I keep TOTP in my password manager, but my password manager is encrypted with a hardware key, a PIN code, and even getting the encrypted files depends on getting into my private git server. I also only use TOTP on sites that don't support u2f/fido/webauthn or implement it badly (like amazon that only allows a single key).
What happens if you lose the hardware key? Is there a recovery mechanism?
I have multiple, both for that scenario and for different computers. I also have a USB stick with the root key for issuing new keys if all my hardware keys break.
Short answer: Password managers offer this funcionality because there is a demand for it. Long answer: In practice, TOTP schemes are used (from a webadmin point of view) just to stop credential stuffing attacks [1]. There is very little additional security in generating TOTPs on a dedicated device, such as a smartphone, compared to generating them on the password manager itself. Threat models in which a separate setu…
I am not an expert, but "Threat models in which a separate setup would have a benefit include only breaches of your password database itself." doesnt this mean that there is a big difference if the attack vector is by a keylogger? (Which can sniff the Database pw). Are keyloggers not a common thing for threats (I dont know)?
Not sure how common it is but if the endpoint is compromised to the point of having a keylogger installed then it's basically already game over.
Short answer: Password managers offer this funcionality because there is a demand for it. Long answer: In practice, TOTP schemes are used (from a webadmin point of view) just to stop credential stuffing attacks [1]. There is very little additional security in generating TOTPs on a dedicated device, such as a smartphone, compared to generating them on the password manager itself. Threat models in which a separate setu…
I am not an expert, but "Threat models in which a separate setup would have a benefit include only breaches of your password database itself." doesnt this mean that there is a big difference if the attack vector is by a keylogger? (Which can sniff the Database pw). Are keyloggers not a common thing for threats (I dont know)?
If the key logger is in a peripheral then the TOTP/password manager can still protect from replay attacks. If the key logger is on the computer then it has access to the password vault and the vault secret.
It usually doesn't except when your threat model includes a scenario where physical compartmentalization is supposed to prevent giving up the secret under duress (you don't carry the out of band device with you to wherever you go). But in that case you're better off being able to plausibly deny the existence of that secret (or the communication channel) in the first place.
TOTPs are also a defense against phishing leading to persistence. You can't phish someone and then lock them out of their account by changing their login details. Other second factors (like ubi-key) are better against phishing because they are cryptographically linked to the domain. This does require some form of challenge-response.
I disagree on phishing protection. In the best case the phisher has 30 seconds to login, and then has enough time to change the login details.
95% of the security of TOTP stuff is that users have no freedom in implementing it and thus cant mess it up. There is no equivalent of having "hunter2" as your password when the user doesn't choose the secret. They cant reuse secrets across sites if they dont choose secrets. Every other realistic threat is not helped by TOTP. There is some threats that in theory TOTP can help with, but dont given how it is used on th…
But then users store these passwords on a sticky note attached to their display device…
Side question: why is nobody losing their minds over the fact that almost all other MFA actions rely on your phone, which almost always has access to critical services (banking, work mail, personal mail, possibly ssh, etc). I’m more concerned about losing my Device as many MFA tokens are not backed up in apple ecosystem. The architecture is flawed for conveniences sake.
This is really annoying with employers who assume they can use your personal phone as part of their MFA fig leaf.
Especially when it isn't plain TOTP but some custom app.
Actually interestingly point number one probably holds true, since very few GUI password managers actually document their threat model at all and actually evaluate their design decisions accordingly. E.g. typical browser extensions if used with no additional confirmation allow easy local exfiltration of passwords. Particularly if actual user input on each request is needed TOTP would provide additional benefits (simi…
Depending on your perspective, a password manager with autofill could actually be more secure. If password managers autofill or suggest accounts based on matching domain , then you're insulated from phishing attacks due to not validating the domain. If you always copy-paste your credentials, you are relying on your own perfect vigilance in checking the domain when pasting the password for the intended site into the a…
I think that auto-suggest, meaning the password manager only suggests a password, but you need to actively click on the suggestion in order for the password to be entered, would satisfy both requirements: mitigate phishing and exfiltration. This is the default for 1password.
Worth noting that a lot of services now force MFA even if the user doesn’t consider it important enough to warrant it (MFA is always a trade off between security on one side, and convenience and the risk of losing access entirely on the other hand)
Putting a TOTP code in a password manager is in many was a way of turning off MFA for services that don’t let you do this.