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The impact of the ‘long peace’ on modern military capabilities

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Re: The impact of the ‘long peace’ on modern military capabilities

#71

Its not the main point of the article, but it made me wonder if finance is the new way “war” (predatory struggle for ownership & control) is waged in today’s world

This is precisely what happened, it happened long ago though and has been the driver behind actual physical war more-so than any other factor that I can tell. I'm admittedly kind of annoying with the frequency for which I post it but I wrote a short paper that attempts to demonstrate how we got to that position over the last 12,000 years. This is the most relevant portion here from the Third Proposition: ---- "“Creat…

The end result being few big corps that own the world's governments.

Re: The impact of the ‘long peace’ on modern military capabilities

#72

> What is – quietly, because they haven’t tried to launch a major invasion recently – most militaries are probably similarly incapable of the basic tasks of industrial warfare? I once read an article that argued in the absence of war, it's impossible to tell if a doctrine or commander is good or not . Maybe you've got five officers up for promotion. One officer wants to give soldiers high-tech equipment, a heads-up d…

How do you know which conflict you're going to fight next?

Each of these commanders may be better suited to a different conflict. The commander who is competent in one conflict may be a buffoon in a different conflict.

Even winning battles doesn't necessarily set up a commander for success. If your enemy changes between conflicts (say, going from a near-peer adversary to an insurgent adversary, a-la-Gulf War 1 -> Gulf War 2, or insurgency to near-peer, a-la Russia-in-Chechnya to Russia-in-Ukraine), radically different strategy, operations, and tactics are required.

I think this goes a long way to explaining the old saying "everyone prepares to win the last war." It boils down to "this guy did good last time, he'll do good this time too" when what helped him the last time is a very specific way of thinking that is not applicable now.

TL;DR: Responding to Change over Following a Plan

Re: The impact of the ‘long peace’ on modern military capabilities

#73
post #10

A lot of cogent analysis here, but I’m surprised the author doesn’t seem to know about the economic and political forms of warfare which the US has been pursuing as a cheaper alternative to conventional war. To use Venezuela as an example, the author says no one has tried to invade it (which is actually not even true, see below) but also the US has been imposing crippling sanctions for over 15 years in an attempt to…

So, not to come off as "these are good things" or anything, but you have to be able to see that "economic warfare" is preferable to "warfare warfare", right? It would obviously be better to have neither, but if I have to pick one, I know which one I'm going to pick, and I don't think it's unreasonable to characterize a switch from traditional warfare to economic warfare as "more peaceful" or even just "peaceful".

>you have to be able to see that "economic warfare" is preferable to "warfare warfare", right?

Economic warfare can resemble the sieges of traditional warfare. Yemen was blockaded "economically" to prevent food and medical aid from entering the country. Syrians were only getting an hour of electricity per day in recent memory because of economic strictures preventing them from importing oil. It can get pretty brutal.

Re: The impact of the ‘long peace’ on modern military capabilities

#74
post #71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is precisely what happened, it happened long ago though and has been the driver behind actual physical war more-so than any other factor that I can tell. I'm admittedly kind of annoying with the frequency for which I post it but I wrote a short paper that attempts to demonstrate how we got to that position over the last 12,000 years. This is the most relevant portion here from the Third Proposition: ---- "“Creat…

The end result being few big corps that own the world's governments.

Which is exactly what we have now

Re: The impact of the ‘long peace’ on modern military capabilities

#75

> I’ve discussed this before a few times, but I think Azar Gat is probably right to suggest that the long peace is itself a consequence of the changing incentives created by the industrial revolution and to an even greater extent, by nuclear weapons. Prior to the industrial revolution, war was the best way to get rich (if you won) because land and conquered subjects were so much more valuable than any kind of capital…

Honestly another thing I didn't like about this peace was the "Russian army is weak so maybe lots of other armies are weak" idea. That's the last thing we need the chickenhawks running DC to believe

America can win any war but lose the peace. The appetite for nation building has evaporated in the US. Iraq and Afghanistan stripped the hubris.

Re: The impact of the ‘long peace’ on modern military capabilities

#76

> What is – quietly, because they haven’t tried to launch a major invasion recently – most militaries are probably similarly incapable of the basic tasks of industrial warfare? I once read an article that argued in the absence of war, it's impossible to tell if a doctrine or commander is good or not . Maybe you've got five officers up for promotion. One officer wants to give soldiers high-tech equipment, a heads-up d…

Or, in software engineering terms, it's impossible to optimize code that you can't profile.

