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A Defense of Philosophy (against Paul Graham)

jsomers.net

71–80 of 96 posts

Re: A Defense of Philosophy (against Paul Graham)

#71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

1) In this universe, it appear that there is a property -- lets call it mass -- that determines how things pull towards each other. But our universe is just a sample of size 1; so that might be confirmation bias or suppressed evidence. In order to learn more about related phenomena, one needs multiple data points with varying initial conditions. In order to understand more details about a specific case, no further da…

1. This is an excellent point you make. There is, a priori, very little reason (as far as I know) to assume that an alternative universe would have the same physical properties as ours. If there is evidence in that direction I doubt it's merely "because our universe has this property." But I agree with you in principle that this is a weak point. The essay's point was to respond to pg's attacks. jsomers never assumed…

Philosophy, at one point, was the catch-all phrase for any type of thought. Mathematics was philosophy. Science was philosophy. Law was philosophy. Economics was philosophy. Every form of thought (more or less) was philosophy. Over the course of history, these fields have spun off from philosophy, and achieved various degrees of relevance; their earliest works were done by "philosophers" because these fields did not yet exist, but in modern times they are studied independently. The question then becomes, in modern times, what is a person studying when they study philosophy? They are not studying any of the fields that spun off of philosophy, or else they would no longer be classified as philosophers. So, the question becomes (answering your point 5) what problems that other fields care about are still answered by philosophers? The critique in the OP correctly identifies that some philosophers still concern themselves with problems related to cognitive science, which still answer questions from psychology. But once cognitive science becomes its own independent field, there may be nothing left within the realm of philosophy.

We might not have had modern political science without Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Hobbes. But we would have had Hobbes even if he had not been classified as a philosopher, and thus we would have had the rest of them.

We might not have had modern economics without Smith, Pareto, and Mill. But we would have had Smith even if he had not been classified as a philosopher, and thus we would have had the rest.

We might not have had modern sociology without Marx and Gramsci. But we would have had Comte even if he hadn't been classified as a philosopher, and thus we would have had the rest.

I mention these three individuals' work because they (1) fundamentally began what came to eventually be their fields, and (2) did not really build these fields incrementally out of the rest of the philosophical body of knowledge at the time. This demonstrates that it isn't some kind of unifying thread within the study of philosophy that causes these fields to spin off from them; philosophy was just what you called it when you were studying problems that weren't in their own field yet. This no longer occurs in modern times, so we don't see philosophy spinning off new fields in the way that it used to; computer science (as a whole) sees its roots in modern mathematics, not philosophy. Psychoanalysis, as a modern field (unlike psychology as a whole, which also often refers to much older studies), clearly descends from biology. Electrical engineering. Nuclear physics even has it in the title.

The study of the works of "philosophers" can still be relevant within other fields, but to study philosophy is to spend one's time looking at what's left. It is this study, in modern times, that pg and I are attacking as vague, useless, and prone to wars of semantics.

Re: A Defense of Philosophy (against Paul Graham)

#72
post #69
post #68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Absolutely not. But linguistics seems like a legitimate enough field, and Chomsky is considered rather influential there. His work seems to follow logically from Wittgenstein's point that a lot of philosophy comes down to the precise meanings of words.

So you're just going by his reputation? I have read about some of his ideas and formed the opinion that they are bad (apart from the one i mentioned).

Ignore his politics, though I personally have a great deal of respect for people with extreme politics.

The Chomsky hierarchy -- a method of classifying formal grammars. Seems computer science-y enough that you'll consider it as something real. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chomsky_hierarchy

Re: A Defense of Philosophy (against Paul Graham)

#73
post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The study of mathematics is both more useful, and carries most of the same benefits (although it typically lacks the forced experience with communicative writing).

I think the statement that math is more useful then philosophy is debatable, especially at the university level. Advanced calculus and "pure math" courses had precious few uses in the day to day grind of many jobs. Pure math might teach logic in some way, but philosophy tends to focus on argument itself, which lends itself to more obvious practical uses.

As a programmer, you don't see obvious practical use in understanding results in number theory? These have importance in a wide variety of computer applications.

What about linear algebra? Do you really think that understanding its applications in computer graphics doesn't/wouldn't improve your employability?

Certainly, if you're a janitor, having studied philosophy vs. mathematics does not significantly affect how you do your job (though it probably does affect how easy it is for you to get a different job). But mathematics--even advanced mathematics--has more and more obvious applications than philosophy.

