Earlier quoted context omitted.
But if they have the decrypted secrets, do they really need the key?
The Vault will not prevent someone who has login access to your database and the right grants (or superuser) from decrypting the data. If someone is in this position they are fully compromised and the Vault is not protection against that (nor is anything else really). In particular if an attacker has a postgres superuser login they can essentially asct as the OS process owner, and could possibly get around the proces…
I understand the point of the database client having access to to the database key and not the key to the secret vault. So in this case other secrets at the vault are essentially protected. But let's say I really have this one secret to protect in which case is the vault fairly pointless?
Is it essentially that if a client using KeyX for some purpose than a compromise of said client will essentially lead to KeyX and there's really no way to protect it?