Re: The impact of the ‘long peace’ on modern military capabilities

#77
> But because the leaders of a country like Venezuela know that, they may well try to avoid developing their country into such a weak state in the first place. Sure, bribery and corruption are fun, but only if you live long enough to use it; it’s not worth ruining the economy if the only consequence is being killed when Brazil, Colombia or the United States invades.

Interesting read but the above point is moot. History features many selfish leaders letting their kingdom, fief, colony, what have you fall into exactly that state of affairs. And when they were occupied, as often as not, the leadership was left intact so long as the tribute did flow. This is true from the ancient world up to through the 20th century.

> This is why, I’d argue, you see the proliferation of failed states globally: in the past it would be actively profitable for non-failed states to take advantage of them

Sure, there may be more independently standing "failed states" but occupation by a "more competent" power was rarely a corrective. These largely just became failed vassals. The little bit of bureaucratic support imposed by the occupier usually had the effect of depriving locals of the experience of self development and coordination and thus deepening and prolonging the crises within.

> I should note I find this version of the argument, based on incentives and interests more compelling than Steven Pinker’s version of the argument based on changing cultural mores.

> The value of the oil and other resources would be less than the cost of maintaining control of the country.

The reasons that managing such a country would be too costly now vs in the past are almost purely cultural. Treating an occupied place like a colony has diplomatic and internal consequences for the occupier (not enough in my opinion but much more than in the past). And much more importantly, the cultural inventions of nationalism and total insurgent warfare have made it much harder to maintain an occupation. Yes, there were insurgencies in the past but the cultural expectation that hundreds of thousands or even millions of people will live in craters, subsist on worms and rats, forgoe medicine, endure exposure, hunger, pain and trauma for years or decades or even generations to guarantee self rule.

The cultural invention of nationalistic mass resistance depends on technological innovations. You need modern small arms and explosives to make every cell of 20 or so fighters a threat which can't be ignored by an occupier. You need modern communication to coordinate these cells.

And of course the value of this cultural invention is in its ubiquity. So you need an era of sentimental propaganda that depends on modern mass media to disseminate it.

Ultimately technology and culture are not separate things. They shape each other as they develop and sometimes they are one in the same.

Re: The impact of the ‘long peace’ on modern military capabilities

#78

One of the less spoken but potentially significant reasons for Russia's invasion is that Putin felt the nuclear tables were about to turn with M.A.D. when the U.S. restarted Strategic Defense Initiative development. https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Defense_Initiative

UCS statement on the establishment of the Space Force and attendant risks of a new arms race (2018):

https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/space-based-missile-defense...

Re: The impact of the ‘long peace’ on modern military capabilities

#79

> What is – quietly, because they haven’t tried to launch a major invasion recently – most militaries are probably similarly incapable of the basic tasks of industrial warfare? I once read an article that argued in the absence of war, it's impossible to tell if a doctrine or commander is good or not . Maybe you've got five officers up for promotion. One officer wants to give soldiers high-tech equipment, a heads-up d…

It doesn't matter in the military. People aren't machines. And when you throw them into high stress, chaotic, unpredictable environments, the expections of performance arent like what you see in the movies.

Re: The impact of the ‘long peace’ on modern military capabilities

#80

> What is – quietly, because they haven’t tried to launch a major invasion recently – most militaries are probably similarly incapable of the basic tasks of industrial warfare? I once read an article that argued in the absence of war, it's impossible to tell if a doctrine or commander is good or not . Maybe you've got five officers up for promotion. One officer wants to give soldiers high-tech equipment, a heads-up d…

> I once read an article that argued in the absence of war, it's impossible to tell if a doctrine or commander is good or not.

I would argue even more drastically that, a commander or doctrine is only as good as the war they are in. I mean that every conflict has the capacity of developing so differently that even a tested commander or strategy is suspect. Historically, conflict during a period was more homogenous. Having a war every 5 to 10 years would keep your officer corps relatively relevant. Only in large empires with a huge variety of martial interests would we see commanders succeed wildly in one engagement and utterly fail in another.

But modern wars swing suddenly from guerilla, to conventional, to insurgent, to cold with such rapidity that command experience is profoundly difficult to rely on as a predictor of success.

Probably the wisest way to promote in a modern military is to use all your standard expectations in peacetime. Who is organized, dutiful, etc. But maintain the knowledge that once shit hits the fan, you will be moving people around based largely on success. Which is what happens in real full blown conflicts. France in WWI is a good example.

The much harder question is how do you measure performance in non-conventional wars?

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