My only fear is that every vendor will now have to implement secure boot and other mechanisms in order to make sure that only signed software runs on their devices, while providing no way for the customer to take ownership of the device back, so that they can run their own software. I really hope that we eventually get a mandate so that every device, that requires an internet connection for any and all features, will…
Strict launch integrity (unlike "secure boot") depends on a customer-defined root of trust. OpenCompute (OCP) Caliptra is an effort by hyperscalers to enforce a platform root of trust with OSS firmware, mandating dual signature by server OEM and hyperscaler customer. The platform RoT is responsible for validating device firmware and OS boot. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9PlCm4tLb8&t=2764s > Often we see.. great s…
So I would like to have a process where the actual end-user and owner of the device is the root of trust, and then transfer that trust to the vendor software or to their own software if they so choose, instead of having the manufacture, vendor or some agency be the root of trust. Of course, it can come with a sensible setup, where the vendor is already trusted, but that trust should always be revokable.
There should also be a way to remove or transfer the ownership to another person, if the device is sold.
IIUC, OpenTitan is implementing this: https://opentitan.org/book/doc/security/specs/index.html
pKVM goes in a different direction, where software that is run, does not trust the host system, which IMO is not very nice. Trust is something that goes both ways and need to be earned, if I put trust in a software and install it on my system, then I assume that the software also trusts me. If the software doesn't trust me, why should I trust it?
If there is no trust between us, then it should not run on my system but on someone elses and let me communicate with it via a well-defined API we can both trust.