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Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]

ntsb.gov

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Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]

#71

Post by wkipling »

RankingMember wrote: post #58
sterlind wrote: post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No, but I'm also not driving hundreds of souls around near mach 1 strapped to 100k gallons of jet fuel. And when I've worked in government environments I had escorts watching my screen like a hawk the entire time. Not to mention the tapes are only pulled if there's an incident. You could even have a little tamper seal on it to show if it's been downloaded. This is absurd.

See also: police bodycams If you have the capacity to end peoples' lives with an arm spasm I think your privacy should rightfully take a backseat.

Absolutely not. Body cams mute the first part of the audio for this exact reason. Privacy is important.

Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]

#72

Post by blantonl »

bronco21016 wrote: post #34
aftbit wrote: post #13

> The accident airplane was required to be equipped with a CVR that retained, at minimum, the last 2 hours of audio information, including flight crew communications and other sounds inside the cockpit. >The CVR was downloaded successfully; however, it was determined that the audio from the accident flight had been overwritten. The CVR circuit breaker had not been manually deactivated after the airplane landed follow…

What’s missing from this accident investigation without the recording?

ability to somehow claim pilot error. That's what.

Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]

#73

Post by gruez »

sigwinch28 wrote: post #38
aftbit wrote: post #13

> The accident airplane was required to be equipped with a CVR that retained, at minimum, the last 2 hours of audio information, including flight crew communications and other sounds inside the cockpit. >The CVR was downloaded successfully; however, it was determined that the audio from the accident flight had been overwritten. The CVR circuit breaker had not been manually deactivated after the airplane landed follow…

The rule (edit: in Europe) is now 25 hours for aircraft over a certain weight, though it is not (currently) retroactively applied to existing equipment. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/04/2023-26...

>ACTION:

>Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

>[...]

>DATES:

>Send comments on or before February 2, 2024.

Seems like it's a proposal, and not actually enacted yet?

Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]

#76

Post by hencq »

cjbprime wrote: post #17
aftbit wrote: post #13

> The accident airplane was required to be equipped with a CVR that retained, at minimum, the last 2 hours of audio information, including flight crew communications and other sounds inside the cockpit. >The CVR was downloaded successfully; however, it was determined that the audio from the accident flight had been overwritten. The CVR circuit breaker had not been manually deactivated after the airplane landed follow…

The largest US pilots union opposes it on pilot privacy grounds. (To be clear, I think having an expectation of vocal privacy while you are in charge of an airliner is absurd.)

I think there's some validity to the privacy concerns, but it seems those could be addressed with proper access controls and rules. The recordings should only really be listened to in the aftermath of an accident, in which case, as you say, the expectation of privacy should (in my opinion) take a backseat.

Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]

#77

Post by sigwinch28 »

cjbprime wrote: post #60
sigwinch28 wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The rule (edit: in Europe) is now 25 hours for aircraft over a certain weight, though it is not (currently) retroactively applied to existing equipment. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/04/2023-26...

That document is an in-progress proposal to amend a rule, no? I think there was strong opposition to this rule before this accident flight, and the blowback from the missing data here might be strong enough to be able to get it passed anyway.

It is the rule in Europe, which is mentioned in (II)(C) in the link. I failed to link it properly.

Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]

#78

Post by pants2 »

CPLX wrote: post #23
cjbprime wrote: post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The largest US pilots union opposes it on pilot privacy grounds. (To be clear, I think having an expectation of vocal privacy while you are in charge of an airliner is absurd.)

Do you have a voice recording of you doing your entire job, every day of your life?

Well, I do have a Git repo that tracks every meaningful change and action that I've done at my job since inception.

Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]

#79

Post by lotsofpulp »

imoverclocked wrote: post #66
cjbprime wrote: post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The largest US pilots union opposes it on pilot privacy grounds. (To be clear, I think having an expectation of vocal privacy while you are in charge of an airliner is absurd.)

Well, there is the theory and then there is the reality. Theory: having less privacy makes things easier for accident investigators, post-mortem. Reality: In this case, the pilots did their job and got the plane down safely despite rapid depressurization and literally having their headsets sucked off of their heads. It is extremely unlikely to be pilot-error that a door-plug ripped off the airframe at 16,000' or that…

Your comment would only make sense if your example of reality showed the theory was flawed. However, your example of reality is unrelated to the theory, so not sure what your point is.

Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]

#80

Post by rootusrootus »

aftbit wrote: post #19

Depressurization happened around 17:12:33 PST but the aircraft continued to climb until 17:13:41 PST, and the autopilot was configured for 10k ft at 17:13:56 PST. Why did it take the pilots a full minute to begin an emergency descent after the failure? I would expect that the nature of the accident would be clear nearly immediately, at least in the need to descend the aircraft.

A minute is a long time when you're sitting at your computer. But after the sudden depressurization, I imagine the pilot is focused first on making sure he has complete control of the airplane, assessing the situation, running checklists. Besides, 10K is just barely above the normal pressurization altitude anyway, it doesn't pose an immediate risk to the passengers that justifies just nosediving towards the ground. Especially given how much air traffic is at lower altitudes that close to PDX.

Edit: Re-reading, it was more like 16K feet when it popped, 10K is what ATC assigned them when requested. Still low enough not to be a critical emergency. Some people absolutely will get altitude sickness at that level, but it's likely to be mild. Many people climb mountains much taller.

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