Re: A Defense of Philosophy (against Paul Graham)

#74
post #67

The argument in this essay relies heavily on, among other things, the idea that extraordinarily abstract mathematical discussions are similar to extraordinarily abstract discussions in philosophy or literary theory. This premise (among the others refuted throughout this post) is flawed; while some of mathematics is not yet related to any applied field, that is because applied fields develop by using the mathematics a…

And what is this substance of mathematics? Calling mathematics "incontrovertibly true" and stating that abstractions used in mathematics can be explained concretely in simpler terms are philosophical positions and the justifications for and against these positions are debated outside mathematics in philosophy. You praise the rigor of mathematics while ignoring the rigor in which philosophy searches for the justificat…

The substance of mathematics is figuring out what is still true when one applies the highest standard for rigor that still permits the possibility of determining things not yet known to be true.

That any philosopher might continue to debate this issue is, while sadly true, irrelevant. A logical system without modus ponens can either define modus ponens, or is clearly not extensible enough to define anything. A logical system with modus ponens is either inconsistent, or at most as general as mathematics. Thus, there can be no extensible system of truth in which mathematics is false, validating my claim that it is incontrovertible.

As to whether or not mathematics can be explained in simple terms, I will suggest that this appears to be the case empirically, since some people become mathematicians, and they all seem to use the same terminology, more or less. To prove that every mathematical result in existence can be explained simply would require that I actually explain every mathematical result simply, and that is beyond the scope of an HN comment.

Finally, philosophers do not "search for the justifications of assumptions for all fields of human knowledge including mathematics and science" with the level of rigor I specified in my comment; indeed, the entire point of this discussion is that they tend not to use any level of rigor at all. Insofar as philosophy actually does anything to "justify the assumptions" for any field, it occasionally achieves useful results; however, much of philosophy is focused solely on a continuing failure to agree on semantics.

Re: A Defense of Philosophy (against Paul Graham)

#75
post #47
post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have great respect for Wittgenstein, certainly far more than for the myriad of analytical philosophers I read a long time ago who all "wrote sense" (comparatively speaking) and all of whom I've forgotten.

That's wonderful. Perhaps you, as a Wittgenstein buff, would be so kind as to explain how the Wittgenstein quote I gave above, which at first glance appears to be nonsense, is in fact respectable and worthwhile thinking? I don't get it; enlighten me.

Above you say that this is an honest request to know more so I will treat it as such.

In philosophy a method proposed by Descartes to find the foundations of knowledge was to doubt everything that possibly could be doubted which includes the external world. Wittgenstein in his Tractatus similarly starts from a blank slate and tries to define and describe the world without crossing his own boundaries and definitions of what can be considered sensible to say (and fails. To objectively describe the world is an attempt to step outside it and his bounds of sense).

I would also like to note that this early is work very different from his later work where he completely rejected the Tractatus, writing with a different style and focus. His later work (especially Philosophical Investigations) has some extremely interesting ideas regarding language, its use and development which I believe would interest those working in the areas of semantic web and NLP.

Re: A Defense of Philosophy (against Paul Graham)

#77
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And what is this substance of mathematics? Calling mathematics "incontrovertibly true" and stating that abstractions used in mathematics can be explained concretely in simpler terms are philosophical positions and the justifications for and against these positions are debated outside mathematics in philosophy. You praise the rigor of mathematics while ignoring the rigor in which philosophy searches for the justificat…

The substance of mathematics is figuring out what is still true when one applies the highest standard for rigor that still permits the possibility of determining things not yet known to be true. That any philosopher might continue to debate this issue is, while sadly true, irrelevant. A logical system without modus ponens can either define modus ponens, or is clearly not extensible enough to define anything. A logica…

Yet this failure to agree on semantics is in part because of the difficulty in providing solid, incontrovertible justifications for these meanings. Consider the new branches of mathematics that were [created|discovered] when Euclid's definition of a straight line were questioned.

That mathematics corresponds so well to the world we perceive is amazing. Why should this be the case? How can we be sure that mathematics and science holds for all cases which we do not observe or that they will continue to do so? Can rigorous justifications be given for these questions that do not rely on circular arguments and blind faith?

