customers are used to justifying why they spent more money on the same thing with the logo on it, and they are able to be completely irrational about it and it's OK - a brand rep would look unhinged if they violently attack people who point out that it's bullshit, loyal fans will get understanding or even praise.

I actually thought about 10-15 years ago that Apple was about to do this, but they didn't and once Let's Encrypt happens there's no room really. Apple does still make money off some places where they're sole issuer and get to charge arbitrarily for doing nothing, but not like they would if they'd seized the entire Web PKI.

Re: Entrust Certificate Distrust

#78

It always fascinates me when this happens. Don't the CAs understand that the browser vendors can and will kill their business if they don't comply with the rules? It's not like a fine that can be ignored. How dysfunctional does a company have to be to let this happen?

We've seen the CEO of a CA arguing in a public forum that their 3 month trial is better than Let's Encrypt. Yes, those can be dysfunctional and can be led by people who have little idea about the business.

Re: Entrust Certificate Distrust

#79
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Right, and that's a fundamental sea change in PKI security posture since the Iranian "ComodoHacker" and the Soghoian and Stamm compelled issuance paper! My point is just that some attackers might be willing to have their attacks show up in public logs if their victims are unlikely to ever notice that and if nobody else is likely to notice it either. With Let's Encrypt we made a lot of people's certificate management…

I got every self-hosting sysadmin I know to run certificate monitors for sites they maintain but it certainly isn't a common thing to do. I know Cloudflare has a beta certificate monitoring feature which would certainly help a lot with this problem considering their market share if they enable it by default. (Although one problem with this is that they issue backup certificates from other CAs so it'd easily trigger w…

> Although one problem with this is that they issue backup certificates from other CAs so it'd easily trigger warning fatigue!

Indeed, the fact that Cloudflare emails out CT warnings due to their own backup certs is rather embarrassing.

Re: Entrust Certificate Distrust

#80
post #9

Can someone ELI5 what the violations linked in the first line are? They seem pretty minor to me but I don't understand certs

A LOT of minor fuck ups which demonstrates Entrust is (likely) not malicious, they just stupid and don't care how to do things correctly. How long until they fuck up something serious?

This reminds me about discussion about Russian Goverment's NUC Root CA (not trusted by default in Chrome/Firefox, Trusted by Yandex Browser only with some additional verifications to prevent abuse by goverment). Discussion was not about why this cert was necessary in first place, it was about it's creation violating Russian laws and procedures AND violate a lot of technical rules. A lot of people just said - this cert is necessary and it's clear who made it so why we should look to "minor details"? (Links - in Russian https://habr.com/ru/articles/666520/ / https://habr.com/ru/articles/708970/ )

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