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Serious flaws in the way Samsung phones encrypt key material in TrustZone

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Re: Serious flaws in the way Samsung phones encrypt key material in TrustZone

#71
post #70

Don't buy phones from Samsung. They're the worst. They've been #1 on https://dontkillmyapp.com/ for a while now.

As someone who has been enjoying 3-5 day battery life, i am fine with Samsung killing background apps. And they have a system for whitelisting apps.

Also, totally not relevant to the article.

Re: Serious flaws in the way Samsung phones encrypt key material in TrustZone

#72
post #70

Don't buy phones from Samsung. They're the worst. They've been #1 on https://dontkillmyapp.com/ for a while now.

There are around 1000 other factors in buying phones, mostly much more important to most users. I get it when ie developers are frustrated by inconsistent behavior across phones, but for example I prefer longer battery life compared to something that still runs in the background because I used it few hours ago.

Re: Serious flaws in the way Samsung phones encrypt key material in TrustZone

#73

I am pretty surprised how they allowed reusing IV. Unique IV is explicitly mentioned to be an assumption for AES GCM (first sentence in security section of AES-GCM wikipedia page) How could anyone design TA (i.e application whose whole point is security and hence it runs in the secure mode) and allow user to set IV in the API?

My experience is the odds are greater than 50% that people designing a system do the wrong thing with the I.V.'s.

The NSA gave up on back doors, limiting the key size, etc. because people are too stupid to manage keys correctly.

Re: Serious flaws in the way Samsung phones encrypt key material in TrustZone

#74
post #70

Don't buy phones from Samsung. They're the worst. They've been #1 on https://dontkillmyapp.com/ for a while now.

Is there also a dontkillmybattery website listing poorly designed apps that leach my data and energy? Because it's very easy to whitelist the good ones on a Samsung device.

Re: Serious flaws in the way Samsung phones encrypt key material in TrustZone

#75
post #2

I used a Samsung phone for a few months, it gave me the strong impression that they really don't know how to develop software properly.

I don't know. Their UX team is infinitely superior to Google's. Didn't always used to be the case.

Re: Serious flaws in the way Samsung phones encrypt key material in TrustZone

#76
post #60

I am pretty surprised how they allowed reusing IV. Unique IV is explicitly mentioned to be an assumption for AES GCM (first sentence in security section of AES-GCM wikipedia page) How could anyone design TA (i.e application whose whole point is security and hence it runs in the secure mode) and allow user to set IV in the API?

> How could anyone design TA (i.e application whose whole point is security and hence it runs in the secure mode) and allow user to set IV in the API? I mean... TLS did the same (in 1.2, it was fixed in 1.3). I co-authored a paper about it: https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot16/workshop-program/pr...

Thanks for the pointer to your interesting paper.

My understanding is that TLS spec did not enforce non-repeating nonce, only suggested it and left it to implementers to decide which led to the vulnerabilities you explored.

This Samsung one here is in a way similar - the TEE API had a way for users of the API to set IV which it should not, TA should make sure the IV is not repeated.

Since you have done prior research in this area, is using a counter for IV still recommended even when IV is 12 byte? I assume chances of HW random number generator (which I assume exists on most phones today) colliding for 12 byte random number generation would be pretty low.

Re: Serious flaws in the way Samsung phones encrypt key material in TrustZone

#77
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have two new LG TVs, never connected them to the internet. I do all my media consumption via a ATV and rpi

My new Sony TV wouldn't allow me to do anything without connecting it to the internet during initial setup. I just wanted to use it as a dumb screen to show HDMI signal. But even that wouldn't work without initially connecting it to the internet. I haven't connected it to the internet since and so far it hasn't stopped working, but I wouldn't be too surprised if it does as some point and forces me to reconnect and up…

I find it hard to believe there wasn't a work around for your tv to be set up without Internet.

For example the Sony web site doesn't seem to support what you are saying

https://www.sony-asia.com/electronics/support/articles/00113...

I set up my grandmothers sony tv last year without Internet.

Re: Serious flaws in the way Samsung phones encrypt key material in TrustZone

#78

Earlier quoted context omitted.

LG does the same. I bought good OLED and still, I had to connect pihole to block ads... New LG's are even worse. I don't know what I do if my current TV will stop working. I want only display, I don't want any additional features (ads, personalization etc.).

TCL and many other manufacturers use Roku For their OS. I’m on my second tv with it, and have never connected either to the internet, without any issues. That’s what you want.

Sencor used to offer big (as large as 58'') TVs, some of them even dumb as bricks

I'd argue this is what parent wants instead...

Re: Serious flaws in the way Samsung phones encrypt key material in TrustZone

#79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My new Sony TV wouldn't allow me to do anything without connecting it to the internet during initial setup. I just wanted to use it as a dumb screen to show HDMI signal. But even that wouldn't work without initially connecting it to the internet. I haven't connected it to the internet since and so far it hasn't stopped working, but I wouldn't be too surprised if it does as some point and forces me to reconnect and up…

I find it hard to believe there wasn't a work around for your tv to be set up without Internet. For example the Sony web site doesn't seem to support what you are saying https://www.sony-asia.com/electronics/support/articles/00113... I set up my grandmothers sony tv last year without Internet.

I was trying to avoid it. I am tech savvy. I could not find a workaround. There was no way, at least none I could find despite my efforts, to skip the screen requiring you to connect without connecting.

Re: Serious flaws in the way Samsung phones encrypt key material in TrustZone

#80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'd say this is more in-line with Intel SGX than Intel ME.

SGX is implemented on top of ME and relies on it for a substantial fraction of its functionality. You are right though that trustzone and sgx are both TEEs.

I wish especially AMD would offer Java Card support through their PSP to the operating system, at least if the PSP is resistant to MMIO attacks on the integrity of the Java Card memory.

Being able to open a Diffie-Hellman encrypted, mutual-signature-authenticated channel to a remote device to then receive an AES key for disk encryption is far better than some TPM header that can easily be sniffed with physical access.

Would be even better if NVMe SSDs were able to authenticate themselves and let you transfer in a key over a DIffie-Hellman channel so sniffing the PCIe bus wouldn't deliver the key (or a non-PFS-encrypted encapsulated form of it) to an attacker. The speeds of NVMe SSDs unfortunately prevent LUKS from being cheap, and TCG Opal is kind of a joke from a security standpoint (doesn't even (seem to) specify that the provided "password" is used to derive a key, suggesting that it may just be used via a password hash to compare against a database entry to decide whether to unlock a disk encryption key).

Even TPMs don't seem to encrypt the communications channel they use with the CPU/PSP, and they are often socketed which makes MITM attacks easy with physical access. If they'd offer Java Card, they'd at least be somewhat useful...

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