Re: A Defense of Philosophy (against Paul Graham)

#78
post #77

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The substance of mathematics is figuring out what is still true when one applies the highest standard for rigor that still permits the possibility of determining things not yet known to be true. That any philosopher might continue to debate this issue is, while sadly true, irrelevant. A logical system without modus ponens can either define modus ponens, or is clearly not extensible enough to define anything. A logica…

Yet this failure to agree on semantics is in part because of the difficulty in providing solid, incontrovertible justifications for these meanings. Consider the new branches of mathematics that were [created|discovered] when Euclid's definition of a straight line were questioned. That mathematics corresponds so well to the world we perceive is amazing. Why should this be the case? How can we be sure that mathematics…

We can't guarantee anything about the world. Empirically, science seems to work, and that is all we can ever get from it. Math is true regardless of its utility in science, and we use it in science because it is convenient to do so.

There are no solid, incontrovertible definitions. Only solid incontrovertible proofs (even there, we don't generally actually know whether or not a proof is incontrovertible, because proofs are rarely verified on that level...but, within mathematics, it is at least POSSIBLE to either verify a proof on that level, or provide a verifiable flaw). Definitions are a matter of convenience.

That the semantics of mathematics sometimes change does not imply that any of its terminology are ever inherently complex in the sense that those who don't understand it, "Don't get it." Indeed, since semantics in mathematics are only ever a shorthand, every mathematical construct could conceivably be expanded into the language of logic, and every mathematician (modulo human error) would agree that the expansion was valid. This underlying agreement on meaning is precisely what is missing from fields like much of literary criticism and philosophy.

Re: A Defense of Philosophy (against Paul Graham)

#79

What a poor reply. Paul Graham's essay can easily be dismissed. Some examples: 1) Graham found philosophy not useful and didn't understand it. This is basically a sample size of 1. Is this a meaningful sample or just a confirmation bias (or suppressed evidence)? 2) Graham believes the early philosophers were encouraged by the progress in maths. But was there really much progress before Euclid's Elements, written arou…

1) I think you've confused logic with an experimental science. 2) I am having serious trouble figuring out how this dismisses PG's essay. 3) So this is the only item in your list that actually addresses Graham's central point at all. I'm not sure exactly what you're trying to say but I think you're circling around this idea: "Sure, pre-20th century philosophy got a lot wrong, but it was that wrongness that allowed ce…

Thanks for your critical thoughts. That's holds for you as well as gambling8nt, straiberman and kragen.

I'll try to answer some of your objections.

(1) You're right that "sample of 1" is an expression found in experimental science. But how do we know that a small sample is no sufficient reason to accept a hypothese if not by using logic?

Also: Read PG's essay once more and tell me: What reasons did he present to support his hypotheses, other than merely: "I didn't understand philosophy, therefore all current philosophy is useless"? He's basically making an appeal to authority, namely his own authority. Hardly a good reason.

2) PG asserts that early philosophy was inspired by maths. But was it, really? How does PG know? In fact, both fields probably inspired each other. This is one of the examples that makes some philosophy useful -- examples that PG simply ignored.

3) Just because you agree with PG (or had a similar experience) doesn't make any of you right. However, I agree that philosophy has had a quality problem every now and then. But that doesn't render all philosophy (or its method) useless.

Also: I'm wasn't trying to say: "I think he's wrong". I say: "Where are his arguments to believe his assertions that he can find a quick way?" Even the more practical sciences have had some really strange ideas when looking at them in hindsight. If usefulness is such a good guide, why did they run into these errors?

4) Indeed, all kind of thinking produces more thinking. Homo sapiens is about 40.000 years old. Then, what did they do the first 37.000 years if mere thinking is sufficient to find the meaningful and true statements?

Finally, attacking the presentation is often the same thing as dismissing the argument. For what are his arguments? PG can point to some bad philosophy, granted. Everybody can do this for all kind of fields. I can point at some really bad software. Is therefore all software engineering useless?

PG wants us to believe his assertions that the philosophical method is inherently flawed. But he presents no arguments other than his own experience, some selected examples and that's about it.

If you want to know what's useful about philosophy, look no further than Socrates: His way to ask people critical questions about the meaning of words, the reasons why they do have the believes they have, and his way to find the differences between good and bad reasons (namely by debate) still is what philosophy is all about. We need the bad thinking to find out why it's bad. Philosophy proceeds by discussing and recording these issues.

You might call it as well critical thinking.

Our small discussion here hopefully shows why this is useful. Trying to dismiss arguments makes you a better thinker.

Re: A Defense of Philosophy (against Paul Graham)

#80
post #39
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"The sheer volume of the literature that has grown up around it..." So it inspired a huge waste of time. Doesn't really fit my definition of useful.

How is it a waste of time?

Instead of refuting the flawed chinese room, the authors of those papers could have done something more productive instead. Like really working towards a real AI algorithm.
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